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In this dissertation, I study the effects of Seguro Integral de Salud (SIS), a publicly-
operated health insurance program in Peru that provides healthcare coverage to poor and 
vulnerable individuals and complements the subsidies already existing through the 
nationwide network of public healthcare providers.  First, I estimate SIS' effect on 
healthcare utilization.  I find that SIS has had a positive impact on healthcare utilization, 
especially preventive care, while some implementation problems are likely to be the cause 
of an estimated negative effect on obtaining corrective lenses.  I also find that SIS effect is 
smaller among poor enrollees, likely because the program is unable to help its enrollees to 
overcome other barriers to access healthcare (e.g., geographical barriers).  In addition, I 
find some negative effects on people’s out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures, especially 
for some types of preventive care.  SIS’ debt to providers is likely the reason why it had a 
positive effect on “other services.”  Lastly, I find no evidence of an effect of SIS coverage 
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Chapter 1  





Many countries around the world have achieved or are on their way to reaching universal 
healthcare coverage.  Almost everyone in the developed world has some form of health 
insurance or healthcare coverage to protect them from the financial risks associated with 
their health, and in recent years many developing countries have moved towards universal 
healthcare coverage by implementing government–operated health insurance programs.  In 
September, 2015, 267 economists from 44 countries, including Nobel laureates, signed a 
declaration calling on policy makers throughout the world to “prioritize a pro–poor 
pathway to universal health coverage as an essential pillar of sustainable development.”1  
Health insurance has proven to be a very attractive policy all over the world. 
This trend towards universal coverage is taking place despite inconclusive 
evidence, mostly from developed countries, on the effects of health insurance.  For 
example, Brook, et al. (1983) found that the extra healthcare gained from having a better 
insurance coverage did not have an effect on people’s health in the U.S.  On the other hand, 
increasing the number of people enrolled in Medicaid reduces children’s mortality by 34% 
(Currie and Gruber, 1996).  If healthcare obtained through insurance is ineffective, the case 
for a better use of resources to improve healthcare could be argued.  But if it is cost-
effective, then the extension of health insurance should be promoted.  In either case, 
governments are making these policy decisions with little or no evidence. 
                                                 




One case that exemplifies this lack of evidence in decision making is the Seguro 
Integral de Salud (SIS) in Peru.  Implemented in 2002, this program was the National 
government’s response to strong economic barriers to obtaining healthcare (47% of the 
population that required healthcare did not obtain it due to economic reasons in 2000; 
Madueño, et al., 2003, p. 95) that coexisted with high levels of idle capacity among public 
providers (40-53% among providers of outpatient services in 1999; Madueño, et al., 2003, 
p. 194).  With the objective of reducing the economic barriers that “vulnerable people”2 
face when in need of healthcare, but without any formal studies providing technical, 
objective support for an extension, SIS has progressively increased its number of enrollees.  
By December, 2019, it enrolled 47.9% of Peru’s population.3 
Considering that the program is the main mechanism to achieve universal coverage 
in Peru,4 that it absorbs significant public resources, and that in 2019 22.4% of the 
population is still uninsured, the main goal of my research is to estimate causal relations 
between SIS and three outcomes of importance: healthcare utilization, household 
healthcare expenditures, and health outcomes. 
As previously stated, the main objective of SIS is to increase the use of needed 
healthcare services, especially among the poor.  Thus, Chapter 2 will focus on estimating 
the magnitude of this relationship for the specific case of SIS, i.e., the extent to which SIS 
                                                 
2 Though vaguely defined, this is the legal term for the program’s target population.  Most of the time, it is 
understood that “vulnerable people” refers to the population under the poverty line, though sometimes it 
refers to specific groups with a higher probability of needing care (such as pregnant women and children 
under five). 
3 The 2019 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO) reports that only 47.9% of its sample is enrolled in 
SIS. However, official records report 20 million enrollees, which is closer to two thirds of the population. 
4 In 2009, a law was passed that declared Universal Coverage as a national goal.  Although a considerable 
percentage of the population is still uninsured, the rate of health insurance coverage has increased 
significantly since this law passed, almost exclusively through expansions of SIS enrollment. 
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has achieved its goal of providing healthcare services to the poor and vulnerable 
propulation.  Chapter 2 will also study the equity effects of this program; SIS was designed 
to improve access to healthcare among the poor, but not all poor are enrolled,5 and high 
rates of leakage to the non-poor have been observed since the early stages of the program’s 
implementation until 2009, when Universal Healthcare Coverage was declared to allow 
participation by certain groups of the population regardless of their poverty level. 
Healthcare is one of the few categories of consumption that can impoverish 
families, and this is one of the main reasons for the spread of health insurance in the world.  
One of the core objectives of health insurance is to provide some degree of protection 
against the financial risk associated with poor health.  This relationship is explored in 
Chapter 3.  Does enrollment in SIS reduce the possibility that households spend a high 
portion of their income on healthcare?  The direction of the relationship between health 
insurance and healthcare expenditure is not as clear as the relationship studied in Chapter 
2.  It may be that, by enrolling in SIS, people gain coverage and their disposable income 
(net of expenditures on healthcare) increases as this coverage reduces the price of 
healthcare.  But it may also be the case that, as people enroll, the lower price leads them to 
seek more care, sometimes not covered by the program, which offsets the initial price 
reduction and decreases their disposable income. 
Ultimately, health insurance should improve health, to the extent that it facilitates 
access to healthcare services that have a positive effect on health.  However, the empirical 
literature is still inconclusive about this relationship.  And that leads to the main objective 
                                                 
5 The percentage of poor people who are not enrolled in SIS has decreased over time, especially after 2009. 
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of Chapter 4: estimating the relationship between health insurance and health.  I will focus 
on children’s health and evaluate the effect of SIS in short-term illnesses and symptoms 
(e.g., diarrhea and acute respiratory infections), and children’s malnutrition as a proxy to 
long-term health. 
This dissertation will fill some of the gaps in the empirical literature, which are 
especially large among developing countries, and will provide useful information for the 
design of future expansions of SIS.  It will also provide evidence that policy makers and 
health officials in Peru can use to adjust the program and increase its effectiveness in 
reducing inequality.  Finally, my results will provide key information to the current debate 
about universal coverage in Peru, since the effects of health insurance on healthcare 
utilization, financial protection, and health are decisive factors in this debate. 
The remaining sections in this chapter provide some background information: a 
brief history of health insurance in Peru, and a description of some relevant components of 
the program. 
1.2. Health Insurance in Peru 
As with most health systems, the one in Peru is highly complex. With different insurance 
programs, each with their own provider apparatus, their own revenue sources and financial 
channels, and with little interaction between these healthcare stakeholders, a patient can 
have different experiences depending on which sub-system they is tied to.  However, the 
two main insurers, SIS (61.7% of the population with insurance coverage in 2019) and the 
Social Health Insurance (34.5% of the population with coverage), are operated by the 
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government.  Each one of these two institutions funds and operates an exclusive network 
of providers.  SIS works almost exclusively with the different networks from the Ministry 
of Health (MOH) and the regional governments.  The Social Health Insurance system is a 
public institution that administers the mandated contributions made on behalf of their 
enrollees6 and provides them with healthcare through its own network of providers.  These 
two main institutions coexist along with several private insurance plans and providers, who 
capture a small and decreasing portion of the market (3.9% of the population with 
coverage). 
When SIS was implemented in 2002, the health system already had some major 
insurers, including the Social Health Insurance, which has been operating since 1936.  In 
this section, I provide a brief review of the history of health insurance in Peru. 
1.2.1. The Social Health Insurance 
The first major health insurance scheme that was implemented in Peru was the Caja 
Nacional del Seguro Social del Obrero in 1936, which targeted a very specific group of 
unionized employees.  Twelve years later, in response to demands from another union, the 
government created the Caja del Seguro Social del Empleado.  These two organizations 
had similar objectives: to provide outpatient and inpatient care when needed due to illness, 
pregnancy, injury, or disability; monetary subsidies due to illness, pregnancy, maternal 
leave, and death; and pensions due to disability or retirement. 
                                                 
6 Enrollment is restricted to people who are formally employed, which limits the number of enrollees, 
especially given Peru’s high rate of informal employment. 
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Between the 1970s and 1990s, Peru’s Social Health Insurance underwent major 
changes.  First, the Caja Nacional del Seguro Social del Obrero and the Caja del Seguro 
Social del Empleado were merged in 1973 to become the new Social Health Insurance, 
which was modeled after other similar programs in Latin America.  Second, in the 1980s 
there was a series of adjustments to the size of the premium paid by employers, which has 
always taken the form of a percentage of the employee’s paycheck. Third, the pension and 
health insurance systems were separated in 1992 and the latter was branded as EsSalud.  
Fourth, in 1997 private companies were allowed to enter the Social Health Insurance 
market to supplement EsSalud, the government’s health insurance, and to provide 
preventive and ambulatory recovery care to those groups that decided to form their own 
pools.7 
EsSalud is financed by a premium equivalent to 9% of most enrollees’ paychecks; 
78% of EsSalud enrollees pay this contribution and the other 22% pay a discounted 
premium.8  This contribution is mandated for everyone who is formally employed and it 
provides health insurance for the employee and his or her family.  EsSalud offers a 
comprehensive plan that includes prevention, promotion, recovery, and rehabilitation, 
along with regular curative health services and even economic and social benefits.9  This 
plan is offered through a network of clinics and hospitals that EsSalud operates. 
                                                 
7 Employees of every company can choose to have their ambulatory care be administered by private insurers.  
These private companies would receive half the premium paid to EsSalud but would receive an additional 
payment if they estimate a higher premium based on the specific pool of employees. 
8 This contribution is smaller (4-6%) for some groups: retirees, farmers, fishers, and home workers. 
9 These social benefits are mainly disability payments for enrollees when they are on a leave due to an illness 
that has lasted over 30 days. 
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The main challenge that the Social Health Insurance faces is how to expand 
coverage more widely in Peru given the structure of Peru’s labor market, which has a high 
level of informality, a situation that is beyond the control of the health sector. 
1.2.2. Subsidized Healthcare 
The Ministry of Health (MOH) was created in 1935 as an attempt to organize, modernize, 
and improve the provision of health services by public facilities.10  These facilities, 
organized in territorial networks of clinics and hospitals affiliated with the MOH, were 
funded by taxes and out–of–pocket payments made by patients.  However, in 2002 Peru 
began to decentralize its government, and these networks were included in that process; 
they were transferred to the departmental governments, with the sole exception being the 
National Research Hospitals and the healthcare network in the Metropolitan area of Lima. 
The primary objective of these networks has always been to provide comprehensive 
care to everyone, regardless of their insurance status.11  Since they receive tax revenue to 
fund their operations (31% of all health expenditure was funded out of general tax revenue 
in 2005; MINSA and CIES, 2008), fees in these facilities were subsidized regardless of the 
socioeconomic status of the patient.  However, this was a system of subsidies, not of 
insurance, until two pilot insurance programs (predecessors of SIS) were implemented. 
                                                 
10 Originally, the Ministry was in charge of public health, labor, and public assistance issues.  In 1942 and 
1968 this Ministry transferred its responsibilities on labor and public assistance matters, respectively, to other 
ministries. 
11 In fact, if an insured person seeks care in one of these facilities, they would be responsible for full payment 
of the fees as the MOH does not charge insurers for the care of their enrollees. 
9 
 
1.2.3. Health Insurance Pilot Programs 
In 1997 and 1998, the MOH established health insurance programs that sought to expand 
coverage and healthcare use through the demand for these services.  The first of such pilot 
programs was the Seguro Escolar Gratuito, which targeted children in public schools and 
pre-schools between the ages of 3 and 17 years.  Although it was mainly a program created 
to increase the popularity (and votes) of the administration at the time, it was founded on 
the basis that there was idle capacity in public clinics and hospitals.  Thus, in theory, it was 
a demand subsidy to increase healthcare use among a targeted population. 
One year after the creation of the Seguro Escolar Gratuito, and under the advocacy 
and funding of the World Bank and the Inter–American Development Bank, the Mother 
and Child Insurance program was implemented.  This program targeted pregnant women 
living in pilot districts classified as poor.  It provided coverage to women throughout the 
pregnancy and postpartum, as well as coverage to the child until they turned 5 years old.  
The program’s goal was to reduce the high rates of maternal and infant mortality in Peru. 
One of the main differences between these two programs was that whereas the 
Seguro Escolar Gratuito was implemented nationwide, the Mother and Child program 
operated in pilot areas of the country determined mainly by a targeting criteria based on 
geographic and socioeconomic barriers to care.  This difference was the main reason why 
some initial analysts deemed the Seguro Escolar Gratuito to be a program concentrated in 
urban, middle class areas, whereas the Mother and Child program was considered as a 
poverty alleviation and reduction program.  Later, this criterion for the implementation of 
the Mother and child program was used for the implementation of SIS. 
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1.2.4. Universal Coverage 
In April 9th, 2009, the Framework Law declaring Universal Health Insurance Coverage in 
Peru was passed.  This marked a milestone for the Peruvian healthcare system as it implied 
a major reform that would change the structure of this system.  Although this Framework 
Law did not establish specific enrollment goals, nor did it have a timeline (or a plan) to 
establish when universality was to be achieved, it did give a start to this reform and defined 
the general terms and principles that should guide the process. 
One of the principles that this Framework Law established was that coverage 
expansion should be implemented progressively.  Despite previous efforts to increase 
health insurance coverage, mainly implemented through SIS, still almost half the 
population was uninsured.12  Given that reaching universality would imply a significant 
fiscal effort by the government, employers, and families, it was not realistic to declare that 
universality would be accomplished in the short term. 
This Framework Law also defined three regimes that categorized enrollees and 
administrators of health insurance (IAFAS for the acronym in Spanish).  The subsidized 
regime was targeted to people living in poverty.  This regime, which includes a significant 
percentage of the population, provides a full premium subsidy and is assigned exclusively 
to SIS.  The second regime, or semi-contributory regime, has a partial subsidy and was 
created to enroll middle income families with unstable jobs or working in small-sized 
companies.  The Law does not define which IAFAS should administer this regime, 
although at the time the Law was passed only SIS offered plans that were partially 
                                                 
12 In 2008 the rate of uninsurance in Peru was approximately 47%. 
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subsidized with public funds.  Finally, the third regime, the contributory regime, includes 
all plans with premiums fully paid by private agents: either employers or families.  The 
main IAFAS in this regime is EsSalud, since it administers the Social Health Insurance 
program, which is funded by employers.  Also, some private insurance companies offer 
group (although for small pools) and individual plans, but they cover only about 4% of the 
population. 
As stated above, SIS currently administers two regimes: fully and partially 
subsidized.  Although affiliated with the MOH, SIS has some level of (budgetary and 
operational) independence.  Its main function is to administer the funds used to finance 
individual health benefits of Peruvians who do not have health insurance and meet the 
eligibility characteristic: the vulnerable population living in poverty. 
1.3. The Seguro Integral de Salud (SIS) 
Increasing health insurance coverage among the poor is one of the most important policies 
implemented in the last 20 years in Peru, and the only reform initiative during that time in 
its healthcare system.  This reform began when SIS was implemented in 2002 and reached 
a major milestone when Universal Coverage was declared in 2009.  In fact, SIS is the main 
(and, in practice, the only) strategy that Peru has to achieve universal health insurance 
coverage. 
SIS was implemented in 2002 by merging the two pilot programs described 
previously, the Seguro Escolar Gratuito and the Mother and Child program.  The newly 
created SIS expanded coverage to all children of school age, without requiring enrollment 
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in a public school, all pregnant or postpartum women, and all children under 5 years of 
age, with no geographical restriction.  Although SIS did not define a clear qualifying rule, 
the program’s benefits were meant to reach low-income, vulnerable people only. 
SIS was designed as a mechanism for public insurance that fully subsidizes and 
facilitates access to health insurance among the poor.  It is a publicly funded health 
insurance program that operates at the national level.  It finances the costs of most 
healthcare procedures, prescription drugs, and other complementary services through a 
nationwide network of publicly managed providers to treat most health conditions, though 
recently it started funding services provided by other networks.  A SIS enrollee is entitled 
to receive free healthcare, with no copay or deductible, whereas an uninsured person would 
still have to make (subsidized) out–of–pocket payments to obtain the same care.  There is 
a trivial fee that an enrollee has to pay when applying to join the program, equivalent to 
$0.3, but this fee can be waived and it is seldom paid by an enrollee. 
SIS has four main objectives: i) increase access to healthcare; ii) target healthcare 
toward the poor and vulnerable; iii) improve the allocation of public resources; and iv) 
increase investment in public facilities. Yet, in practice, almost all its efforts focus on the 
first two. 
1.3.1. Beneficiaries 
The poor are the main population that SIS targets.  From 2002 to 2006, SIS operated under 
five different plans that categorized enrollees based on their demographic characteristics.  
The two prioritized plans were for pregnant women and children under 5 years of age.  
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Other plans covered children between 5 and 17 years of age, adults, and people 
experiencing emergencies. 
Also, using the geographical targeting criterion from the Mother and Child 
program, SIS began its operations by prioritizing seven departments.  Based on high rates 
of socioeconomic and geographic barriers, a more aggressive enrollment was originally 
planned in Apurimac, Ayacucho, Bagua, Cusco, Huancavelica, Huanuco, and Puno.  These 
departments were the poorest at the time and faced significant geographic barriers, in terms 
of the average distance to the nearest health clinic. 
These two priorities, to pregnant women and children and to seven departments in 
the country, were changed in 2006, the first change in administration after the program’s 
implementation in 2002.  This led to other plans, especially the plans for children between 
5 and 17 years of age and for adults, which started accounting for a greater proportion of 
SIS budget.  Similarly, resources began to be allocated to wealthier, urban departments.  In 
addition, SIS began offering basic health plans to working adults who were not eligible for 
partially subsidized plans.  These plans targeted informal workers and offered coverage 
under a reduced premium. 
1.3.2. Cost sharing and network 
Government providers, which are grouped into networks of clinics and hospitals, are where 
SIS enrollees obtain care.  This web of networks is mainly funded by: (i) budget allocations 
made by departmental governments and the MOH; and (ii) out-of-pocket payments made 
by patients (or by SIS on their behalf through a previously determined fee schedule).  The 
departmental governments and MOH finance the “fixed costs” of healthcare: salaries, 
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equipment, new infrastructure, and maintenance;13 whereas the patient (or SIS) is 
responsible for the “variable costs” incurred by providing care to SIS beneficiaries, such 
as drugs, hospital supplies, tests, and exams.  This has been the situation for decades, and 
having to make out-of-pocket expenditures has been a significant barrier for the poor.  
Despite having explored other payment mechanisms, SIS has not changed this structure, 
which was originally designed to reimburse providers using fee-for-service payments and 
simply replaced the source of funding for its enrollees.14 
1.3.3. Targeting 
At its implementation, SIS did not have a strategy to target its beneficiaries; there was no 
tool or algorithm used to determine people’s eligibility.  SIS used a general application 
form that provided basic data on the family’s assets, but these data were not used to 
determine eligibility.  The only piece of information SIS used was the applicant’s report of 
enrollment in EsSalud and later the dataset of enrollees was cross-checked with EsSalud 
dataset to eliminate people enrolled in both programs. 
The closest to a targeting strategy that SIS had at the time was a set of enrollment 
goals defined by SIS and followed by the departmental health directorates.  These goals 
were determined for four out of five of the health plans that the program offered: children 
aged 0-5, children aged 6-17, pregnant women, and other adults.  Since enrollment in the 
program was mainly through the network of government-run healthcare providers, SIS 
                                                 
13 Since these funds are allocated through their budgets, in practice any healthcare provided in these facilities 
is subsidized regardless of enrollment status.  In other words, anyone seeking care through a provider 
affiliated with the government will receive subsidized healthcare. 
14 SIS has tested other methods, and recently implemented a capitation payment, although it does not affect 
the period of analysis of this study. 
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published these goals to promote a planned expansion of the program.  Although these 
goals did not respond to the specific characteristics of the applicants, they were established 
taking into account geographical concentrations of poverty throughout Peru. 
The two pilot programs that preceded SIS provided a base of enrollees, so that since 
its creation SIS had millions of beneficiaries.  However, there was a fundamental difference 
between enrollment for these two pilots and SIS.  Seguro Escolar Gratuito was the program 
with most enrollees.  This program was implemented nationwide and it enrolled 
automatically all students in public schools, following an opt-out enrollment process.  In 
contrast, the Mother and Child program had an opt-in enrollment strategy, and it was 
implemented only in seven departments: Apurimac, Ayacucho, Cusco, Huancavelica, 
Huanuco, and Puno, and in the network of Bagua, from the Amazonas department. 
SIS followed the Mother and Child program’s enrollment strategy but did not limit 
its beneficiaries to these seven departments since it was a nationwide program.  Building 
on the Mother and Child program, SIS started stronger in these seven localities and that 
meant that the enrollment goals were higher in these departments.  These goals were 
revised periodically and were made in consultation with the Ministry of Health and local 
governments throughout Peru.  In practice, this meant that after the first year, these goals 
increased steadily at a similar rate in all departments. 
After Peru’s administration changed in July of 2006, SIS stopped establishing these 
enrollment goals.  I use these enrollment goals as my the main identification strategy for 
the estimation of the effect of health insurance, which will be explained in detail in the 
methodology section of Chapter 2. 
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Three years after SIS was implemented, a socioeconomic assessment of all 
enrollees’ households was introduced as a filter to determine program eligibility.  Despite 
not being mandatory, this assessment was based on the use of a Socio-Economic 
Assessment Form (FESE for its acronym in Spanish), which collects data on the applicant’s 
household’s assets. 
This form was the precursor of the Household Targeting System (SISFOH for its 
acronym in Spanish), which is an algorithm that uses information on a household’s assets 
to approximate the household’s wealth.  The experience through the application of the 
FESE allowed government officials to test and improve the algorithm used to estimate this 
index.  The office responsible for this tool, the Targeting Office of the Ministry of 
Development and Social Inclusion, standardized this tool as an effort from the national 
government to homogenize different eligibility criteria for all its social programs and 
establish a National Targeting System for public programs.  This office tested the algorithm 
in the capital city, Metropolitan Lima, in 2011.  In 2012, this tool was rolled out nationwide 
and it was used as part of the eligibility rules for all social programs from the national 
government.  In 2013, this algorithm was first modified and has since been updated in 
several occasions. 
With the intention to prevent social programs applicants from adjusting the 
information they provide with hopes of improving their chances of qualifying for social 
programs, the government has not disseminated the algorithms and the thresholds used to 




As mentioned above, initially SIS assigned enrollment goals to all public provider 
networks, which then enrolled people through two main mechanisms: recruitment or 
accepting applications.  When in an expansion stage, or when a specific network is falling 
behind in its goal, public providers enrolled people through campaigns they conducted with 
communities, such as immunization campaigns.  This way, they could reach people who 
would not regularly visit their facilities. 
The most common way in which SIS has always enrolled beneficiaries is when 
people seek care through public providers.  When people visit a public provider, a social 
worker offers them the possibility to enroll in SIS.  The application process is basically 
going through a socioeconomic assessment, the SISFOH is currently applied, and one can 
even get coverage right away and avoid payment for the care they originally were seeking.  
This introduces a bias when using regular estimation methods to assess the effect of SIS 
on healthcare utilization, financial protection, and health.  This mechanism of enrollment 
implies that people obtain coverage when they need care, which introduces a problem of 
selection; assessing the effect of health insurance on healthcare utilization, and the other 
outcomes, one hypothesizes that getting coverage would increase the use of care, but in 
this case one also observes that the use of care is what facilitates the decision of enrolling.  
Thus, some specific econometric methods will be required to isolate the selection bias 
introduced by this latter relationship as I am interested only in the effect of enrollment in 
SIS on healthcare utilization, financial protection, and health.  One approach is to use the 
enrollment goals for each provider network as an instrumental variable, since these goals 
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should affect the probability that an individual is enrolled but not their decision to seek 
healthcare (except through the individual’s insurance status). 
1.3.5. Coverage expansions 
SIS coverage has been steadily extended since its implementation.  Out of Peru’s total 
population of over 28 million people, by the end of 2002, its first year of operation, 
administrative data showed 5.8 million enrollees, and by December, 2019, the figure 
almost quadrupled, to 20.1 million enrolled.15 
Figure 1.1 shows the insurance rate and SIS enrollment from 2000 to 2019.  These 
estimates show the same trend: approximately 44% of the population was insured prior to 
2002, and this increased to 78% in 2019.  This figure also shows that the main driver of 
coverage expansion in Peru has been SIS, which started with an enrollment of 24% of the 
population before 2002 and grew to almost 50% by 2019. 
Although SIS was implemented in 2002, Figure 1.1 (and Figure 1.2) include data 
of only one of the previous pilot programs for 2000 and 2001, the Seguro Escolar Gratuito, 
which was a program for all students enrolled in a public school, including pre-primary 
formal school.  Thus, between 2001 and 2002, Figure 1.1 shows not only a change in the 
aggregate number of people enrolled in the program, it also includes a change in the 
                                                 
15 Administrative data can be different from self-reported data for several reasons.  Administrative data can 
double count some individuals.  For example, it can be that some enrollees first enrolled in the emergency 
plan to receive healthcare services and later enrolled through a more permanent plan based on their 
demographics.  Self-reported data can undercount the total number of enrollees, when individuals do not 
recollect and report their enrollment in the program. 
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demographics of these enrollees as health coverage was no longer restricted for public 
schools students and children and pregnant women from seven departments. 
Figure 1.1: Insurance Rate and Enrollment Rate in SIS, 2000-2019 
 
Author’s analysis of the 2000-2019 ENAHO. 
It is also important to show the trend in enrollment of two specific cohorts, as they 
are used for the analysis in Chapter 4.  In Chapter 4, I study the effect of obtaining SIS 
coverage on malnutrition among children who were one year old at the baseline and were 
five years old after they enrolled in SIS.  A simple inspection of Figure 1.2 allows the 
reader to reach the same conclusions stated above: SIS has been expanding coverage and 
it has been the main driver of the increase in the insurance rate. 
However, what is specific to these cohorts is that most of the expansion happened 
quickly, in the first years after SIS was implemented.  As mentioned above, SIS gave a 










of one-year-olds.  This cohort reached its highest enrollment rate through SIS in 2003 
(64%), although it remained high after that, over 50% in almost all years. 
Figure 1.2: Insurance Rate and SIS Enrollment in Peru for Children 1 and 5 
year of age, 2000-2019 
 
Author’s analysis of the 2000-2019 ENAHO. 
In contrast, the cohort of five-year-olds already had a high insurance rate in 2000, 
mainly through the Seguro Escolar Gratuito, as this program reached students in public 
schools who at five were in kindergarten.  Even though the cohort of five year olds had a 
high enrollment in 2000, it quickly increased its enrollment after 2005 when the 
government redesigned the program and lowered the priority assigned to pregnant women 
and children under five years of age. 
As mentioned above, prior to 2002 enrollment through SIS, as depicted in Figures 







Insured, 5 years of age SIS, 5 years of age
Insured, 1 years of age SIS, 1 years of age
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Insurance Program.  Although the data source used in these estimations, the ENAHO, 
collected information on enrollment through the Seguro Escolar Gratuito, it did not have 
a question where people could report enrollment through the Mother and Child Insurance 
Program, which explains the estimates of zero enrollment for 2000 and 2001 for the cohort 
of one year olds. 
This dramatic expansion of SIS occurred with no rigorous analysis of the program’s 
effects.  Based on simple correlations or anecdotal observation, a widespread perception 
among health officials and experts is that SIS has increased healthcare utilization for 
enrollees.  But there has been no estimation of the causal relationship between the program 
and people’s health.  It could be that the government is financing an ineffective program, 
wasting scarce resources.  Or it could be that this expansion should have been more 







Chapter 2  
How Successful Has SIS Been in 
Increasing the Use of Healthcare 
Services and Reducing Inequity in 





Prior to the implementation of the health insurance programs in Peru, the healthcare system 
was one where the population’s needs were often unmet, and facilities were significantly 
underused.  Policy makers and officials focused on the barriers to the use healthcare, and 
the debate emphasized economic barriers over geographic and cultural barriers, perhaps 
because economic barriers were easier to address, despite the challenges they posed.  In 
fact, having to make (subsidized) out-of-pocket payments to obtain health services was a 
major hurdle for people in need of healthcare, which exacerbated existing inequities; 
implementing the payment of user fees in Peru in the 1980s “reduce[d] the access to care 
proportionally more for the poor than for the rich” (Gertler et al., 1987, p. 67).  In this 
context, health insurance arrived in the 1990s as a possible solution to this problem, as it 
could facilitate access to healthcare services for people who could not afford these fees. 
Of its four strategic goals, SIS focused its operations on two: i) increase access to 
healthcare; and ii) target healthcare toward the poor and vulnerable.  These two goals are 
where SIS focused most of its efforts, and it is widely believed that SIS has increased 
healthcare use among its enrollees, although no rigorous evaluation has been conducted to 
verify this conjecture. 
This chapter explores the relationship between obtaining SIS coverage and the use 
of healthcare services.  Since SIS prioritized enrollment of the poor in its early years, I will 
explore whether this relationship varied by socioeconomic levels.  More specifically, this 
chapter seeks to answer the following questions: 
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 How did SIS affect the use of healthcare services by the end of its first 
administration, in 2005? 
 Did this effect vary across socioeconomic levels?  In particular, did SIS help 
narrow inequities in the use of healthcare services between poor and non-
poor households? 
The overall perception of the program’s performance is that its effect is positive 
and significant, that is that SIS has increased the use of health services among its enrollees, 
focusing the increase in the national rate of healthcare utilization among people who report 
needing care.  In terms of the equity analysis, it is commonly believed that the middle class 
gained the most from the SIS expansions, rather than the prioritized population: poor and 
rural households. 
The rest of this chapter is organized in six sections.  First, I summarize the literature 
in the developing world, including a few studies about SIS and its predecessors.  The next 
section introduces the data source used in this study: the Encuesta Nacional de Hogares.  
A standard theoretical model of the demand for healthcare is presented in the following 
section.  The estimation methods are then discussed in detail.  The following section 
presents the results of the effect of SIS enrollment on the utilization of healthcare, and on 
inequity in the use of healthcare services.  The final section summarizes the main 
conclusions and draws policy implications from these results. 
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2.2. Literature Review 
Almost all health economists would agree that health insurance leads to an increase 
in healthcare consumption.  Literature reviews that have focused on this relationship show 
that most studies find a positive effect of health insurance on healthcare utilization.16  In 
fact, as discussed in detail below, economic theory suggests that gaining health insurance 
makes the individual face a lower price for healthcare services, which increases his or her 
consumption of these services.17 
In fact, increasing the use of healthcare services is one of the goals of health 
insurance. Individuals who purchase health insurance do so in order to increase their 
consumption of healthcare (in the event of illness), as is assumed by most economic models 
of health insurance, and governments implement these programs when they intend to 
facilitate the population’s (or, more strictly, the insurance beneficiaries’) access to medical 
care. 
2.2.1. Health Insurance Programs in Developed Countries 
The effect of health insurance coverage on the use of medical care has been studied in the 
developed world for many decades.  Most notably, the RAND Health Insurance 
Experiment clearly showed that having different coinsurance rates (i.e. different out–of–
pocket prices for each unit of medical services) led to different levels of consumption.  In 
particular, Manning, et al. (1987) found that the price elasticity for all types of healthcare 
utilization was approximately – 0.2.  More recently, Finkelstein, et al. (2011) also found 
                                                 
16 Geidion and Diaz (2010), Buchmueller, et al. (2005), and Hadley (2003). 
17 Pauly (1968). 
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that one year after obtaining health insurance through Medicaid, a group of low-income 
adults in Oregon increased their healthcare utilization for three different types of care: 
preventive, primary care, and inpatient care. 
2.2.2. Health Insurance Programs in Developing Countries 
The economic literature about the effects of health insurance in the developing world is 
more scarce.  Several programs in other Latin American countries that are similar to SIS 
have been studied.18  For Mexico, Sosa-Rubi, et al. (2009) found that enrolling in the 
Seguro Popular program is positively associated with the use of general obstetrical care, 
and Harris and Sosa-Rubi (2009) found an increase of 1.65 prenatal care visits.  This last 
result from Harris and Sosa-Rubi (2009) is based on a Poisson regression conditional on 
membership in one of three latent classes: i) women who have had very few or no prenatal 
visits during their pregnancy; ii) women who sought care, on average, every five weeks 
during their pregnancy; and iii) women who had some complications detected prior to 
labor, and thus were required to have a visit, on average, every 2.4 weeks.  The authors 
report that 59% of the overall effect of an increase in 1.65 prenatal visits is due to the 
increase in prenatal care among women in the first latent class, and the remaining effect is 
mainly due to an improvement in the detection of pregnancy complications, which results 
in a shift of some women from the second to the third latent class. 
King, et al. (2009) evaluated a program that promoted enrolling in Seguro Popular 
and improved healthcare facilities.  This evaluation used a randomized experiment that 
assigned treatment to territorial clusters defined by the healthcare facilities networks.  The 
                                                 
18 For a detailed description of these programs, see the literature review in Chapter 4. 
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experiment had a high attrition rate, from 74 matched pairs of clusters at the baseline to 50 
pairs at the follow-up, and the authors found no effect on utilization of a number of health 
services: medical procedures, preventive care, outpatient care, inpatient care, eye exams, 
flu vaccinations, mammograms, cervical exams, and Pap smear testing.  This lack of any 
effect could be explained by the short amount of time between the baseline and the time of 
the evaluation, only 10 months of treatment. 
Another randomized experiment, in Nicaragua, found that obtaining insurance 
affected neither the probability of seeking care nor the number of visits.  Thornton, et al. 
(2010) studied a voluntary health insurance program for workers in Nicaragua’s informal 
sector.  The randomization occurred at enrollment locations, and the cost of premiums was 
also randomly assigned.  Two potential problems may have affected these results.  First, 
since coverage was voluntary, the take-up rate was very low (20%).  The authors explain 
that bureaucracy and program costs may have hindered enrollment.  Second, the study does 
not explicitly rule out the possibility of crowding out; the people who enrolled in the 
program could have had other forms of coverage before enrollment. 
In Colombia, where preventive care is essentially free regardless of insurance 
coverage, Miller, et al. (2009) found that enrollment in the subsidized regime is associated 
with an increase of approximately 29 percentage points in the utilization of preventive care 
among enrollees.  In the case of children, they found that those enrolled had 1.24 more 
growth monitoring and well-care visits than children who were uninsured.  These results 
are very interesting as they cannot be due to moral hazard, since they are not due to a 
significant reduction in the price of preventive care.  Instead, it likely reflects the supply-
side incentives to contain (curative services) expenses, as health insurance creates some 
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incentives that encourage providers to improve the health of enrollees (through the increase 
of the preventive care), which reduces future expenditures in curative care services. 
Similarly, Giedion, et al. (2009) find that the probability of having a complete set 
of immunizations in Colombia increased by six percentage points for covered children 
between 1995 and 2005.  Again, this result is interesting because immunizations are free 
regardless of children’s insurance coverage.  These two similar results from different 
studies suggests that “health insurance in Colombia generates some positive spillover 
effects that go beyond making services more affordable” (Giedion, Diaz, Alfonso, and 
Savedoff, 2009, p. 68). 
2.2.3. Health Insurance Programs in Peru 
Six studies have examined the relationship between obtaining coverage from a public 
program and the utilization of healthcare services in Peru.  All use cross-sectional data, but 
they use different identification methods and estimation approaches.  Although they all 
find significantly positive associations between public coverage and utilization, only one 
of them claims to estimate causal relationships. 
Three of these studies examine this relationship for the two original pilot programs, 
the Seguro Escolar Gratuito and the Mother and Child Insurance program.  Jaramillo and 
Parodi (2004) conducted an evaluation of these two pilots.  This evaluation included an 
analysis of whether these programs reduce the inequities in coverage and access.  In order 
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to study these inequities, the authors use two variables to define socioeconomic quintiles: 
predicted household expenditures19 and a wealth index. 
Using the Heckman method to correct for selection bias, they found that the Seguro 
Escolar Gratuito was associated with an increase in the probability of visiting a healthcare 
provider when in (self–reported) need by 16.7%.  When evaluating the Mother and Child 
Insurance program, the authors found an 8% increase in the probability of seeking 
preventive care during pregnancy. 
Their analysis of how the program affects the inequities of access concluded that 
neither program favored households in the poorest quintile in terms of gaining more access 
relative to the other quintiles.  Moreover, their results suggest that both programs increased 
these inequities as people in the richest quintile benefited the most from this coverage, with 
increased benefits for each quintile as one move from the least wealthy to the wealthiest 
quintile for the Seguro Escolar Gratuito. 
McQuestion and Velasquez (2006) examined the two programs implemented in the 
1990s: the Mother and Child Insurance program and a USAID project in Peru: Proyecto 
2000.  Using variance components logistic models, the authors found that enrolling in the 
Mother and Child Insurance program increased the probability that a pregnant woman 
delivered her most recent child in a public facility. 
Bitrán, et al. (2010) examined the relationship between enrollment in all publicly 
funded health insurance program in Peru: SIS and its two predecessor pilot programs.  They 
                                                 
19 They use the predicted household expenditure, since one of their data sources, the Demographic and Health 
Survey, does not have income or expenditure information. 
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use two data sources – the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) from 2000 (pilot 
programs) and a pooled DHS sample for 2004-2007 (SIS);20 and the 2002-2006 ENAHO 
panel – to explore the effect of coverage on specific types of healthcare services.  The 
authors find that both programs had a positive association on the probability of young 
children, (18-59 months of age) being fully immunized, the probability of women (15-49 
years of age) receiving a pap-smear exam, the probability of children under 5 years of age 
being treated for diarrhea, the probability of children under 5 years of age being treated for 
acute respiratory infections, and the mean percentage of growth monitoring schedule 
completion among children under 5 years of age.  Interestingly, the only health service for 
which they did not find a significant result was for the probability of pregnant women (15-
49 years of age) having their delivery attended by skilled personnel.  For SIS only, they 
found an increase of approximately 6-19% in the probability of seeking care when 
symptoms, illnesses, or relapses where present. 
In addition, Bitrán, et al. (2010) explored whether these results varied by income 
level.  They found that the pilot programs had a pro-poor effect on the probability of being 
fully immunized, although the opposite happened for all the other services they studied.  
They also found a pro-poor association between the probability of receiving treatment for 
both diarrhea and acute respiratory infections, and the mean percentage of growth 
monitoring schedule completed. 
                                                 
20 The 2004-2007 DHS surveys do not ask the insurance status of children.  This study uses the mother’s 
insurance status to impute children’s enrollment in SIS. 
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Using a probit model, Longaray (2010) found a positive effect of SIS coverage on 
healthcare utilization.  Moreover, he predicts that if all uninsured Peruvians were enrolled 
in SIS, the probability of using health services would increase by 20%. 
Parodi (2006) used the 2004 Demographic and Health Survey to estimate the 
relationship between SIS coverage among pregnant women and their decision to deliver in 
a public facility.  Using a multinomial discrete choice model, he found that women who 
obtain coverage through SIS increased their probability of delivering their child in a public 
facility by 27%. 
The author found that this association is stronger among the wealthy, with a 56% 
increase in this probability for women in the richest quintile compared to 27% for those in 
the poorest quintile.  This result is consistent with other studies, and also suggests that SIS 
expansions are widening inequities in the use of healthcare services. 
Parodi also explored how non-economic factors (e.g., geography, ethnicity, cultural 
practices, and power relationships within the household) affect this relationship.  He found 
that rural, non–Spanish speaking women whose husbands make most decisions in the 
household have a lower probability of going to a public facility to deliver their child. 
Bernal, et al (2017) evaluated the effect of SIS on a set of access outcomes for the 
population of the city of Lima.  They used a recent targeting tool introduced by the Peruvian 
government in 2011 as a pilot.  This pilot was implemented only in the city of Lima and 
later, in 2012, was extended to the overall country.  Using the ENAHO data set that is 
described in detail in the following section, they found large effects of enrollment on 
utilization of healthcare ranging from 5% to 15% depending on the specific type of service.  
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Interestingly, the authors find that SIS reduces enrollees’ participation in preventive 
campaigns by 5%, which they attribute to a change in people’s behavior once they find 
financial coverage from the risks of having bad health (i.e., moral hazard). 
2.3. Data 
The Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO), which has some similarities to the World 
Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Study surveys and is conducted annually in Peru, 
is the main source of data for this chapter.  This survey is implemented by the Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística e Informática, the government agency responsible for producing 
the national statistics for leading socioeconomic indicators.  Annual cross-sectional 
datasets are available starting in 1997.  A small sub-sample of the participants provide 
information in consecutive years, which provides a small panel dataset. 
The ENAHO has 5 main objectives: i) produce indicators on the evolution of 
poverty, welfare, and other household characteristics; ii) diagnose the population’s living 
conditions and poverty; iii) assess how social programs are improving living conditions; 
iv) be a source of information for research; and v) allow comparisons with similar studies 
and surveys. 
Although the sampling unit is the household, data are provided at two levels: 
household and individual.  Wealth and assets are collected at the household level.  Modules 
in the ENAHO that gather data at the individual level are mainly about their education, 
health, employment and income, and participation in social programs.  Expenditures are 
tracked in detail at both levels, depending on the category.  Healthcare expenditures are 
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tracked at the individual level, and for each type of care: curative or routine care visits, 
drugs and prescriptions, laboratory exams, dental care, optometrist visits, immunizations, 
inpatient care, and pregnancy check-ups and delivery care. 
The health module provides information on: i) people’s healthcare needs in the last 
four weeks (whether they showed symptoms, developed an illness, had an accident, or had 
a relapse related to their chronic conditions); ii) their treatment (facility used, staff that 
provided care, type of care, time issues related to the visit, and reasons for not visiting a 
provider); iii) preventive care (children’s check-ups and immunizations, birth control 
supplies, and nutritional supplement provision); iv) health expenditures; and v) health 
insurance status and type. 
Since the first ENAHO was implemented in 1997, data have been collected 
annually, although there have been some changes in its design.  For example, it was 
originally implemented quarterly, with the health module included in the fourth quarter, 
but in 2003 the methodology changed so that the survey is continuously in the field.  In 
2002 the question about health insurance started gathering information about people’s 
enrollment in SIS, but previous surveys did not collect accurate information on its two 
predecessor programs. 
In Section 2.5, I discuss the identification strategy: instrumental variables.  The 
instrument I use is annual program enrollment goals by geographical jurisdiction, which 
were used only in the early years of operations, between 2002 and 2006.  As mentioned 
above, cross-sectional datasets are available annually from 1997 to 2019, but I focus on 
2005 for two reasons.  First, these enrollment goals were used only until July of 2006, 
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which rules out 2006 as a whole.  Second, as shown in Table 2.1, 2005 has the largest 
sample size of households for this period (2002 to 2005).  In addition, since the last 
methodological update to the survey in this period was implemented in 2003, 2005 offers 
data that should be less affected by the novelty of these changes and subsequent 
adjustments.  
Table 2.1: ENAHO Annual Sample Size, 2000-2006 
Year Households Individuals 
2000 4,447 16,876 
2001 16,515 74,644 
2002 18,598 83,102 
2003 14,892 56,265 
2004 23,900 86,455 
2005 25,643 86,309 
2006 25,807 88,804 
Author’s analysis of the 2000-2006 ENAHO. 
2.4. Theoretical Model 
As discussed above, empirical evidence typically shows that health insurance increases the 
consumption of healthcare.  But how does this happen?  What are the channels through 
which health insurance increases healthcare utilization? 
This relationship can be represented using one of the most widely applied economic 
concepts: the demand for healthcare.  Theoretical models provide two mechanisms for the 
effects on consumers who obtain health insurance: i) health insurance produces a 
movement along the demand curve of health services, since insurance reduces the price of 
healthcare, and ii) health insurance shifts the demand of healthcare to the right (in addition 
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to causing a movement along the new demand curve), since insurance operates as an 
income transfer from the rich to the poor or from the healthy to the ill. 
Pauly (1968) was one of the first economists to propose a theory of how the demand 
for healthcare is affected by health insurance.  His theory was formulated in the context of 
analyzing the welfare consequences of consuming health services when insured.  He 
considers health insurance to be a mechanism by which people with coverage face a 
reduced price for healthcare.  The decision to obtain insurance is driven by the consumer’s 
desire to pay a lower price for healthcare.  Thus, under Pauly’s theory, health insurance 
leads to a movement along the demand curve for healthcare that, under a full coverage 
policy, goes all the way to the point where the demand meets the horizontal axis, a price of 
zero.  If the demand for healthcare is downward sloping, as demands for any good or 
service are almost always expected to be, a lower price will lead to an increase in the 
optimal level of healthcare utilization.  This increase is the effect of insurance on healthcare 
utilization.21 
However, Nyman (2005), challenged Pauly’s theory to consider health insurance 
as an income transfer from the rich to the poor (or the healthy to the ill), not only as a price 
distorting mechanism.22  In economic terms, this implies that health insurance not only 
creates a movement along the demand for healthcare, but also causes an outward shift in 
the demand curve.  Specifically, Nyman (2003) suggests that health insurance produces a 
                                                 
21 Pauly’s main conclusion was that by reducing the price of healthcare that consumers face (to a point below 
its marginal cost), health insurance leads to inefficient and welfare decreasing overconsumption. 
22 Nyman (2003). 
36 
 
positive shift in the demand of healthcare, since health insurance operates like an income 
transfer when ill.23 
I argue that the first mechanism, health insurance having an effect on the price of 
health services, dominates this relationship in the case of SIS.  As discussed in the previous 
chapter, people can benefit from subsidies if they seek care through a public provider.  In 
fact, all SIS does is complement subsidies that are already in place; when an enrollee seeks 
healthcare in these facilities, SIS is responsible for the payment of (almost) all healthcare 
expenses incurred by the enrollee, according to a pre-established fee schedule.  However, 
this does not constitute an income transfer; it is just an increase in the level of subsidy that 
an enrollee receives. 
To model the demand for healthcare I use a relatively simple model.  Assume that 
individual i has a utility function that depends on his or her consumption of medical 
services, Mi, and consumption of other goods, Ci: 
  iii CMUU ,  (2.1) 
subject to: 
   0YCMqp ii   (2.2) 
where p is the out-of-pocket price per unit of medical services, q represents other costs 
incurred by the individual per unit of medical care (e.g. transportation, direct forgone 
                                                 
23 Under this new theory, (social) welfare gains can occur when health insurance allows the previously 
uninsured to obtain healthcare that would otherwise be unaffordable. 
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earnings, day care for children/siblings), and Y0 is the individual’s disposable income.  
Notice that, for simplicity, the price of Ci has been normalized to 1. 
Notice that I model p to be the out-of-pocket expenditure for a unit of medical 














p  (2.3) 
where p0 is a strictly positive value, and could represent either the market price (at marginal 
cost per unit of medical services) or a partially subsidized price, and Si is a binary variable 
that represents SIS enrollment (taking the value of 1 when enrolled). 
Standard assumptions for the individual’s preferences, i.e. locally non-satiated, 
continuous, and rational (which imply the existence of a quasi-concave utility function:  
U( ) and the satisfaction of Walras’ Law), allow for the derivation of demand functions and 
the consequent finding of optimal levels of consumption and utility maximization.  
Equation 2.4 represents the demand for healthcare: 
  0,, YqpmMi   (2.4) 
Recall that the effect of obtaining health insurance through SIS is modeled as a drop in the 
out-of-pocket price per unit of medical services; i.e.,   0,, YqSpmM ii  . 
However, these assumptions do not lead to an unambiguous effect of a reduction in 
the price of medical services (which represents the effect of obtaining insurance coverage) 
on the optimal level of healthcare consumption, as theory still allows for the possibility 
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that this effect is positive.  This theoretical peculiarity, known as a Giffen good, is usually 
related to low-quality (or undesired) goods consumed by low-income individuals, for 
whom a reduction in the price of this good would have an income effect such that the 
individuals would be able to exchange the consumption of this good for other higher-
quality (or more desired) goods. 
If the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences is satisfied, in addition to the previous 
assumptions, then I can argue that the compensated law of demand is also satisfied, so that 








YqSpm i  (2.5) 
where    pYqSpmSM iii  0,, . 
If the Marshalian demand for healthcare services is decreasing in p (and q), as most 
empirical studies have found, then the effect of SIS enrollment (through a reduction in p to 
zero) on the consumption of medical services will be positive. 
One important feature of this model is the relative importance of both prices that 
directly affect the consumption of healthcare.  Using a similar model, Acton (1976) shows 
that when comparing the elasticities for p and q in the model, εp < εq if p < q.  In other 
words, as p drops due to gaining insurance coverage, the demand for healthcare becomes 
relatively more sensitive to these other (non-price) costs, so that the decision to seek 




In the case of SIS, when an individual receives fully subsidized healthcare (i.e., p 
is zero), the other costs still affect consumption decisions.  This prevents the optimal 
consumption of medical services, at least theoretically, from being extremely high (or at 
the extreme, infinite). 
Now, the decision behind individuals’ enrollment in SIS can be incorporated into 
the model.  As mentioned in Chapter 1, enrollment happens mostly at healthcare facilities 
when individuals seek medical services.  This means that the decision to enroll in SIS 
depends on demand for medical services: Si = s(Mi).  Incorporating this decision into the 
Marshalian demand previously formulated yields: 
    0,, YqMSpmM iii   (2.6) 
Equation 2.6 depicts a latent problem in the empirical analysis of health insurance: 
health insurance enrollment and healthcare utilization (or health outcomes or health 
expenditure) are determined simultaneously.  Thus, a simple estimation of equation 2.6 
would produce biased results.  In words, gaining health insurance could lead the individual 
to use healthcare when needed, but it could also be that a larger demand for healthcare 
could lead the individual to seek health insurance.  The relationship of interest of this study 
is the former; it should be isolated from the latter to produce unbiased results. 
This simultaneity bias, also known as selection bias, leads some economists to 
argue that only empirical studies that use randomized controlled trials, or natural 
experiments, produce credible results to evaluate the effects of health insurance.24  
                                                 
24 Levy and Meltzer (2001) 
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However, as discussed below, some econometric methods can reduce the risk of this bias 
without using a Randomized Control Trial. 
Note that the decision to enroll in SIS does not depend only on the individual’s need 
for medical services; it also depends on other factors (e.g. satisfying program eligibility).  
For simplicity, I choose to omit these other factors as they do not affect the discussion 
presented above. 
Although I will use panel data to estimate the relationship of interest, I chose to 
represent this relationship using a static model.  The reason behind this decision is that 
most dynamic models use a first period to represent the decision to purchase health 
insurance prior to the revelation of the health state in the second period of time, whereas in 
the case of SIS this sequence does not apply; the health state is revealed to the individual 
before he or she or they decides to enroll in the program.  Thus, the decision to obtain 
coverage through SIS affects the current period’s consumption of healthcare (and of other 
goods and services). 
One difference between this model and most models that represent the decision to 
purchase (private) health insurance is that this model does not include a premium that 
individuals would have to pay for becoming insured.  The model above represents the 
decision to enroll in a public program, which differs significantly from the decision to 
purchase health insurance.  For example, this model does not include a premium payment 
for enrollment.  This is because enrollment in SIS does not require payment, it requires 
only filling out an application and paying a trivial fee which is waived in most cases.25  
                                                 
25 This fee was approximately $0.30 during the first years of SIS implementation. 
41 
 
Also, since this fee is not actuarially fair and is only meant to cover the administrative cost 
of determining eligibility, I assume this to be zero. 
2.5. Estimation Method 
The main problem for estimating the relationship of interest is the presence of selection 
bias (i.e., the simultaneous determination between having health insurance and seeking 
healthcare).  This refers to the fact that there is dual causality in the relationship between 
healthcare and insurance status.  I am interested in the possibility that someone who is 
insured is more likely to seek healthcare.  But it can also happen that people having a high 
probability of requiring healthcare in the near future will get insurance, which implies that 
a high consumption of healthcare (due to having poor health) leads to being insured.  This 
problem may lead to overestimation of the effect of insurance on the use of care.  In 
addition, as explained in the previous chapter, a high percentage of the program enrollment 
in Peru happens when the eligible patient visits the healthcare provider, which creates the 
perfect setting for selection problems. 
Appropriate estimation techniques are needed to address these issues.  
Experimental approaches provide the most reliable approach about the relation between 
healthcare and health.26  I intended estimating the household assets index used by Bernal, 
et al (2017) for 2012, when eligibility for the program based on this index was extended 
nationwide.  However, I did not find a discontinuity in SIS enrollment at the eligibility 
threshold.  More specifically, I estimated a non-parametric function of the relationship 
                                                 
26 Levy and Meltzer (2001). 
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between enrollment in SIS (sisx) and the asset index (z_ifh). Figure 2.1 shows that 
enrollment decreases at the threshold, but without a discontinuity. 
Figure 2.1: SIS Enrollment by Household’s Wealth 
(Measured by SIS’ Household Asset Index), 2012 
 
Author’s analysis of the 2012 ENAHO. 
Given that there is no discontinuity in the probability of being enrolled in the 
program at the eligibility threshold, a quasi-experimental approach was not feasible for me.  
Thus, I will use a key element in the program’s early implementation strategy, enrollment 
goals by departments, to apply an instrumental variables approach.  In addition, I will use 
other methods as robustness checks for these results, to minimize the possibility that they 
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are sensitive to the method used.  If the results are robust across these different methods, 
the estimated relationship will have greater credibility. 
2.5.1. Instrumental Variables 
A common way to address selection bias produced by simultaneity is to use instrumental 
variables.  This implies first modeling the decision of a person to enroll in the program and 
then modeling the process that determines the use of healthcare. 
This approach is credible as long as its assumptions are satisfied.  The main 
challenge is finding a good instrument: a variable that affects the explanatory variable of 
interest, i.e. health insurance enrollment, but does not directly affect the dependent 
variables. 
As described in section 1.3.3 in Chapter 1, SIS used annual enrollment goals for 
each geographical jurisdiction to guide the expansion of the program.  However, this 
strategy was applied only from 2002 to 2006.  I use these enrollment goals as the instrument 
for my analyses.  The number of enrollees that SIS wanted to achieve is a relevant predictor 
for enrollment in the program, since it affects the effort that ‘recruiters’ put into enrolling.  
Higher enrollment goals drove enrollment in SIS as it affected eligible individual’s 
probability of enrolling.  However, these enrollment goals in and of themselves did not 
change the decision an individual makes about their healthcare utilization, except through 
an increased probability of being enrolled.  And these goals did not affect an individual’s 
perceived healthcare needs. 
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In total, I aggregated these goals to 25 geographical jurisdictions and the resulting 
enrollment goals ranged from 14.6% of the overall population in Callao to 61.0% in 
Huancavelica in 2005.27 
The first stage of the model, estimating the decision to enroll in SIS, is: 
 𝑆 𝛼 𝛾 𝐺 𝜏 𝑋 𝜇  (2.7) 
where Si represents enrollment in the program, Gi is the enrollment goal set for the 
individual’s department as a percentage of the total population, and Xi is a set of covariates. 
Using the probability of enrollment, predicted in the first stage, the decision to seek 
care is modeled as: 
 𝑌 𝜃 𝛿𝑆 𝜑𝑋 𝜀  (2.8) 
where Yi is the healthcare outcome under analysis and 𝑆  is the predicted probability of the 
individual of being enrolled in the program. 
The second challenge to using this approach is the possibility that the enrollment 
goal is a weak instrument.  Using a Hausman test, and the routines suggested by Shea 
(1997) and Angrist and Pischke (2009), I will test for the potential problems caused by a 
presumably weak instrument.  Angrist and Pischke (2009) also suggest a few alternatives 
in the case of weak instruments (e.g. just-identified estimates). 
                                                 




For this analysis, I select 2005 as the year of analysis.  This is because 2005 falls 
within the period in which enrollment goals were used as a strategy to plan the program’s 
expansion and it was the year of highest enrollment within that period.28   Also, 2005 is the 
year with the highest sample size within this period. 
2.5.2. Equity Analysis of the Effect of SIS on Healthcare Utilization 
In order to assess whether the program’s effect differs for different sub-groups of the 
population, I will add a right-hand-side variable to all instrumental variables regressions: 
the interaction between SIS enrollment and the individual’s poverty status. 
Since this analysis has two endogenous variables, two instruments are needed for 
correct identification.  As with the endogenous variable, the second instrument is the 
interaction of the enrollment goals with the individual’s poverty stratus. 
Thus, equations 2.9 and 2.10 are the new first-stage regressions and equation 2.11 
is the new second-stage regression: 
 𝑆 𝛼 𝛾 𝐺 𝜌 𝐺 ∗ 𝑃 𝜏 𝑋 𝜇  (2.9) 
 𝑆 ∗ 𝑃 𝛼 𝛾 𝐺 𝜌 𝐺 ∗ 𝑃 𝜏 𝑋 𝜇  (2.10) 
 𝑌 𝜃 𝛽𝑆 𝛿𝑆 ∗ 𝑃 𝜑𝑋 𝜀  (2.11) 
where Pi is the individual’s poverty status. 
                                                 




From these equations, δ is the estimated effect for the non-poor sub-group, whereas 
δ + β is the estimated effect for the poor sub-group.  I will also focus on the statistical 
significance of δ, since this is the estimated difference between both effects. 
2.5.3. Outcomes and Covariates 
I evaluate the effect of SIS on 16 types of healthcare: 
 visit to a healthcare professional, 
 medications, 
 laboratory tests, 
 X-rays, 
 other exams, 
 preventive care, 
 dental care, 
 eye care, 
 corrective lenses, 
 immunizations, 
 children’s wellness checkups,  
 birth control supplies, 
 other types of care. 
 inpatient care, 
 pre-natal care, and 
 institutionalized delivery. 
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The first five outcomes are reported for the four weeks prior to when people were 
interviewed.  The following nine and three outcomes are reported for the three and twelve 
months prior, respectively.  Wellness checkups were only reported for children under five 
years of age.  The analysis for birth control supplies includes only individuals between 15 
and 50 years of age.  Lastly, pre-natal care and institutionalized delivery were only reported 
by women who gave birth 12 months prior to when they were interviewed.29 
In addition to estimating the effect of enrollment in SIS on these outcomes, I include 
a set of ten covariates in these regressions: age, sex, educational level (head of household’s 
education if the individual is a minor), ability to read and write, has an indigenous language 
as mother tongue, number of household members, sex of the head of the household, poverty 
level, urbanicity, and region of residence.30 
2.5.3. Multiple Hypothesis Testing 
In this chapter, I assess the effect of SIS in 16 different outcomes for two analyses: the 
effect of SIS on the overall utilization of these 16 healthcare services and the effect of SIS 
in the equity in access to healthcare.  Chapters 2 and 3 also assess the effect of SIS in a 
large number of outcomes.  Given the high number of outcomes estimated in these 
analyses, there is a high probability of falsely finding that SIS has an effect on some of 
these outcomes. 
                                                 
29 The data set provided information on these 16 outcomes, but did not collect data on other important 
outcomes, such as emergency services. 
30 These regions were defined by the geographic condition (e.g., coast, highland, and jungle) rather than the 
political jurisdiction of an area. Thus, some departments, used to define the instrument, have a portion of 
their population in one of these regions and another potions in a different region. 
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Considering the case of 16 independent outcomes, and assuming that all null 
hypothesis are true, the commonly used critical value of 0.05 (i.e., the threshold to reject 
the null hypothesis that the estimate is statistically zero) would yield a 56% probability of 
finding at least one false rejection, or error type I.31  This issue is commonly known as 
Multiple-Hypothesis Testing. 
There are a few different methods that control for Multiple-Hypothesis Testing.  
One of the most widely used is the sharpened False Discovery Rates (FDR) q-values.  
These FDR are, as it name suggests, the proportion of false rejections.  If we define V as 
the number of false rejections and S as the number of true rejections, where R = V + S, the 
FDR is 𝐸 𝑄 𝑉/𝑅 . 
Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) formalize the use of FDR controls.  Suppose there 
are m hypothesis to be tested, where p1 < p2 < … < pm, and that there is a number q such 
that: 𝑞 𝜖 0,1 .  If k is the largest i for which 𝑝 𝑖𝑞 𝑚⁄ , then hypothesis 1 through k are 
rejected, which controls the FDR at level q for independent or positively dependent q-
values. 
Benjamini, et. al. (2006) proposed using the FDR controls in a two-stage process 
that estimates the number of true rejections (m0) to achieve “sharpened” FDR controls.32  
First, apply the FDR control at level 𝑞 𝑞 1 𝑞⁄ , and stop if k is zero.  If not, 
approximate 𝑚  as m - k, and apply the FDR control at level: 𝑞∗ 𝑞′𝑚 𝑚⁄ .  This process 
                                                 
31 These probability is estimated as: 1-0.9516 = 0.56. 
32 If m0 is known, or approximated, then the q values can be “sharpened” by replacing 𝑖𝑞 𝑚⁄  with 𝑖𝑞 𝑚⁄  and 
greater power would be attained if at least one hypothesis would be false. 
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further improves the power of the FDR controls by incorporating (an approximation to) the 
number of true rejections. 
Anderson (2008) uses this two-stage procedure to estimate the minimum value of 
q* at which each hypothesis would be rejected (i.e., the q-value), which provides a 
“sharpened” controlled alternative to the p-values. 
The main advantage of this method is its flexibility around the set of estimates being 
controlled.  For example, in Chapter 3 I will assess the effect of SIS on the probability of 
incurring an out-of-pocket payment (i.e., a binary variable) and its effect on (transformed) 
healthcare expenditures (i.e., a set of continuous variables).  This method also allows for 
different outcomes to be estimated using different specifications or identification methods, 
since it only requires the estimates’ p-values. 
One disadvantage of this method is that it does not account for the possibility of 
correlations among the p-values.  This is the case of my analyses since I test the effect of 
SIS in the use of different types of healthcare services – and expenditures on different 
services in Chapter 3 and health outcomes in Chapter 4.  However, Anderson (2008) 
performed a series of simulations that showed that this method works well when this 
correlation is positive, such as the case of my analyses. 
Compared to other methods, such as the familywise error rate control, the FDR are 
not too conservative, but they are more conservative that regular p-values, or z-values in 
the case of Instrumental Variables estimates.  However, the value of the sharpened q-values 
can sometimes be below the value of unadjusted p-values.  This is particularly the case 
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when there are many hypotheses rejected, because false rejections can be tolerated if there 
are many true rejections. 
2.6. Results 
As explained in the previous section, I use instrumental variables to estimate the 
relationship between participating in SIS and the use of health services.  In particular, I use 
the program’s enrollment goal for 2005 to approximate a participation rate that SIS is 
expected to achieve.  At the time, SIS had five different health plans, which targeted 
different sub-groups and provided different benefits: children under five years of age, 
children of school age (6-17), pregnant women, adults, and a plan that covered emergency 
cases.  Since the plan for emergencies did not involve any enrollment goals, I used the four 
other sub-groups to define enrollment goals for each subgroup in 2005.  In addition, I 
calculated the aggregated enrollment goal as a percentage of the population. 
2.6.1. Overall SIS Estimated Effects 
Following equations 2.7 and 2.8, Table 2.2 shows the instrumental variable estimates of 
the effect of the SIS program on different outcomes of healthcare utilization.  Although I 
estimated these results using the enrollment goals for specific sub-groups of the population 
(e.g., children under 5 years of age) as instruments, I focus on the results obtained all using 
the expected participation rates for each department for the overall population. 
Table 2.2 shows mixed results for the effect of SIS on healthcare utilization; there 
are positive, significant effects among some types of services, but the opposite is found for 
other types of care (see Tables A.2-5 in Appendix A for the full regression results). 
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   z-value q-value 
Utilization in the last 4 weeks     
Visit to a healthcare professional -0.017 0.211 0.937 0.713 
Medication -0.110 0.285 0.699 0.606 
Laboratory -0.021 0.056 0.707 0.606 
X rays -0.071 0.044 0.101 0.254 
Other exams 0.012 0.015 0.430 0.543 
     
Utilization in the last 3 months     
Preventive care 1.726 0.534 0.001 0.007 
Dental care -0.159 0.110 0.148 0.340 
Eye care -0.095 0.057 0.096 0.254 
Corrective lenses -0.111 0.050 0.026 0.093 
Immunizations 1.822 0.559 0.001 0.007 
Child’s checkup (<5 years of age) 0.658 0.188 0.000 0.007 
Birth control (individuals 15-50) 1.142 1.839 0.535 0.548 
Other 0.213 0.157 0.177 0.362 
     
Utilization in the last 12 months     
Hospitalization -0.091 0.077 0.234 0.369 
Pre-natal care (women who gave birth) 5.070 6.074 0.404 0.543 
Institutional delivery (women who gave 
birth) 
2.110 3.128 0.500 0.548 
Notes: Statistical significance indicates the probability that the coefficient is zero.  Due to estimating the 
effect of the program on several outcomes, I used the sharpened False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-
values to adjust for multiple-hypothesis testing. 
 Robust standard errors estimated clustered at sampling cluster. 
 The overall sample size is 64,118; with 7,660 children under 5, 31,157 people aged between 15 
and 50; and 3,594 women who gave birth in the previous 12 months. 
 Author’s analysis of the 2005 ENAHO. 
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Preventive care, including immunizations and children’s wellness checkups, 
showed positive effects.  In contrast, the estimates show a decrease in the probability of 
seeking eye care and purchasing of corrective lenses.  Lastly, Table 2.2 does not show any 
significant effects on visiting a doctor, prescribed medications, having some laboratory 
exams, dental care, or hospitalizations. 
All first-stage regressions pass the tests for underidentification and weak 
identification, with the exception of 3 services: birth control, pre-natal care, and 
institutional delivery (see Table A.1 in Appendix A). 
As mentioned in section 2.5.3, there is a 56% chance of finding one or more false 
rejections.  To control for Multiple-Hypothesis Testing, I estimate the sharpened q-values 
following the procedure suggested by Anderson (2008). 
The original estimates showed negative effects for visiting an ophthalmologist, but 
estimating the sharpened q-values following the procedure suggested by Anderson (2008) 
lead me to disregard this conclusion.  The q-value for this relationship is over the 0.1 
threshold, suggesting that this estimated negative effect was false.  The significance 
conclusion remain the same (either significant or not statistically different from zero) for 
all other estimates in Table 2.2  after estimating the sharpened q-values, although the effect 
of SIS on purchasing corrective lenses goes from being moderately significant (p<0.05) to 
being mildly significant (q<0.1). 
All future tables ignore the p-values and use the sharpened q-values instead to 
report on the statistical significance of each estimate, p-values are only shown in the 
Appendices.  Since the “sharpened" q-values are more conservative in assessing statistical 
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significance and less likely to produce false rejections, I use them to provide a better 
assessment of all estimates’ statistical significance. 
As a sensitivity analysis, I also used the enrollment rates of specific population sub-
groups as instruments.  Although there is some correlation between the different alternative 
instruments, there are also differences in the values and relative differences between one 
department and another.  The results obtained using these other instruments are consistent 
with those shown in Table 2.2 (see Table A.6-7 in Appendix A for selected outcomes). 
2.6.2. Estimated SIS Effects by Poverty Status 
The program was intended to provide coverage for vulnerable groups of the population, 
but it also enrolled some non-poor individuals.  In 2005, 17.4% of all SIS enrollees were 
not poor.  In order to assess whether the program had different effects for these sub-groups, 
I used an interaction term between SIS enrollment and the individual’s poverty status, 
following equations 2.9-2.11.  Table 2.3 shows the estimates for β and β+δ in equation 
2.11. 
Table 2.3 shows that the effect of SIS on healthcare utilization is lower for poor 
individuals; all estimates of δ in equation 2.11 are highly significant (q<0.01), with the 
exception of access to birth control supplies and institutional delivery (q>0.1).  Prenatal 
care is also significant, but only slightly (q<0.1).  These results imply that individuals living 
in poverty that are enrolled in SIS show a smaller effect on healthcare utilization, even for 




Table 2.3: Instrumental Variables Estimated Effect of SIS on Healthcare 
Utilization by Poverty Status, 2005 
 









Utilization in the last 4 weeks    
Visit to a healthcare professional 0.522 -0.123 0.001 
Medication 0.471 -0.255 0.001 
Laboratory 0.155 -0.044 0.001 
X rays 0.007 -0.083 0.001 
Other exams 0.036 0.013 0.005 
    
Utilization in the last 3 months    
Preventive care 2.201 1.684 0.008 
Dental care 0.052 -0.217 0.001 
Eye care -0.042 -0.107 0.007 
Corrective lenses -0.067 -0.120 0.008 
Immunizations 2.371 1.777 0.007 
Child’s checkup (< 5 years of age) 0.843 0.631 0.005 
Birth control (individuals 15-50) 1.696 1.364 0.101 
Other 0.491 0.174 0.001 
    
Utilization in the last 12 months    
Hospitalization 0.032 -1.087 0.001 
Pre-natal care (women who gave birth) 4.794 3.806 0.094 
Institutional delivery (women who gave birth) 1.857 1.547 0.128 
Notes: Statistical significance indicates the probability that the coefficient is zero, which were estimated 
using the False Discovery Rate (FDR) control. 
 Robust standard errors estimated clustered at sampling cluster. 
 The overall sample size is 64,118; with 7,660 children under 5, 31,157 people aged between 15 
and 50; and 3,594 women who gave birth in the previous 12 months. 
 Author’s analysis of the 2005 ENAHO. 
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As in the overall analysis, all estimates pass the first-stage tests for 
underidentification and weak identification, with the exception of birth control supplies, 
pre-natal care, and institutional delivery (see Table A.8-9 in Appendix A).  Table A.9 
shows that the first-stage of the interaction between SIS enrollment and poverty status 
passes the test of excluded instruments but does not pass the Sanderson-Windmeijer 
multivariate Chi-squared test of underidentification. 
2.7. Discussion 
The results presented in the previous section indicate that SIS improves healthcare access 
for its enrollees, especially for preventive services.  Some implementation and bureaucratic 
problems are potentially weakening the program’s full impact. 
SIS, as well as its predecessor pilot programs, was created under the assumption 
that there was a significant level of unutilized healthcare supply, and that the marginal cost 
of providing these services was below the marginal benefits for all Peruvians.  The main 
objective of the program was to increase healthcare utilization, in particular through 
creating a shift in demand for targeted sub-groups of the population who needed these 
services but could not afford them. 
The estimates shown in Table 2.2 suggest that this goal was achieved, at least in 
part.  Even in its early years, SIS increased the use of some healthcare services, mainly 
preventive services, for its enrollees.  This is particularly important as SIS gave priority to 
preventive care for small children and pregnant women.  The positive effects on children’s 
checkups and immunizations are particularly encouraging, as preventing health conditions 
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is especially important for a country with an underdeveloped health system, a general f 
lack of resources, and wide-spread poverty.  Unfortunately, the number of pregnant women 
in the sample was too small to produce valid results and SIS’ effect on services targeted to 
this sub-group could not be assessed; the estimates for prenatal care and having an 
institutional delivery did not pass the tests of excluded instruments and underidentification. 
However, these results also point to some problems faced by the program.  Since 
its early years, the program has been underfunded, with more enrollees that its resources 
allows it to serve.  Moreover, this gap has increased in time, as the political and social 
pressures to expand the program have meant that enrollment has grown at a higher rate 
than its funding.  The result of this mismatch has been chronic debt and delays in payments 
to providers for services received by SIS enrollees.  This has led providers to reject these 
services and the provision of medical equipment for SIS enrollees, since they did not expect 
to be reimbursed for these.  This was especially the case for services and equipment that 
were not fully subsidized by the providers’ own budget (e.g., corrective lenses).  Some 
providers even engaged in the illegal practice of requesting out-of-pocket contributions to 
cover the cost of services that were included in SIS’ plan of benefits.33  These practices 
explain the negative results for purchasing corrective lenses, as it was more likely that SIS 
enrollees would forgo these products when their coverage was rejected.  This is one 
example of how bureaucratic problems undermine SIS’ intervention, and why enrollees 
were less likely to find care when needed. 
                                                 
33 Alarcón (2004) and Bernal, et al. (2017). 
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Table 2.3 shows that the effect of the program on most services is not the same for 
the poor and the non-poor.  In fact, SIS has a smaller effect among their poor enrollees, 
those it is mandated to prioritize.  Although 82.6% of SIS’ enrollees were poor in 2005, 
they seem to face more barriers to access healthcare than just having to pay for these 
services.  
As mentioned before, SIS was created under the premise that the public healthcare 
system was underutilized in Peru, so that boosting the demand for healthcare would 
produce just a small marginal cost to the public budget while addressing the needs of a sub-
group of the population.  However, despite the efforts by the national government to 
expand the healthcare supply in the 1990s, these healthcare clinics and hospitals clustered 
in urban areas where non-poor families, who could already afford to pay a subsidized fee, 
reside.  Poorer, rural areas still lacked access to these services.  Thus, mostly non-poor 
households were in the best position to gain from the benefits of the program. 
Without a comprehensive strategy to expand healthcare supply to rural and remote 
areas, an initiative like SIS would not likely fulfill its ultimate goal of increasing healthcare 
access for the poor.  Even when SIS can produce a demand expansion for the poor, they 
still face geographic barriers to access healthcare.  In some extreme cases, it can take 
several hours of rudimentary transportation (e.g., riding an animal, canoeing, or even 
walking) to get to the nearest healthcare facility for some people living in rural areas, most 
of whom are poor or extremely poor.  Acknowledging this barrier, the Ministry of Health 
implemented guest houses next to healthcare facilities as a strategy to reduce maternal 
mortality.  But birth is a health event that can possibly be planned, other health shocks 
cannot and even preventive care would be forgone in these extreme situations. 
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As SIS improved its targeting strategies, and different levels of government 
increased their investment in healthcare services, the program may have started to reduce 
the inequities in access to healthcare.  However, in the first few years, up until at least 2005, 
the program increased these gaps as it was the non-poor who benefited the most from SIS. 
Thus, to answer the main question posed in this chapter, I conclude that SIS reached 
its goal of expanding the demand for healthcare and effectively increasing healthcare 
utilization for a set of desirable types of care.  However, this demand shift is higher among 
non-poor individuals, which increases the gaps in access to healthcare between the poor 
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The Peruvian government made a significant investment in expanding the healthcare 
supply during the 1990s, when the construction of publicly administered hospitals and 
clinics boomed.  These new healthcare facilities across the country provided health services 
for a subsidized fee, where a doctor’s visit would cost approximately between $0.3 and 
$1.7.  However, despite these subsidies most people still had unmet healthcare needs, and 
the use of these new facilities fell short of their full capacity.  Health officials, with the 
support from other branches of the government and multinational agencies such as the 
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, decided to try a new approach to 
subsidies.  This led to the creation of the two preceding pilot programs, the Mother and 
Child program and the Seguro Escolar Gratuito, and the subsequent implementation of 
SIS. 
The idea behind these programs was that supply-side subsidies were not sufficient 
to reduce unmet needs for healthcare, and that demand-side subsidies may be more efficient 
in meeting these needs.  These subsidies received through SIS enrollment would add to the 
already existing supply-side subsidies, so that SIS enrollees would receive a full subsidy 
for any health service included in that health plan’s benefits. 
In theory, a full subsidy on all health services included in the generous health plan’s 
benefits of SIS would likely lead to a decrease in healthcare expenditures paid by patients, 
even if utilization of these services increased, or no change in expenditures (e.g., an 
individual may not have use a specific service before enrolling in SIS and makes no out-
of-pocket expenditures, but after enrolling these services would be free).  However, a failed 
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design and some implementation problems meant that, in practice, enrollees had to make 
out-of-pocket payments for some services that were supposed to be covered by SIS; due to 
lack of compensation, many public providers restricted access to some services (e.g., 
medications or lab exams), and SIS enrollees had to find them on the private market where 
SIS did not provide coverage, and these providers even charged SIS enrollees for some 
services that were fully covered.34 
Since enrollees had to make out-of-pocket payments, even for services that were 
covered by the program, it is important to assess whether SIS produced a decrease in out-
of-pocket expenditures.  As found in Chapter 2, SIS increased the consumption of some 
healthcare services, but if the financial coverage of SIS was not effective, its enrollees 
could have seen an increase in expenditures.  And if this was the case, it is useful to identify 
which types of services had decreased expenditures under SIS, and which had increased 
expenditures. 
The effect of health insurance on healthcare expenditures is an empirical question.  
For most cases, when the price of healthcare drops for someone when they obtain health 
insurance coverage, one could expect healthcare expenditures to drop as well.  This is 
particularly the case for covered healthcare that is needed on a regular basis, such as 
preventive care.  Officials in Peru expected this to be the case for all services included in 
the plan’s benefits.  However, as mentioned above, implementation problems resulted in 
SIS enrollees having to make some payments for the services they received.  And increases 
in the consumption of some services may have led to an increase in expenditures, even 
                                                 
34 Alarcón (2004). 
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though prices dropped.  This is likely the case for services that would not have been 
consumed without health insurance and for which enrollees had to make some out-of-
pocket payments, most notably adjunct services.  And for some services, an increase in 
consumption due to a decrease in out-of-pocket expenditures may have led to healthcare 
expenditures not changing for individuals. 
Thus, this chapter first addresses the following questions: Has SIS reduced the 
overall out-of-pocket payments made by their enrollees?  Is this effect homogeneous across 
different types of healthcare services? 
In addition, I explore the effect of SIS on its enrollees’ financial protection against 
impoverishing healthcare expenditures, that is catastrophic expenditures.  Not all health 
shocks affect a household’s financial stability in the same way.  In fact, some health events 
have the capacity to damage this stability and pose such a financial strain on people that 
they can fall in poverty. 
In 2012, healthcare represented over 10% of total expenditures for 18% of all 
Peruvians.35  Even more alarming is that 6% of the population spent 20% or more of their 
total expenditures on healthcare.  For people living in extreme poverty, these figures were 
9.6% and 4.3%, respectively, which may indicate that SIS is somehow protecting the 
financial status of the poor, although it may indicate that the poor simply do not seek 
healthcare since they cannot afford it. 
                                                 
35 Alarcón (2013). 
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A severely adverse health shock can harm a household’s standard of living in many 
ways.  For example, a household may lose disposable income if this shock directly affects 
a working adult, either through that person having to recover from a long illness or accident 
or through that person having to care for another household member who is recovering 
from this event.  Peru’s Social Health Insurance could protect families from this income 
loss, but a very small portion of the labor force in Peru is covered by this benefit since most 
of the labor force works in the informal sector.36 
A more direct way by which a severe health shock could affect a household’s 
standard of living is when a high-cost treatment is required to recover from the health 
shock.  In the long term, if the household needs to make high out-of-pocket payments for 
a prolonged period of time, this event could affect the household’s wealth as it may need 
to incur debt through either formal or informal (e.g., a loan from family or friends) 
channels, or it may need to liquidate some of their assets to pay for healthcare.  In the short 
term, these high out-of-pocket payments would lead to families having to adjust their 
consumption and reprioritize their spending, cutting expenses in other areas to pay for 
healthcare. And for poor households, who are the majority of SIS enrollees, this means 
cutting spending on basic needs. 
This phenomenon complements the previous research questions mentioned above.  
More specifically, I investigate whether a non-catastrophic health insurance program, has 
helped poor households in Peru cope with severely adverse health shocks.  Has SIS been 
                                                 
36 Diaz and Valdivia (2012) estimate that only one in four workers have Social Health Insurance benefits. 
64 
 
successful in reducing households’ likelihood of incurring in large healthcare expenditures 
that can lead them to poverty or financial distress? 
One of the intrinsic features of health insurance is the protection it provides against 
the financial risk associated with severe health shocks.  Another benefit of having health 
insurance is that it makes available healthcare that is simply not affordable without it.  
Some argue that this is the main reason why people seek health insurance, to protect their 
assets from such risk.  But how effective has SIS been in providing such protection to its 
enrollees? 
Many health insurance programs in the developing world were created to help 
households avoid high healthcare expenditures (e.g. the Seguro Popular program in 
Mexico).  They are usually implemented in a context where a large portion of the 
population is incurring catastrophic healthcare expenditures, the type of expenditures that 
can compromise the household’s ability to maintain its customary standard of living.  In 
contrast, SIS was not created to cover high cost, recurring health services and procedures.  
Instead, SIS was intended to address the economic barriers to seeking healthcare among 
the poor.  Thus, the main objective of SIS is to increase the use of healthcare through a 
demand-side subsidy, eliminating any out-of-pocket payments. 
In addition, SIS was not explicitly intended to protect families against catastrophic 
healthcare expenditures.  In addition, SIS has had some design and implementation 
problems that have forced enrollees to decide between either making out-of-pocket 




SIS had generous coverage, including a wide range of health services, but these 
benefits do not include coverage for high cost, long-term health services and procedures, 
such as dialysis for kidney failure, bone marrow transplants for leukemia, and some other 
cancer treatments.  Alongside SIS, officials created in 2002 another program to cover these 
services and procedures: the Fondo Intangible Solidario de Salud (FISSAL), but this 
program did not begin operations until 2013 due to its low level of political priority.37  
Despite this, SIS may still have had an impact on the likelihood of their enrollees 
experiencing catastrophic healthcare expenditures. 
3.2. Literature Review 
The economic literature on the relationship between health insurance programs and 
healthcare expenditures is concentrated on specific cases, mostly those programs for which 
the goal was to reduce high expenditures of their target population, mainly low–income 
people.  Programs such as Seguro Popular in Mexico, FOSYGA in Colombia, the Seguro 
Facultativo de Salud in Nicaragua, and programs in other regions have been the subject of 
several studies. 
3.2.1. Seguro Popular in Mexico 
The Seguro Popular program in Mexico is an exemplar case of a program that was created 
to address high healthcare expenditures made by the uninsured population.  This program 
                                                 
37 FISSAL (2014). 
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had the explicit goal of providing financial protection to its beneficiaries against excessive 
healthcare expenditures. 
A randomized controlled trial conducted in rural areas of Mexico allowed King, et 
al. (2009) to study the effect of Seguro Popular on catastrophic healthcare expenditures.  
This experiment was launched in 2005 and it consisted in selecting 50 out of 100 “health 
local clusters,” for a program that promoted enrollment in Seguro Popular and upgraded 
the medical facilities.  The definition of health cluster was based on the geographic 
coverage of healthcare facilities.  They estimated an intent-to-treat effect of 23% on the 
probability of incurring this type of impoverishing expenditure, and a local average 
treatment effect of 55% on this probability. 
Grogger, et al. (2009) replicate the analysis done by King, et al. (2009) and add 
administrative data about the status of the supply of healthcare.  They also replicate the 
analysis using a household survey to provide results for the whole population.  They reach 
a similar conclusion and find an important weakness of the program: they conclude that 
catastrophic healthcare expenditures fell for rural households that have access to “well-
staffed facilities,” but had no effect for other households.  Their analysis of the household 
survey leads them to argue that the program also reduces catastrophic healthcare 
expenditures by 2.9 percentage points among urban households. 
Galárraga, et al. (2010), using an instrumental variable approach, estimate that this 
program reduced catastrophic expenditures, defined as spending 30% or more of total 
expenditures on healthcare, by 54% at the national level.  Taking advantage of the gradual 
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implementation of the program by Mexican states, the authors use the year a state was 
incorporated into the Seguro Popular as the instrument in this study. 
3.2.2. Fondo de Solidaridad y Garantia (FOSYGA) in Colombia 
Colombia’s FOSYGA is a program with two distinct regimes: contributory, for those who 
can afford to pay a premium, and fully subsidized, for the poor.  FOSYGA was designed 
to provide cross-subsidies from the wealthy to the poor, the healthy to the sick, and the 
young to the old.  Individual choice is embedded in the system as people choose their plan 
(and insurer) and FOSYGA pays their premium.38 
Florez, et al. (2009), using propensity score matching, found that FOSYGA 
reduced the probability of incurring a catastrophic healthcare expenditure.39  The authors 
use different thresholds, 10%, 20%, 30%, and 40%, to explore differences in this effect by 
the size of the health shock.  Their results suggest that the mitigating effect of health 
insurance in Colombia decreases with the level of the catastrophic healthcare expenditures.  
More specifically, they find that the probability of incurring healthcare expenditures that 
exceed 10% of the household’s overall expenditure is reduced by 62%, but this figure drops 
to only 13% when the threshold is set at 40%. 
                                                 
38 In practice, most cities have only one available insurer (Miller, et al., 2009). 
39 This result holds for all thresholds used in the analysis: 10%, 20%, 30%, and 40%. 
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3.2.3. Seguro Facultativo de Salud in Nicaragua 
In 2007, informal sector workers in Nicaragua were offered the Seguro Facultativo de 
Salud.  This is a voluntary health insurance program that shares many similarities to health 
insurance offered by a typical Social Health Insurance. 
Thornton, et al. (2010) used a randomized control trial to estimate the effect of 
health insurance on out-of-pocket expenditures.40  They found that total out-of-pocket 
expenditures fell for those who took up the insurance after only one year of enrollment.  
Although the estimate is not statistically significant, they estimate that out-of-pocket 
expenditures fell by approximately 55%. 
Their estimate also implies that the monetary value of this reduction in expenditures 
is below the average annual premium, which suggests that this program did not provide 
absolute cost savings mechanism for the average enrollee. 
3.2.4. Medicaid in the United States of America 
Finkelstein, et al. (2011) used an experiment conducted in Oregon to study the effect of a 
Medicaid expansion that occurred in 2008.  The experiment randomly offered a group of 
uninsured, low-income adults a chance to apply to a fully subsidized health insurance 
coverage through Medicaid.  This randomized controlled trial found that after one year of 
implementation the group selected by lottery to have health insurance coverage 
experienced a 20 percentage points decline in the probability of having out-of-pocket 
medical expenditures, an 18 percentage points decline in the probability of having medical 
                                                 
40 The experiment consisted in randomizing the costs of premiums as well as enrollment locations. 
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debts, a 15 percentage points reduction in the probability of having to borrow money or 
not pay other bills in order to pay for medical expenses, and a 4 percentage points decline 
in the probability of treatment having been refused due to medical debt. 
3.2.5. SIS in Peru 
Bitrán, et al. (2010) studied the relationship between SIS enrollment and out-of-pocket 
expenditures for medical services in the four weeks prior to being interviewed.  They used 
a subsample of the 2002-2006 ENAHO panel (only those that provided information in all 
five years), which is a small subsample of this panel.  Using information on prior health 
insurance (i.e., insurance coverage status two years prior to the survey) as an identifying 
variable to control for endogeneity, the authors found that gaining SIS coverage reduced 
the probability of making out-of-pocket expenditures in the past four weeks by over 67% 
(and possibly by 81%) in 2004.41 
The study also estimated the effect of enrollment on the amount spent on healthcare 
and the probability of incurring catastrophic healthcare expenditures, which the authors 
defined as healthcare expenditure equivalent to 30% or more of all household expenditure 
in one year. They found no significant effect for these outcomes. 
Petrera and Jimenez (2018) study the determinants of out-of-pocket expenditures 
among poor Peruvians that seek healthcare in public facilities.  They found that SIS reduced 
people’s out-of-pocket expenditures between 2010 and 2014.  They also found that factors 
                                                 
41 The authors report that analysis beyond 2004 was not possible due to a very small number of observations 
that made some out-of-pocket expenditures in healthcare.  This is a limitation of the sample and the 
identification strategy of the study. 
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associated with higher out-of-pocket expenditures were age, total household expenditures, 
and type of provider (e.g., hospital), 
Bernal, et al. (2017) used a regression discontinuity design to estimate the effect of 
SIS in Metropolitan Lima, the capital of Peru.  As described in Chapter 2, the authors use 
the pilot of a national targeting strategy for social programs implemented in Lima in 2011, 
which used an asset index for any household applying for SIS coverage. 
Using a Regression Discontinuity Design estimation strategy, they find that SIS has 
no effect on individuals’ incurring at least some healthcare expenditure, and no effect on 
the amount of this expenditures.  The authors find that SIS increases healthcare 
expenditures on medications (by 55%), X-rays (by 17%), and inpatient visits (by 41%).  
They also find that SIS increases the probability of incurring a catastrophic expenditure, 
using several thresholds: 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, and 25%. 
3.3. Data 
The main data source for this chapter is the one described in the previous chapter: the 
Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO).  As mentioned in Chapter 2, one of the main 
goals of the ENAHO is to provide an estimate of the poverty rate, which implies gathering 
detailed and comprehensive information about households’ income and expenditures.  
These detailed data include information about households’ expenditures on healthcare for 
a selected set of services. 
In addition to the information on health and the use of healthcare services, detailed 
in Chapter 2, the ENAHO also provides detailed information about out-of-pocket 
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expenditures on: i) provider visits, ii) drugs and prescriptions, iii) laboratory analyses, iv) 
dental care, v) optometrist care, vi) corrective lenses, vii) immunizations, viii) child 
checkups, ix) contraceptives, x) inpatient care, xi) surgery, xii) pregnancy check-ups, xiii) 
delivery, and xiv) other healthcare services.  This information is available for each 
individual in the household.  If respondents refused to provide this information, it is 
imputed using a “hotdecking” method.42 
Using these data, I explore the effect of SIS enrollment on the amount of out-of-
pocket expenditures individuals paid for each of these services.  In addition, I assess the 
impact of SIS on making any payment for healthcare, which is defined as having a positive 
amount in at least one of the individual service categories. 
I also focus on the effect that SIS has on the probability of incurring catastrophic 
(or impoverishing) healthcare expenditures.  As mentioned before, catastrophic 
expenditures are defined as a percent of healthcare expenditures relative to total household 
expenditures, although the economic literature on the topic has not settled on a standardized 
threshold for this indicator.  I provide more detail about the definition of this variable in 
the Methods section. 
3.3.1. Expenditures on Healthcare 
Peru is a country where healthcare represents a small proportion of total consumption 
expenditures.  The Ministry of Health estimate that 4.6% of the Peru’s GDP was spent on 
                                                 
42 Hotdeck is a widely used routine that dataset managers use to impute missing data.  In this case, the Instituto 
?Nacional de Estadistica e Informatica provides these variables already imputed when missing. 
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healthcare in 2005.43  Not only is this a low percentage in comparison with the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development countries, it is also below the average in the 
South American region (7.6%).44 
Households are the most important source of healthcare expenditures in Peru; direct 
payments from households, mostly out-of-pocket and not premium payments, represented 
38% of all healthcare consumption in 2005.  Employers funded 33% of healthcare 
expenditures, and the Government, mostly through general funds, contributed 27%.  In a 
country where poverty rates are high (49% of the population cannot afford a basic basket 
of food and non-food goods and 17% cannot afford the basic food basket), this contribution 
from households to healthcare is significant. 
Using the 2005 ENAHO, I estimate that 52.5% of the population living in a 
household where no member works in the formal labor market, and thus no one is eligible 
for coverage through Peru’s Social Health Insurance, used healthcare services.  However, 
only 34.7% made out-of-pocket expenditures, which implies that 17.8% received a full 
subsidy for their use of healthcare services or someone outside of their household paid for 
them, including an insurer. 
Table 3.1 shows the mean of these out-of-pocket expenditures in 2005 for each of 
the services under analysis.  Medications were the largest healthcare expense in Peru in 
                                                 
43 MINSA (2015). 
44 The World Bank: Data Bank, https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=world-development-
indicators. Last accessed 22 August, 2021. 
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2005, with an overall average of 69.5 nuevos soles.  This mean increased to 272 nuevos 
soles when considering only those who made any out-of-pocket payment. 








Outcome  90% 95% 99% 
OOP Expenditures in the last 4 weeks 
Doctor’s visit 89.3 13.7 23.8 60.9 302.3 
Medication 74.4 69.5 121.6 308.5 1,257.9 
Laboratory 98.4 7.2 0.0 0.0 214.3 
X rays 99.3 4.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other exams 99.9 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
      
OOP Expenditures in the last 3 months 
Dental care 94.3 19.5 0.0 39.8 481.1 
Eye care 98.4 2.9 0.0 0.0 60.7 
Corrective lenses 98.8 5.5 0.0 0.0 273.6 
Immunizations 99.3 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Child’s check up 97.3 2.0 0.0 0.0 40.5 
Birth control supplies 98.6 1.1 0.0 0.0 31.9 
Other 93.8 6.4 0.0 7.96 120.37 
      
OOP Expenditures in the last 12 months 
Hospitalization 97.4 16.1 0.0 0.0 352.4 
Pre-natal care 93.3 4.7 0.0 15.2 101.7 
Institutional delivery 89.6 9.4 5.5 50.8 200.8 
Notes: The population of this table was restricted to households with no member employed in the formal 
labor market. 
 The average exchange rate in 2005 was: 1 U.S. dollar = 3.29 nuevos soles. 
 Author’s analysis of the 2005 ENAHO. 
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Medications was also the category with the largest expenditure cutoff for the 99th 
percentile in the 2005 ENAHO: 1,257.9 nuevos soles. 
The portion of the population that made no out-of-pocket payments for doctor’s 
visits was 89.3%, while those who did not spend any money on medications was 74.4% of 
the population.  However, the percentage of the population that made no out-of-pocket 
expenditures is very high (over 90%) for other healthcare services included in Table 3.1.  
For example, almost no individual paid directly for X-rays, immunizations, birth control, 
and “other exams,” all services with over 99% having no out-of-pocket payments. 
There can be different underlying factors driving the high percentages of people 
not spending on services and these are related to the type of service.  For example, 
preventive care is meant to be fully subsidized for all (i.e., immunizations and birth 
control), and enrollees will not likely find themselves in situations where they are forced 
to pay for these services.  On the other hand, adjunct healthcare services, such as an MRI, 
are required as a part of another form of treatment (e.g., surgery); if someone cannot afford 
the surgery and decides not to have this procedure, they are less likely to require these 
adjunct services. 
Table 3.1 also shows the nature of the distribution of healthcare expenditures; 
skewed distributions, with a high concentration at zero and long tails.  The following 
section discusses how this issue is addressed in this chapter. 
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3.3.2. Catastrophic Healthcare Expenditures 
As discussed above, some health shocks require high-cost treatment that can lead a 
household to financial strain and even poverty.  The economic literature measures this type 
of expenditures in terms of its proportion of a household’s total expenses.  Thus, severe 
health shocks often imply a redistribution of consumption priorities within a household; 
with limited resources, families have to reduce some expenses or borrow money to pay for 
this healthcare. 
However, in a country where half of the population lives under poverty and almost 
one in every five cannot afford a basic food basket, this redistribution implies that these 
families have to forgo some basic goods and services to pay for needed healthcare.  And in 
these cases, any additional amount of out-of-pocket payments for healthcare impacts the 
household’s ability to meet these basic needs. 
Table 3.2 shows the incidence of catastrophic healthcare expenditures in Peru.  In 
2005, 57.9% of the population that were in households where no member worked in the 
formal labor market faced out-of-pocket healthcare payments that exceeded 10% of the 
household’s total expenditures.  This percentage decreases as the threshold is raised, but 
32.2% of the population still are part of families where a health shock has made them 
allocate 40% or more of their total expenses to healthcare.  Interestingly, the incidence of 
catastrophic healthcare expenditures is similar among SIS enrollees; 55.7% for low 




Table 3.2: Catastrophic healthcare expenditures among Households not Part of 





Low, 10+% of household expenses 57.9 55.7 
Medium. 20+% of household expenses 46.2 45.1 
High, 30+% of household expenses 38.1 37.6 
Critical, 40+% of household expenses 32.2 31.4 
Notes: These estimates exclude households with a member that works in Peru’s formal labor market. 
 Author’s analysis of the 2005 ENAHO. 
 
3.4. Methods 
The relationship between healthcare expenditures and health insurance coverage is similar 
to that between healthcare utilization and coverage: they are simultaneously determined.  
The relationship that I want to assess in this chapter is the impact of having SIS coverage 
on healthcare expenditures and on the likelihood of incurring a catastrophic expenditure.  
However, people who expect to have a need for healthcare, and thus to incur healthcare 
expenditures, may be more inclined to seek SIS enrollment. 
I use the same identification strategy used in Chapter 2: instrumental variables.  
Again, the enrollment goals established by SIS officials are used as the instrument for 
enrollment in SIS.  I expect that these goals influence the likelihood of people being 
enrolled, but do not directly affect healthcare expenditures or the probability of 
experiencing a catastrophic expenditure after controlling for some other characteristics of 
individuals.  As in the previous chapters, I mainly use the F-test of excluded instruments 
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and the Sanderson-Windmeijer F-test of excluded instruments to assess the 
underidentification and weak-identification of the instrument. 
In addition to this potential bias problem, I face two other complications when 
working with the healthcare expenditures data.  First, healthcare expenditures have a 
skewed distribution, being concentrated at a value of zero, with a long tail.  To approximate 
a normal distribution, and reduce the effect of outliers, economists often use a natural 
logarithmic transformation on the variable of interest.  However, as explained below, I find 
the Inverse Hyperbolic Sine Transformation to be better for my purposes.  Second, as 
mentioned above, there is no standardized definition for a catastrophic healthcare 
expenditure.  As in the existing literature, I use several different definitions of the level of 
catastrophic expenditures. 
3.4.1. Inverse Hyperbolic Sine Transformation 
There are many problems associated with estimating relationships where the dependent 
variable has a right-skewed distribution.  One of the main problems is that the distribution 
of healthcare expenditures in Peru is highly skewed to the right, with most people having 
zero expenses and a long tail skewed to the right generated from a few outliers.  For 
example, the distribution of out-of-pocket expenditures on prescriptions and other 
medications has a mean of 73.2 nuevos soles, with 72% of the population reporting zero 
out-of-pocket expenditures on medications. 
A simple logarithmic transformation (i.e., taking the logarithm of healthcare 
expenditures) is commonly used to achieve a better fit of the data.  However, since 63.3% 
of people in the 2005 ENAHO report having no expenditures, I would have to either: i) 
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exclude all those individuals from my analysis, or ii) impute too many observations that 
report zero expenditure to a very low expenditure. 
Instead, I use the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation, also known as arcsinh, 
because it approximates the natural logarithm while being defined at zero and it allows me 
to keep the healthcare expenditure variables for all observations in my dataset.  This 
transformation is defined as: 
 𝐻𝐸 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐻𝐸 𝐻𝐸 1  (3.1) 
where 𝐻𝐸  is the healthcare expenditures of individual i on service j. 
3.4.2. Catastrophic Healthcare Expenditure 
Financial protection from uncertain, high-cost health shocks is at the core of any health 
insurance scheme.  In this case, I aim to identify health events that impose significant 
expenses on the household and can impact its ability to meet its basic or regular needs or 
even impoverish it and jeopardize its standards of living. 
Although the economics literature does not have one standard indicator for this 
event, the definition of catastrophic healthcare expenditure is commonly defined in terms 
of the value of the out-of-pocket expenditures that a household incurs to obtain medical 
services relative to the household’s total expenditure.  However, there is no generally 
accepted threshold for this relative measure.  Some studies define this threshold at 10% 
(e.g., Florez, et al., 2009), while others use higher thresholds (e.g., Galárraga, et al., 2010, 
and Bitrán, et al., 2010).  I consider four thresholds of catastrophic expenditure: 10%, 20%, 
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30%, and 40%, based on the range of thresholds used in the literature.  This set of thresholds 
will provide a better understanding of the relationship of SIS with different severity levels 
of health shocks. 
One particular feature of catastrophic healthcare expenditure is that it does not only 
affect the individual, but due to its significant financial strain it also affects the other 
members of the individual’s household.  Thus, an individual enrolled in SIS not only 
protects or themselves financially but also protects all the members of the individual’s 
household from the financial risk associated with such a health shock. 
Since households are the unit of analysis for the relationship between having SIS 
coverage and the probability of incurring a catastrophic health expenditure, I use a different 
treatment variable for this part of my analyses.  Instead of modelling the effect of an 
individual being enrolled in SIS, as in all other analyses, I model the effect of having one 
or more household members enrolled in SIS on catastrophic healthcare expenditures. 
Similarly, all covariates are aggregated at the household level.  Most explanatory 
variables used in Chapter 2 were defined at the household level (e.g., number of household 
members), but those that were defined at the individual level in previous analyses (i.e., age, 
sex, education, ability to write and read, and mother language) indicate the variable level 




3.5.1. Estimated Effects on Out-of-pocket Expenditures 
Using administrative data on the enrollment rate goals as the instrument, I first estimate 
the effect of having SIS coverage on out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures.  As discussed 
above, I transformed these expenditures using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. 
Table 3.3 shows these estimates for the (transformed) amount of these out-of-
pocket expenditures on a set of healthcare services and for the probability of having to 
make any out-of-pocket expenditure (see Tables B.1-4 in Appendix B for full results of the 
regressions).45 
First, Table 3.3 shows that SIS reduces people’s probability of having to make any 
out-of-pocket payments for healthcare, which is a statistically significant result (p<0.01). 
Second, these results indicate that being enrolled in SIS does not have a significant 
effect on expenditures for most types of healthcare services.  The only healthcare services 
that SIS enrollment have a decreasing effect on are: dental care, corrective lenses, 
immunizations, and child’s check-ups.  Note, however, that less than 5% of all individuals 
reported having made out-of-pocket expenditures for corrective lenses, immunizations, and 
child’s check-ups, which is a limitation of this analysis. 
 
                                                 




Table 3.3: Instrumental Variables Estimated Effect of SIS on Out-of-pocket 







OOP Expenditures in the last 4 weeks    
Visit to a healthcare professional -0.899 0.763 0.315 
Medication -2.265 1.211 0.114 
Laboratory -0.146 0.254 0.591 
X rays -0.320 0.235 0.287 
Other exams 0.000 0.079 0.663 
    
OOP Expenditures in the last 3 months    
Dental care -1.229 0.545 0.098 
Eye care -0.228 0.214 0.349 
Corrective lenses -0.700 0.314 0.098 
Immunizations -0.513 0.239 0.098 
Child’s checkup (children <5) -0.611 0.205 0.045 
Birth control (individuals 15-50) 6.487 8.216 0.543 
Other 1.426 0.619 0.098 
    
OOP Expendoitures in the last 12 months    
Hospitalization -0.493 0.383 0.287 
Pre-natal care (pregnant women) 0.573 2.586 0.663 
Institutional delivery (pregnant women) 1.184 4.292 0.663 
    
Any out-of-pocket expenditure -0.720 0.259 0.005 
Notes: Statistical significance indicates the probability that the coefficient is zero, which were estimated 
using the False Discovery Rate (FDR) control. 
 Robust standard errors estimated clustered at sampling cluster. 
 The overall sample size is 64,118; with 7,660 children under 5, 31,157 people aged between 15 and 
50; and 3,594 women who gave birth in the previous 12 months. 
 Any out-of-pocket expenditure is a binary variable that indicates whether the individual made a 
payment for any type of service.  All other variables are continuous. 
 Author’s analysis of the 2005 ENAHO. 
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Table 3.3 also shows that SIS appears to increase people’s expenditures on “other 
services.”  These services are likely to be adjunct services that were not covered by SIS or 
services for which providers illegally rejected their services or required direct payment for.  
This result likely reflects an increase in utilization and expenses for provided-induced 
healthcare that was not covered by the program. 
The original estimates suggested that SIS reduced expenditures on medications 
(p<0.1), but this significance was challenged using the FDR control as shown in Table 3.3 
(q>0.1). 
All first-stage regressions pass the tests for underidentification and weak 
identification, with the exception of 3 services: birth control, pre-natal care, and 
institutional delivery (see Table A.1 in Appendix A). 
As a sensitivity analysis, I transform these variables into binary variables that 
indicate whether the individual made a payment for the specific service and estimate the 
effect of SIS on having to make out-of-pocket expenditures for these healthcare services 
(see Tables B.5-9 in Appendix B).  These results show that SIS only has a significantly 
negative effect on wellness checkups for children.  Although the estimates for obtaining 




3.5.2. Estimated Effects on Catastrophic Healthcare Expenditures 
Table 3.4 shows the estimated effect of SIS enrollment on incurring catastrophic or 
impoverishing healthcare expenditure (see Table B.10 in Appendix B for full results of the 
regressions).  
Table 3.4: Instrumental Variables Estimated Effect of SIS on Catastrophic 
Healthcare Expenditure, 2005 







Low, 10+% of household expenses -0.758 0.370 0.195 
Medium, 20+% of household expenses -0.557 0.327 0.195 
High, 30+% of household expenses -0.294 0.276 0.216 
Critical, 40+% of monetary expenses -0.332 0.261 0.216 
Notes: Statistical significance indicates the probability that the coefficient is zero, which were estimated 
using the False Discovery Rate (FDR) control. 
 Robust standard errors estimated clustered at sampling cluster. 
 The sample is 15,445 households that are excluded from the formal labor market. 
:  Author’s analysis of the 2005 ENAHO. 
Almost all estimates are negative but not  statistically significant.  The negative 
point estimates suggest that SIS enrollment reduces the chances of incurring in catastrophic 
healthcare expenditures, regardless of the threshold used.  Two of these four thresholds, 
low and medium catastrophic healthcare expenditures, have a p-value below 0.1.  However, 
these estimates are not significant once the FDR q values are used (q > 0.1), suggesting 
that those estimates were falsely significant. 
All first-stage regressions pass the tests for underidentification and weak 
identification (see Table B.9 in Appendix B). 
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3.6. Conclusions and Discussion 
SIS was created to eliminate the economic barriers that reduce access to healthcare by 
making healthcare more affordable for the most vulnerable Peruvians; by complementing 
the existing subsidy through public providers, SIS aimed to fully subsidize most healthcare 
services.  The results presented in Table 3.3 suggest that SIS accomplished this goal by 
2005; people who enrolled in SIS reduced their likelihood of making any out-of-pocket 
expenditures for healthcare. 
When disaggregating this analysis by type of service, I estimate that SIS reduces 
expenditures on dental care, corrective lenses, immunizations, and children’s checkups.  
These results are important since they indicate that people are consuming more preventive 
healthcare, as found in Chapter 2, and reducing their expenditures at the same time due to 
SIS. 
Table 3.3 also shows that despite theoretically reducing the price of healthcare to 
zero, SIS increased expenditures on “other services.”  This is only marginally significant, 
but it reflects that some of these services are excluded from the SIS benefit plan and, most 
importantly, perhaps due to some implementation problems that affected the early years of 
the program’s operations. 
SIS did not cover all services, most notably high-cost, catastrophic expenditures 
were excluded from the SIS plan of benefits.  These services were supposed to be covered 
by another fund created specifically to administer public resources for rare, high cost 
treatments.  However, this plan had low levels of priority and so it was not implemented 
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until 2013 due to lack of resources.  In practice, public funds provided only a partial subsidy 
for these services in 2005; households had to finance directly most of these costs. 
However, if SIS had worked according to plan, enrollees would not have had to 
make any out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures for most services, as the health plan’s 
benefits were quite generous.  But this was not the case as the delays in reimbursement for 
they services provided forced some providers to charge out-of-pocket payments to 
enrollees for services that were covered by SIS.  Some public providers also rejected 
providing these healthcare services to SIS beneficiaries, which led enrollees to forgo these 
services or obtain them from private providers, where they had to pay the full cost of the 
service as SIS was not authorized to reimburse providers outside its network of public 
providers. 
This situation was generated by structural problems that hindered the capacity of 
SIS to provide financial protection for its enrollees.  The program was not created as an 
insurance program but rather as another public agency.  A health insurance program needs 
a level of flexibility to manage the health risks of its enrollees.  Instead, SIS was limited 
by typical Public Finance Management rules that imposed limits on how the SIS budget 
was allocated, spent, and accounted for, and so the impact of SIS was affected by these 
controls. 
SIS funds were allocated through the regular budgetary channels that regulated 
every public agency.  SIS funds were, in practice, a line-item budget that was proposed by 
SIS officials and approved by the Ministry of Finance.  Instead of following a budget 
growth that was the result of a planned expansion of the program and that focused on filling 
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the gaps of unmet healthcare needs among its target population, the Ministry of Finance 
allocated funds based on a restrictive budgetary growth rate that depended on tax revenues 
growth. 
Within two years, SIS was unable to reimburse providers for the services they 
provided to SIS enrollees.  It is very likely that SIS’ budget in 2002 was not based on an 
actuarial study of its plan of benefits for the number of enrollees it had that year.  By the 
end of 2003, less than 24 months after beginning its operations, debts to providers were 
estimated to be equivalent to 6 months of claims at the national level.46 
Consequently, providers began rejecting services for SIS enrollees or asking them 
to pay out-of-pocket for these services even when they were entitled to receive the service 
at no cost.47  In practice, SIS did not provide coverage for services that required additional 
supplies not covered by the own provider budget.  For example, providers that 
recommended laboratory services for some patients to aid their diagnoses, would require 
full payment from these patients regardless of their enrollment status. 
Thus, despite being theoretically fully subsidized, SIS enrollees had to make some 
payments that influenced how the program affects their healthcare expenditures.  Since the 
price for some healthcare services was not zero, expenditures did not fall for all services, 
and even rose in one case.  As shown in Table 3.3, individual’s expenditures on “other 
services” increased due to being enrolled in SIS.  These “other services” are mostly adjunct 
services, such as particular diagnostic analyses needed for a surgery procedure.  And they 
                                                 
46Alarcón (2004).  
47 Bernal, et al. (2017) report that these practices continued in 2011, although by 2011 SIS had placed agents 
in hospitals to help enrollees get the services covered by the program at no cost. 
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are also the types of services that providers would restrict access to, and even charge for.  
The estimated positive effect of having SIS coverage on expenditures of these “other 
services” suggests that enrollees were not willing to forgo the whole treatment and agreed 
to make out-of-pocket payments for these adjunct services. 
I also find that SIS has no major effect on the probability of incurring a catastrophic 
healthcare expenditure (see Table 3.4).  SIS was not created as a catastrophic health plan; 
the Fondo Intagible Solidario de Salud (FISSAL) had this objective.  Treatments such as 
dialysis for kidney failure or stem cell transplant for some cancers, were meant to be 
covered by FISSAL.  This fund was also established in 2002, as part of a more 
comprehensive strategy to provide coverage for Peruvians vulnerable to severe health 
shocks.  But despite its legal creation, in practice, it was not implemented due to its low 
political priority and lack of resources.  It took 11 years after its creation for FISSAL to 
cover the treatment of its first beneficiary. 
However, the need for a high-cost treatment is not the only impact on a household’s 
financial stability.  There are other situations in which households have to make out-of-
pocket payments that can deplete their disposable income and push them to poverty.  These 
situations are at the core of the concept of catastrophic healthcare expenditures.  Anyone 
who is already living in poverty does not have disposable income and is highly vulnerable 
to most health shocks.  In this situation, any additional out-of-pocket payments that a 
household makes for medical services needed by one of its members implies reducing the 
consumption of a basic good or service that is needed for its subsistence. 
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In Peru, the cost of a basket of basic goods and services was 232 nuevos soles for 
an individual in 2005.  Basic food consumption, which is used to estimate extreme poverty, 
was estimated to cost 106 nuevos soles.  Although only 3.9% of the population was 
hospitalized in 2005, the average out-of-pocket expenditure for inpatient services was 614 
nuevos soles (see Table 3.1), although this average was almost half among SIS enrollees, 
at 284 nuevos soles.  This means that if a member of a poor household requires 
hospitalization, it is highly likely that this household will experience a catastrophic 
healthcare expenditure.  Even though SIS did not cover high-cost treatments, there was 
room for it to provide financial protection against catastrophic healthcare expenditures for 
its poor enrollees.  However, my results show that SIS does not have an effect on the 
probability of incurring a catastrophic health expenditure for its enrollees. 
Since it was first implemented, SIS was intended to focus on the most vulnerable 
population, which mainly includes people living in poverty.  In 2005, 82% of all enrollees 
were poor.  Although SIS enrollees may not have received a full subsidy for their healthcare 
consumption, either because some services are not covered by their plan of benefits or 
because providers restrict access to covered services, SIS still reduces their expenditures 
on the most common types of healthcare services.  Yet it does not reduce the probability 











Chapter 4  
Does Seguro Integral de Salud Have 





When countries set a goal of improving their population’s health outcomes, sometimes they 
resort to policies that affect the financing rules that govern their healthcare systems through 
(expanding the eligibility of their) health insurance programs.  The underlying idea behind 
these initiatives is that reducing the financial burden of healthcare will facilitate access to 
care, which in turn will improve the population’s health.  However, one may question 
whether expanding the coverage of publicly-operated health insurance programs affect a 
country’s health outcomes.  Do health insurance programs improve health?  Internationally, 
there is no conclusive evidence that supports this hypothesis.  Some studies find a positive 
effect, but evidence showing no effect is also often found, and even the studies that support 
this relationship find that its impact is small (Levy and Meltzer, 2001 and 2008, and 
Giedion, Alfonso, and Diaz, 2013). 
The most plausible way in which health insurance could affect health outcomes is 
via an increase in healthcare utilization.  Standard economic reasoning argues that when 
families face a reduced price of care, they increase their consumption of healthcare.  The 
economic literature strongly supports this relationship.  In fact, in Chapter 2, I find that 
those enrolled in Peru’s Seguro Integral de Salud are more likely to obtain care when 
needed, especially preventive care.  However, these findings are not enough to show that 
health insurance has a positive impact on health.  This hypothesis also requires that the 
increased utilization of healthcare services will improve people’s health.  The fact that the 
international literature remains inconclusive about the effect of health insurance on health 
suggests that the latter part might be the weak link in the relationship between health 
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insurance and health outcomes; it may seem that more healthcare, obtained through gaining 
health insurance coverage, is not always better, at least at the margin in aggregate measures. 
If evidence about the effects of health insurance on healthcare utilization in the 
developing world is scarce, the literature studying its effects on health outcomes is even 
more limited (Giedion, Alfonso, and Diaz, 2013).  In this chapter I will explore this 
relationship for the case of Peru’s SIS, focusing on children’s health as this was one of the 
sub-groups of the population prioritized by the program since its creation.  In addition, 
Chapter 2 concluded that SIS had a positive impact on utilization of children’s wellness 
checkups, which is the theoretical mechanism described above as an intermediate step 
between having health insurance and having better health. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.  The next section provides a 
literature review, which explores in detail studies that examine the relationship between 
public health insurance and health in developing countries; some find a positive effect, but 
they are not the majority (Giedion, Alfonso, and Diaz, 2013).  The data sources used to 
estimate this relationship are presented in the third section.  The fourth section of the 
chapter discusses the theoretic model that informs the econometric modeling, which is 
presented in the fifth section.  Finally, the main findings and conclusions are presented in 
sections six and seven. 
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4.2. Literature Review 
As discussed in Chapter 2, almost all economists agree that health insurance leads to an 
increase in healthcare consumption.48  But the goals of health insurance programs are not 
only to increase healthcare utilization and decrease the probability that a financial shock 
could severely affect disposable income, but also to improve the health outcomes of their 
beneficiaries.  Although it is probably the ultimate goal of any health policy, such as 
increasing health insurance coverage, improving health is an indirect result of increasing 
healthcare utilization, one that perhaps can be observed only in the long run.  The 
underlying theory is that people can achieve better health outcomes when effective 
preventive and curative healthcare services are available to them in a timely manner, which 
health insurance is intended to facilitate. 
Most of the literature that explores this relationship comes from the developed 
world, where natural experiments, as well as randomized experiments, have been used to 
investigate it.  In the U.S., two major public health insurance programs have been studied: 
Medicare and Medicaid. 
The eligibility rules to qualify for Medicare present a scenario where the elderly 
benefit from a system that provides them with (nearly) universal coverage.  Since one 
becomes eligible upon reaching 65 years of age, the opportunity to compare the newly 
eligible with those who are a few months away from eligibility arises.  Card, et al. (2004) 
used this approach to perform a set of discontinuity design regressions and explore the 
changes in mortality and self-reported health status, among other variables, at this age.  
                                                 
48 Giedion and Diaz (2010), Buchmueller, et al. (2005), and Hadley (2003). 
93 
 
They find small effects on self-assessed health, although they find that the largest effects 
are observed among the groups that experience the largest gains in coverage at age 65: the 
less educated minorities and Hispanics; a reduction of about 15% of the gap between the 
overall population around the age of 65 and each of these groups.  These small effects could 
be interpreted as an indication that changing insurance types would not have a large effect 
on health status, even if the benefits from Medicare are better than those from a previous 
type of coverage.  However, gaining insurance could yield a perception of improved health 
in people.  Although Card, et al. (2004) used different methods and data sources to explore 
the effects of gaining Medicare coverage on mortality rates, they found no significant effect 
either at 65 or over the long run; and when they found a change in mortality rates, they 
argue that they are most likely driven by other factors.  However, they were unable to 
measure changes in mortality rates for specific subgroups, which could experience some 
improvement hidden by aggregation. 
In terms of mortality, Card, et al. (2009) found that Medicare-eligible people 
experience an important absolute decrease and a slower growth in the probability of death 
at the age of 65.  They also found an estimated 0.8-1.0 percentage point decrease in the 
likelihood that a patient admitted to a hospital dies within a week of admission when 
compared to patients in a similar condition at admission but who are just under 65 when 
admitted (Card, et al., 2009).49  This effect persists, in significance and size, for at least 
nine months after someone becomes 65.  The increased healthcare use due to becoming 
                                                 
49 This reduction of 1 percentage point in the 7-day mortality is equivalent to a 20% reduction in deaths.  
Other lengths of mortality were also estimated: at 14, 28, 90, 180, and 365 days of admission, but they are 
relatively less precise than estimates for the 7-day mortality.  They estimate a reduction of deaths by 7%-9% 
and 2%-4% for the 28-day and 365-day mortalities, respectively; however, robustness checks, based on lower 
bound estimates, performed by the authors are not consistent with these estimates. 
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Medicare eligible also leads to a reduction in the growth of the probability of death at 65 
(Lichtenberg, 2002). 
The first channel that may explain the effect of Medicare on health outcomes is the 
gain of insurance from people who were uninsured just before 65.  However, the size of 
these effects suggests that this is not the only driving factor.  Another potential source for 
these large effects is the increase in healthcare use among patients who were previously 
insured, either by Medicaid or private insurance, due to more generous benefits.  The latter 
has not been strongly proven empirically (Card, et al., 2009). 
Medicaid is the other main health insurance program that has been studied in the 
U.S.  Its target population has been low income families, giving clear priority to children 
and pregnant women.  However, expansions from the last decade have favored other adults, 
including childless adults.  Medicaid eligibility is determined by states, and different states 
have granted eligibility to people at different income levels throughout time.  This variation 
of income levels at which people are eligible across states provides the identification 
strategy used by some studies to estimate the effect of this program on health outcomes, 
using methods such as difference-in-differences estimation.  Among children, it has been 
found that increasing the eligibility income cutoff is associated with significant 
improvements in health outcomes (e.g.,. a decrease in infant mortality and low birth weight 
(Currie and Gruber, 1996.))50  Furthermore, expansions that targeted low income women 
                                                 
50 Although they examine changes in the eligibility criteria among pregnant women aged 15 – 44, they focus 
on two birth outcomes.  Combining the use of state fixed effects and an instrumental variable, which they 
simulate using the different changes of eligibility criteria throughout states and time, Currie and Gruber 
(1996) find that a 30 percentage point increase in the income level cutoff for Medicaid is associated with an 
8.5 percent reduction in infant mortality and a 1.9 percent reduction in the incidence of low birth weight. 
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have proven more effective, in terms of their effect on health outcomes, than broader 
expansions to women with higher incomes.51 
Among adults, Sommers, et al., (2012) found a decrease in mortality and an 
increase in self-reported health status due to Medicaid expansion.  The Medicaid expansion 
to childless adults with incomes below the federal poverty level that started in 2000 was 
associated with a reduction in adjusted all-cause mortality of 6.2%, or 19.6 deaths per 
100,000 adults.  This result was larger among non-whites, adults aged 35-64, and adults 
residing in counties with high levels of poverty; the adjusted all-cause mortality for these 
three groups fell by in 41.0, 30.4, and 22.2 deaths per 100,000 adults, respectively.  More 
importantly, this estimate increased over time, with an overall reduction of deaths by 6.5 
per 100,000 adults per year.  Medicaid expansions to childless adults since 2000 were also 
found to be associated with an increase in self-reported health status of approximately 2.2 
percentage points for adults reporting an “excellent” or “very good” health. 
In the case of Canada, a natural experiment approach was used to explore the effects 
of the Canadian National Health Insurance (NHI) on infant mortality and low birth weight 
(Hanratty, 1996).  The fact that NHI was implemented progressively throughout all 
Canadian provinces allowed the author to use year effects to reduce the bias due to 
unobservables.  Using a panel of counties for a span of 16 years: 1960-1975, she estimated 
that the introduction of this system was associated with a decrease of 4% in the infant 
mortality.  Similarly, she used panel data on births between 1960 and 1974 to estimate that 
                                                 
51 In contrast, De la Mata (2012) found no effect of Medicaid eligibility on children’s health in the short and 
medium run.  She uses an RDD approach, which ignores the effect of the program for children whose family 
income is not close to the eligibility cutoff. 
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the low-birth-weight rate declined by 1.3 after the implementation of the NHI system, 
although this finding is only weakly significant.  A larger effect, although not significant, 
of 9% was found for the children of unmarried women. 
One factor that may explain the variability of results about the relationship between 
health insurance and health is that health insurance programs are heterogeneous.52  
Differences in the health system in each country explain why the same program works 
differently in different countries, e.g., the healthcare supply available (in terms of 
infrastructure and health professionals) at the time of implementation is very likely to have 
important differences across countries.  Moreover, the heterogeneity of the health insurance 
programs being introduced in the developing world – in terms of target populations, 
benefits, levels of subsidies and eligibility criteria, cost-sharing mechanisms, and payment 
mechanisms to providers – make these programs very difficult to compare.  Health 
insurance programs offered by governments differ with respect to: coverage, as some cover 
primary care while others are comprehensive; premiums, as some are free while others are 
only partially subsidized; copays, as some have high copays while others are completely 
free. 
All these variable elements inherent in the design of health insurance programs that 
address the needs of specific populations bring heterogeneity to the outcome people obtain 
from being covered.  Thus, to explore the different studies, it is important to understand 
the program under analysis and its specific background before discussing their results; this 
is done in the remainder of this section. 
                                                 
52 Levy and Meltzer, 2001 and 2008; Giedion and Diaz, 2009; and Giedion, Alfonso, and Diaz, 2013. 
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4.2.1. Costa Rica 
Costa Rica is a country often referred to as “a health ‘success’ story” as it has better health 
outcomes than other countries with a similar income level (Dow, et al., 2003).53  It was 
during the 1960s and 1970s that health outcomes improved significantly, for example a 
reduction in child mortality from a rate of 70 per 1,000 in 1960 to 20 per 1,000 in 1980, 
which happened to coincide with the expansion of health insurance in that country. 
It was in 1971 that Costa Rica introduced its first national health plan, and coverage 
rates started climbing rapidly in 1973 until the third world debt crisis hit Costa Rica in 
1980.  During this period, the coverage rate among children increased from 42% in 1973 
to 73% in 1984.  Most of this increase was led by gains in coverage among the middle 
class.  Households with informal sector workers or unemployed adults were excluded from 
this expansion and faced barriers to obtain healthcare despite the safety nets implemented 
by the government.54 
Other major policy changes introduced in the health sector during the same time 
period included: i) investment in the expansion of primary care facilities and personnel; ii) 
nationalization of (almost) all hospitals by the agency that runs the universal insurance 
program; and iii) introduction of primary healthcare programs targeting the uninsured 
(mainly for those living in rural areas in 1973, and extended to some urban areas in 1976).  
Simultaneous with these changes in the health system, other major achievements were 
reached: high levels of female education, a sharp fertility decline, water supply and 
                                                 
53 In fact, some of Costa Rica’s health outcomes are equivalent to those of the U.S. (e.g., life expectancy). 
54 In theory, uninsured people with very low incomes were eligible for waivers of user fees and premiums. 
98 
 
sanitation expansions, advanced social development, sustained economic growth, and 
political stability (Dow, et al., 2003, p. 16). 
Using individual-level data, and eliminating time-invariant unobserved bias by 
using fixed effects, Dow et al. (2003) found a small effect of health insurance on child 
mortality.  They estimate an insurance-mortality elasticity of -0.10, or that the health 
insurance expansion in the 1970s explains only about 4% of the decrease in child mortality.  
Their results show a more modest effect than other estimates of the effect because: i) they 
were able to differentiate between the expansion of health insurance and other policy 
changes in the health sector; and ii) they avoided the use of aggregated data by estimating 
individual-level models (they also argue that aggregation can introduce substantial upward 
biases when estimating the effects of health insurance on health). 
Dow and Schmeer (2003) used aggregated data, with fixed effects to control for 
unobservables and an instrumental variables approach, to estimate the impact of health 
insurance on child mortality in Costa Rica. Using the baseline insurance rate for each 
county as an instrument, they find a small effect of health insurance expansion on child 
mortality.  They conclude that “the proposition[s] that health insurance can lead to large 
improvements in infant and child mortality [according to the experience in Costa Rica], 
and that expanding insurance to the poor can substantially narrow socioeconomic 
differentials in mortality …” are questionable (Dow and Schmeer, 2003, p. 975).  They 
conclude that there is little support for the argument that “health sector reforms focusing 
on insurance can by themselves address serious health problems such as infant and child 




Brazil’s health system is, in theory, one of universal healthcare coverage.  The Sistema 
Unico de Saudade (SUS) is the public system that was “based on the principle of health as 
a citizen’s right and the state’s duty” (Paim, et al., 2011, p. 1778) and was implemented in 
1988.  This system was implemented along with the decentralization of many government 
functions, which included the transfer of publicly owned healthcare facilities from the 
federal government to states and municipalities.  In a country of high levels of regional and 
social inequalities, this process led to underfunding in the poorest regions.55  Thus, despite 
offering comprehensive care, people face significant barriers when they seek care through 
SUS. 
These barriers to healthcare result in a situation where one would gain access only 
when willing to pay for it, either by paying out of pocket for private services or purchasing 
private, supplemental coverage.  This was fostered by the government’s strong support to 
the development of an exclusive private sector. 
This led to the formation of “a complex network of complementary and competitive 
service providers and purchasers, forming a public–private mix that is financed mainly by 
private funds” (Paim, et al., 2011, p. 1785).  The Brazilian healthcare system can be divided 
in three sectors: the public sector (SUS), the private services sector, and the private health 
insurance sector.  Healthcare services in the public sector, SUS, are financed and provided 
by all levels of government: federal, state, and municipal.  The private services sector, 
                                                 
55 Although the federal government has some redistribution mechanisms to finance care in the poorest 
regions, these are not enough to overcome the serious inequalities in Brazil. 
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either for-profit or non-profit, is financed in various ways with a mix of public or private 
funds.  Finally, the private health insurance sector is formed by various forms of health 
plans, each with different benefits coverage, premiums that correspond to these benefits, 
and tax subsidies that provide incentives to purchase these plans. 
Nyman and Barleen (2005) explored the Brazilian case and addressed the 
endogeneity problem by restricting their analysis to people who were recently diagnosed 
with an acute illness or a chronic condition.  The restriction on the sample would mitigate 
the bias produced by endogeneity as it is expected that the insurance status of this 
population would not change after the diagnosis; for those uninsured previous to the 
diagnosis it would be (prohibitively) expensive to find private coverage after being 
diagnosed and, for those insured, the decision to obtain coverage would have been 
exogenous to this health shock.  Using this health shock, they found that health insurance 
has a positive effect on self-reported health status.  Among those with an acute illness, 
having insurance increases (reduces) the probability of self-reporting a better (worse) 
health status when compared to the uninsured (Nyman and Barleen, 2005, pp. 11–12, Table 
4).  Similarly, those with a chronic condition have a higher probability of reporting a better 
health status if they have some insurance coverage (Nyman and Barleen, 2005, p. 12, Table 
7). 
4.2.3. Colombia 
In the early 1990s, Colombia began a progressive phase of state modernization, which 
included a package of reforms that affected many sectors.  In the health sector, a significant 
expansion of health insurance coverage was designed with the goal of gradually reaching 
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universal coverage.  In fifteen years, Colombia’s insurance rate quadrupled.  Mainly 
through expansions of the subsidized regime, the insurance coverage rate grew from 20% 
in 1993 to 80% in 2007 (Miller, et al., 2009). 
A National Fund, Colombia’s Solidarity and Guarantee Fund (FOSYGA), was 
designed to receive funds from two regimes: the contributory, for people who have the 
ability to pay a premium (in practice, the formally employed and their families), and the 
fully subsidized, for the poor.  Financed by a combination of private (payroll taxes and 
deductions) and public (general taxation) funds, FOSYGA was designed to provide cross-
subsidies from the wealthy to the poor, the healthy to the sick, and the young to the old.  
Individual choice is embedded in the system as people choose their plan (and insurer) and 
FOSYGA pays their premium.56 
In the contributory regime, every formal employee, which includes self-employed 
people, who contributes 12.5% of his or her salary57 receives coverage for themselves and 
their families.  In the subsidized regime, everyone who is identified as eligible58 is granted 
coverage at no cost.  However, in practice, due to budgetary limits not everyone who is 
eligible for the subsidized regime obtains coverage.59  Given this constraint, priority is 
given to pregnant and lactating women, children under five years of age, people with 
disabilities, and displaced populations (Pinto, 2008). 
                                                 
56 Although, in practice, most cities have only one available insurer (Miller, et al., 2009). 
57 Employers are responsible for a contribution of 8.5% of the employee salary, while the employee 
contributes the remaining 4%. 
58 Eligibility to the subsidized regime is determined by a system, SISBEN, that uses a proxy means test to 
approximate family wealth.  This system is very similar to Peru’s SISFOH. 




In this context, Miller, et al. (2009) used a regression discontinuity design approach 
combined with the use of an instrumental variable60 to explore the effect of enrollment in 
the subsidized regime on health status.  They find that enrollment produces: 1) a 1.3 days 
reduction in the time a child is absent from usual activities due to illness, and 2) a 35 
percentage points reduction in children reporting cough, fever, or diarrhea.  They argue 
that these effects are strongly related to increases in preventive care observed among 
enrollees, which suggests that the supply–side, cost–containing incentives play an 
important role in Colombia’s results from coverage expansions.61 
Giedion, et al. (2009) used two alternative approaches, propensity score matching 
and matched double difference, and obtained inconclusive results.  They evaluate the 
effects of the subsidized regime on five different health outcomes, related mainly to 
newborns and children.62  Their results find no relationship between health insurance and 
health, with the exception of an effect on low birth weight.  At the national level, they 
found a lower incidence of extremely low birth weight using the propensity score matching 
estimator.  In rural areas, they found a reduction in the incidence of low birth weight and 
extremely low birth weight, but only when using the matched double differences estimation 
method.  However, their analysis is based on a cross-sectional survey and limits the checks 
of robustness of their results, as they cannot find a credible identification strategy. 
                                                 
60 They use a simulated SISBEN score to predict and instrument for enrollment. 
61 Miller, et al. (2009) find that enrollment in the subsidized regime is associated with an increase in the 
probability of a preventive visit within a year of 29 percentage points.  They also find that enrolled children 
had 1.24 more growth monitoring and well-care visits than uninsured children. 
62 These measures are: 1) survival of children under five; 2) health status perception score; 3) low birth 




Much like in Peru, by the turn of the millennium health insurance in Mexico was 
limited to formally employed workers (and small group who could pay full premiums to a 
small private market).  The Social Security System guaranteed that every employee in the 
formal sector would have health insurance coverage for themselves and their families.  
However, a structural characteristic of the labor market, namely having a high rate of 
employment in the informal sector, meant that insurance rates were relatively low.  
Catastrophic health expenditure was a major issue in the country, which led to the 
introduction of a set of reforms with the objective of providing “social protection in health” 
to a significant number of people: 50 million uninsured Mexicans (King, et al., 2009).  One 
of the most important components of this reform was the implementation of Seguro 
Popular in 2002.  This program provides its enrollees with insurance coverage based on a 
well defined benefits package, which includes coverage for 266 unique health interventions 
and 312 medicines recommended for treating 95% of the disease burden (Barros, 2008).  
Within this package, beneficiaries have full coverage for their healthcare; there are no 
deductibles or co-payments. 
Since its design, Seguro Popular was planned to have a progressive expansion.  The 
main eligibility criterion for Seguro Popular is not being a beneficiary of the Social 
Security System.  Although most families in the informal sector are among the poorest, the 
program has no explicit targeting system based on poverty at the individual level.  
However, the program focused its expansion on the poorest regions. 
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Seguro Popular is administered by states, although it is financed mainly by the 
Federal government.  In 2006, for every family enrolled by the program the federal 
government transferred to the states approximately $660 per year.  States also made a 
contribution of approximately $130 per family per year (Barros, 2008). 
The Seguro Popular does not seem to have had a strong effect on health outcomes.  
Taking advantage of the identification strategy provided by the irregular expansion of the 
program, Knox (2008) uses a modified difference-in-differences analysis on panel data for 
2002, 2003, and 2004.  She finds that although small and driven by the effect on a specific 
group of the population, females aged 31 – 55, there is a slight increase in the number of 
days that people report as being sick or that they cannot perform their daily activities due 
to illness.  The author argues that this result may be explained by an increased awareness 
about health that people gain when they increase their use of healthcare services, especially 
when the analysis uses self-reported measures of health; these results can be driven by 
individuals’ perception of their own health. 
Using a triple difference approach,63 Barros (2008) provides an intention–to–treat 
estimate of the effect of Seguro Popular on a set of outcomes.  This approach implies that 
the control group is defined by people who are covered by the Social Health Insurance, 
instead of people who are eligible but chose not to enroll.  He provides estimates for two 
health-related outcomes: the probability of experiencing health problems and reports that 
the health of a user improved after receiving healthcare, and he finds no significant 
difference in either outcome.  Barros argues that “the program had a negligible effect on 
                                                 
63 Barros’ approach uses a triple-difference analysis taking differences over: 1) the targeted state intensity, a 
measure of the goal for a state’s expansion rate, 2) time, and 3) eligibility to the program. 
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the health of beneficiaries, perhaps because the quality of care was low” (Barros, 2008, p. 
1). 
King, et al. (2009) studied an outreach program that was implemented using a 
randomized experiment at the community level: they defined 74 matched–pair clusters.  
The treatment consisted of encouraging people to enroll a year prior to the planned rollout 
of Seguro Popular in their communities, e.g. informing beneficiaries of Oportunidades, a 
pre-existing conditional cash transfer program, that they were automatically enrolled in 
Seguro Popular.  The authors used non–parametric methods to estimate intention–to–treat 
and complier average causal effects on a set of outcomes, including self–reported health, 
over a ten-month period.  Although they found significant reductions in catastrophic 
healthcare expenditures and in health expenditure, there was no significant effect on health 
outcomes (or healthcare utilization). 
4.2.5. Summary 
As discussed in detail above, empirical studies have not found strong, conclusive evidence 
about the relationship between health insurance and health; some studies find a positive 
(but mild) effect, and some studies find no effect at all (Levy and Meltzer, 2001 and 2008; 
Giedion and Diaz, 2009; and Giedion, Alfonso, and Diaz, 2013).  These results suggest 
that there may not be a strong relationship, but the fact that this is a relationship that is 
difficult to estimate may also explain this inconclusiveness. 
As found in other literature reviews, methodological issues present more challenges 
for the study of this relationship than for the others studied in Chapters 2 and 3 (Giedion, 
Alfonso, and Diaz, 2013).  First, some studies focused on a health outcome that is not 
106 
 
directly related to the intervention or the services that are affected by the coverage 
expansion.  In fact, very few health insurance programs specify goals related to the health 
of their beneficiaries, and most programs have comprehensive benefits, which makes it 
more difficult to estimate a causal effect on a single health outcome.  Second, some studies 
conduct evaluations over a relatively short time period that does not allow sufficient time 
to show some effect of health insurance coverage on health.  It seems that health insurance 
may affect health, but not immediately; it may take many years for someone with health 
insurance to see their health improved due to this coverage.  Third, the data available to 
study this relationship (using sound methodologies) are relatively scarce, especially in the 
developing world.  Most of these data come from surveys that are cross-sectional; even 
though these surveys are repeated over time, they do not follow the same individuals.  And 
when longitudinal data are available, they are repeated in rounds that are four or six years 
apart, which may be too long to study the effects of participating in a program.  For 
example, one individual may not have been enrolled in round 1 of the survey, but then 
enrolled the following year and disenrolled the year after; the data may omit such 
information. 
In the case of Peru’s SIS, although it does not have an explicit goal related to the 
health of its beneficiaries, the initial priority focused on the enrollment of pregnant women 
and children, especially young children, and the funds allocated to their care suggest that 
one goal of the program was to improve the health outcomes for this population (e.g., 
reduce infant and maternal moralities, reduce malnutrition among children).  This priority 
has implications for the data to be used in this study.  Thus, the following section discusses 




There are two sources of data for this analysis: i) the Encuesta Demográfica y de Salud 
Familiar (DHS); and ii) the Young Lives Study. 
4.3.1. The Demographic and Health Survey 
The Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) program has been implementing household 
surveys throughout the world since 1984.  DHS surveys have been collecting information 
from over 90 countries, and in Peru they are called the Encuesta Demográfica y de Salud 
Familiar.  The program is administered by ICF International, and in Peru the survey is 
collected by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática, the government’s statistics 
agency, which provides official estimates of key socio-economic indicators, such as 
poverty, maternal and infant mortality, and malnutrition. 
The main objective of the DHS is to provide information for a set of indicators 
relevant to population, health, and nutrition.  Although the survey provides information for 
the entire population in the country, it focuses on and provides more detailed information 
for women between 15 and 49 years of age and their children born alive in the last 60 
months.  Topics covered by the DHS include: child health; nutrition and anemia; infant and 
child mortality; maternal health and mortality; fertility; family planning; HIV prevalence; 
knowledge, attitudes, and behavior; women’s empowerment; gender and domestic 
violence; education; household composition and basic demographic characteristics of the 
household members; access to services related to environmental health; and wealth. 
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In Peru, the DHS is a nationally representative survey, with representative inference 
at the departmental level.64  In addition to the domains covered by the standard DHS 
survey, data on children’s and women’s insurance status and type are included in Peru’s 
DHS, which allows one to identify SIS enrollment.65  The first survey was conducted in 
1986, and additional surveys were implemented in 1992, 1996, and 2000.  Subsequent 
surveys were collected annually starting in 2004. 
The sampling strategy of this survey was changed after the survey that was 
implemented in 2000.  First, although it is not a longitudinal study, starting in 2004 the 
DHS-Peru has been collected continuously every year; it changed its design from annual 
to multiannual cross-sections; instead of collecting data for 30,000 households in 2004, the 
design divided this sample over four years: 2004-2007.  This is known as the Interim or 
Continuous DHS .  Datasets are available for every year in the period 2004-2020.  The 
purpose of this change was to be able to have estimates by pooling 3 or 4 years after a few 
rounds of the survey that could be updated annually.66  Despite the smaller sample size, 
each annual cross-section was designed to be nationally representative, although for a 
smaller set of indicators.  Indicators such as infant or maternal mortality and 
anthropometric data require an aggregation of three to four years of data. 
The second change was that in 2008, and later in 2009, the sample size was 
increased.  In 2008, the government made a structural change in the way budgeting is 
programmed for most agencies, and this change required annual data to follow some key 
                                                 
64 Peru has 24 departments and an additional province that has administrative autonomy from any department. 
65 The 2000 DHS identifies coverage through the Mother and Child Insurance program, as SIS was not 
implemented yet. 
66 The plan was to have most indicators annually starting in 2006, the exceptions being indicators that require 
a big sample (e.g., maternal mortality) and would need the pooled sample of four consecutive surveys. 
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indicators.  Instead of programming the national budget based on a set of activities 
historically performed, the budget was going to be planned based on a set of national 
priorities.  These priorities were expressed in a group of measurable goals set for every 
year, reducing malnutrition and maternal and infant mortality among them.  Since this 
budgeting process required continuous, annual data, the sample of the DHS was adjusted 
to provide this information; the sample was increased in 2008, and the following years, to 
be able to estimate these indicators at the departmental level. 
These two main changes to the sampling strategy had important changes for the 
sample collected in each survey.  Table 0.1 summarizes the changes in sample sizes from 
2000 to 2014: i) the reduction of the sample size in 2004, and ii) the increase in sample 
size in 2008 (and 2009). 
These two main changes to the sampling strategy had important changes for the sample 
collected in each survey.  Table 0.1: DHS Sample Size, 2000 – 2014 






2000 33,046 131,062 29,423 13,697 65,453 
2004 7,063 27,756 6,251 2,537 13,692 
2005 6,148 28,458 6,214 2,631 13,666 
2006 7,552 29,879 6,625 2,779 14,258 
2007 8,573 29,217 6,399 2,696 14,313 
2008 14,469 53,372 11,968 4,835 24,636 
2009 27,709 105,225 24,212 10,289 50,084 
2010 27,756 101,409 22,947 9,281 46,780 
2011 27,709 98,662 22,517 9,146 46,194 
2012 28,376 103,211 23,888 9,620 47,261 
2013 28,324 99,097 22,920 8,983 44,725 
110 
 
2014 30,361 108,536 24,872 9,610 47,633 
Author’s analysis of the 2000-2014 DHS-Peru. 
Given that I use an Instrumental Variables approach, with the program’s enrollment 
goal as instrument, I am limited to the period of the first administration that ran the program 
until mid-2006.  Thus, I aggregate data from 2004 and 2005 and obtain a universe of 5,168 
children born up to 60 months prior to the time their mothers were interviewed for this 
survey. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, SIS intended to provide health insurance to the 
vulnerable population who could not afford other forms of insurance.  This excluded people 
who were eligible to obtain coverage through the Peruvian Social Health Insurance 
program: EsSalud.  This program covered every employee in the “formal” labor market, 
and SIS explicitly denied coverage to anyone who was covered by this other program. 
I exclude from this analysis children who were eligible for coverage through the 
Peruvian Social Health Insurance at the time of the survey, as measured by having a 
household member who was covered by this program.  In addition, children included in the 
dataset who were dead at the time of the interview are also excluded due to lack of 
information for the main outcomes under analysis.  This, leaves a total of 3,940 children 
under 5 in the sample. 
The 2004-2005 DHS has 5 main outcomes to evaluate children’s health; whether 
these children had: i) diarrhea, ii) blood in stools, iii) cough, iv) difficulty breathing, and 
v) fever in the last 2 weeks. 
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As mentioned before, the DHS provides information at various levels: household, 
household members, women aged 15-49, and their children.  Using these data, I select 10 
variables as covariates for these analyses: 
 child’s age, 
 child’s sex, 
 mother’s education level (i.e., no education, elementary, secondary, some college, or 
college graduate), 
 mother’s employment status, 
 mother’s relationship to the head of the household (i.e., head, head’s wife, head’s 
relative, non-relative), 
 sex of the head of the household, 
 household’s wealth level (belonging to one of five quintiles), 
 community’s altitude (in meters), 
 community’s natural region (capital city, Coast, Highland, High Rainforest, Low 
Rainforest), and 
 community’s urbanicity (large city, small city, or town). 
Other variables were included as covariates in previous versions of the analyses but 
were later discarded due to their lack of contribution in explaining the first or second stage 
outcomes.  Some of these variables were: the source of drinking water in the household, 
characteristics of the sewage network, a continuous household’s wealth index, and a 
different measure of the community’s density. 
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4.3.2. The Young Lives Study 
The Young Lives Study is a longitudinal study focused on the dynamics of childhood 
poverty.  It is being conducted in four developing countries: Ethiopia, India (in the states 
of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana), Peru, and Vietnam.  As an international study, this is 
an initiative that involves a network of organizations, led by the Department of 
International Development at the University of Oxford.  The main partner organization in 
Peru is the Grupo de Análisis para el Desarrollo (GRADE). 
This study planned to follow children and their families, with a special focus on the 
children’s caregivers, for about 16 years: from 2002 to 2017.  The first round was 
conducted in 2002 and targeted children who were born either between 2001 and 2002 (6 
to 18 months old at the time of the survey) or between 1994 and 1995 (7.5 and 8.5 years of 
age in 2002).  These children were then followed, so that data were gathered again in 2006 
and in 2009.  However, in 2009 children were not asked about their health insurance status, 
which means that the 2009 (and 2013 and 2017) data will not be used in my analysis. 
In total, the study followed approximately 12,000 children in each of the four 
countries.  The distribution of the sample per cohort was approximately 2:1 favoring the 
younger children, i.e.  the younger cohort has data for approximately 2,000 children aged 
1 year in 2002.  The younger cohort in Peru started with 2,052 children in 2002, of which 
1,963 were re-contacted in the second round (2006).  Although this attrition rate is small 
relative to other longitudinal studies in developing countries, this attrition is not random 
(Outes-Leon and Dercon, 2008).  It has been found that urban, poorer, and less educated 
households were more likely to attrite.  However, there is little evidence of attrition bias 
113 
 
when conducting analysis of child anthropometric and school enrollment outcomes, 
especially when controlling for a set of observable variables (Outes-Leon and Dercon, 
2008). 
The analysis in this chapter will focus on the younger cohort for two reasons.  First, 
the larger sample provides more power for statistical inference.  Second, and more 
importantly, the effects of having health insurance, and the increased probability in 
healthcare utilization that comes with it, are generally larger among younger children than 
among school–aged children.  The younger cohort moves from 1 to 5 years of age between 
Round 1 and Round 2 of the survey, which is a critical age range for children’s 
development, one in which access to healthcare can have a significant effect over many 
health outcomes, such as malnutrition. 
In each round, information was gathered on the child’s current and past health, 
childcare, education and work (if the child was of working age), other daily activities, 
hopes and aspirations for the future, how they feel they are treated by others, and parental 
background.  In addition, the caregiver was asked for his or her perceptions, attitudes, and 
aspirations for the child and the family. 
Of special interest for this analysis is the information about insurance status and 
type, and anthropometric measures of the child and his or her caregiver.  The 
anthropometric data allow for the assessment of the child’s nutritional status throughout 
both rounds, as well as control for genetics using the height and weight of the caregiver, 
who is typically the mother. 
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It should be noted that the question asking about insurance type changed between 
the first and second rounds.  Specifically, one of the categories in the first round was having 
an insurance provided by the “Government,” which was later changed to having an 
insurance provided by “Seguro Integral de Salud.”  Despite this slight change, results 
should be comparable throughout both rounds.  It is likely that in 2002, when SIS was 
implemented as a program that replaced the previous two government insurance programs: 
Seguro Escolar Gratuito and Mother and Child Insurance, it was more convenient to have 
a vague category as “Government”; even if SIS were already implemented by the time of 
the interview, people could have not known the new program when asked about it if they 
were more familiar with the old programs. 
In addition to the individual level data, the Young Lives surveys also collect 
household and community level data.  Topics included in the household questionnaires are: 
demographic composition, assets and financial support, food and non-food consumption 
and expenditure, socio-economic status, social capital, economic changes, and recent life 
history.  The community data include information about infrastructure and services, health 
and education facilities, community networks, crime, and environmental changes. 
The sampling method used by the Young Lives Study presents a potential limitation 
for the external validity of this study.  First, although the households were randomly 
selected within each sentinel site, these 20 sentinel sites were not randomly selected.  The 
sample was drawn to oversample poor areas, but also to ensure representation of each 
country’s diversity.   
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In addition, the sampling strategy in Peru included a country-specific feature: it 
excluded the districts ranked at the top five percent of the national poverty map developed 
by the government for the year 2000 (Escobal and Flores, 2008).  These issues challenge 
the data’s representativeness of the population in Peru.  In fact, the Young Lives Study was 
not designed to be representative at the national level.  However, it has been found that 
estimates from the Young Lives Study in Peru are similar to those from two nationally 
representative surveys: the Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO) and the Encuesta 
Demográfica y de Salud Familiar (DHS).  For example, after applying sampling weights, 
poverty rates were similar for the Young Lives Study and the ENAHO, which is used to 
measure the official poverty rates in Peru.  It is concluded that “while not suited for simple 
monitoring of child outcome indicators, the Young Lives sample will be an appropriate 
and valuable instrument for analyzing causal relations and modeling child welfare, and its 
longitudinal dynamics in Peru” (Escobal and Flores, 2008, p iv). 
Finally, since the goal of this study is to explore the effects of gaining SIS coverage, 
my focus lies on children who were initially uninsured and later gained coverage through 
SIS.  This implies a small sample size because only 586 (30%) of the Young Lives younger 
cohort are reported as being uninsured in 2002.  In particular, of the 1,963 children who 
were interviewed in Rounds 1 and 2, 1,150 reported in 2002 that they had some form of 
insurance coverage from the government.  One possible explanation is that the study 
oversampled children in departments where the Mother and Child Insurance program had 
been previously operating; the interest of the study in exploring the dynamics of poverty 
led them to focus on the poorest districts of the country which were also targeted by 
government programs.  The main implication from having a high percentage of children 
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enrolled in SIS in Round 1 is that an Average Treatment Effect will not be possible to 
estimate.  Instead, I will focus in estimating the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
as I will try to match those who were uninsured in 2002 and reported having SIS coverage 
in 2006 with those who reported being uninsured in both rounds. 
4.4. Theoretical Model 
Some economists argue that a major contribution to the field of health economics is the 
model of the demand for health by Michael Grossman (1972), the first economic 
explanation of the characteristics of health and how people make decisions to determine its 
optimal level (Culyer, 1981; Muurinen, 1982; and Wagstaff, 1986).  Grossman presented 
health as a stock of human capital that depreciates over time but can also be increased.  
Investments in health can be made through a “household production function” that is 
determined by the consumption of inputs (e.g., medical care, time inputs, etc.).  However, 
as depicted in traditional economic models, these inputs imply a positive cost to consumers 
who have limited resources.67  Thus, consumers find the optimal level of health, along with 
optimal levels of other desirable goods and services, that maximize their utility given these 
restrictions and production functions. 
Using Grossman’s assumption about people’s preferences for health, as a desirable 
good but not necessarily valued above all others, I formulate the average individual’s utility 
function: 
                                                 
67 In the case of medical services, even when enrolled in SIS there are other costs associated with consuming 
these services.  See the theoretical model in Chapter 2 for a discussion of these costs. 
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  iii CHUU ,  (4.1) 
where Hi represents the individual’s health status and Ci his or her level of consumption. 
Since the individual’s preferences are modeled as non–lexicographic, there exists a 
quasi–concave utility function: U( ), which can be maximized by consuming optimal levels 
of health and other goods. 
An individual’s health is determined by his or her consumption of health inputs.  In 
his work on child mortality, Schultz (1984) presents an improved model for this health 
production function.  He discusses the idea that there might be some characteristics of the 
individual, such as biological endowments, that affect simultaneously the demand for 
health inputs and child health outcomes (see Figure 0.1).  Given that these characteristics 
are unobservable, simple OLS estimation of the health production function using cross-
sectional data would yield biased results. 
For the purpose of my analysis, I will disaggregate Schultz’s demanded inputs into 
medical care, Mi, other observable health inputs, Oi, such as sanitation, food, etc., 
biological endowments, Bi, and a random error, e1i: 
  iiiii eBOMHH 1,,,  (4.2) 
I make the assumption that this function is quasi-concave in health inputs: H'( ) > 0 and 
H"( ) < 0. 
Following, Schultz’s diagram, aside from the biological endowments, the demand 
for these health inputs is determined by economic endowments, Ei; regional, price, and 
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program variables, Vi; unobserved preferences, Pi; and other unobserved factors, e2Oi.  The 
following equation represents these relations: 
  Oiiiiii ePBVEOO 2,,,,  (4.3) 











Source: Schultz (1984). 
However, the demand for medical care is also determined by the insurance status 
of the individual; as observed in Chapter 2, health insurance through SIS increases the 
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  Miiiiiii ePBVESMM 2,,,,,  (4.4) 
Using these expressions, the reduced form that corresponds to the health production 
function can be expressed as:  
  iOiMiiiiiii eeePBVESHH 122 ,,,,,,,  (4.5) 
Equation 4.5 represents the main relationship to be estimated in this chapter as it 
depicts the way health insurance enrollment (through SIS) affects health outcomes.  As 
pointed out by Schultz, one needs to be careful when estimating these functions as using 
ordinary least squares on (4.5) would produce biased estimates due to unobserved 
determinants (and endogenity): enrollment in SIS is correlated with the health outcomes 
via the biological endowments, preferences, and other unobserved factors that affect 
enrollment.  Clearly, estimation methods need to address this fundamental issue to estimate 
the relationship between health insurance (through SIS) and health.  The following section 
discusses these issues in detail. 
4.5. Methods 
The choice of the econometric methods to estimate equation 4.5 depends on the data source 
that is used.  Thus, for the synthetic panel created using the DHS-Peru 2004-2013, I propose 
to combine instrumental variables with a first differenced estimation method.  For the 
Young Lives data, I combine propensity score matching with difference-in-differences 
estimation that compares children who gained insurance through SIS between Rounds 1 
and 2 with children who remained uninsured in both rounds. 
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4.5.1. Instrumental Variables 
As in Chapters 2 and 3, I first use an Instrumental Variables approach to address the 
potential simultaneity existing in the relationship between health and health insurance 
coverage.  To isolate the effect of having health insurance, in particular SIS, on children’s 
health I use the program’s enrollment goals as the instrument.  I argue that these goals, 
which are defined by SIS officials, affect the likelihood of people being enrolled in the 
program, but do not affect children’s health directly after controlling for some other 
children’s characteristics and those of their family and household. 
4.5.2. Difference-in-differences Matching Estimator 
By pairing each individual treated with someone from the non–treated group in the sample, 
matching methods attempt to create a control group, a group that is equivalent to the treated 
group in all factors except that of having received the treatment.  When used correctly, and 
when the method’s assumptions are satisfied, the control group can be a correct 
approximation to the counterfactual of the treatment group. 
The propensity score is based on the premise that the treatment is not randomly 
assigned, but rather depends stochastically on a set of observable variables, Xi.  This 
method can be used when treatment is targeted to some population defined by some 
observable characteristics, which exemplifies the case of SIS using an algorithm that is 
calculated from a set of observable characteristics of the individual’s household, which 
then determines program eligibility. 
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The fundamental assumption for any matching method is conditional independence 
between the dependent variable (health) and program participation (enrollment in SIS): 
  iiCiTi XSISHH |,  , where TiH and CiH  represent individual i‘s health when being treated 
and when not being treated, and SISi denotes enrollment.  Using the propensity score 
theorem formulated by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), this assumption implies that 
   iiCiTi XpSISHH |,  , where    iii XSISPXp |1  is the propensity score.  In other 
words, if the conditional independence assumption is valid for Xi, then it is also valid for 
p(Xi). 
One additional assumption that is required by this matching method is that the 
propensity score falls between 0 and 1 (i.e.   10  iXp ), which is known as the common 
support assumption. 
The main advantage of using this method is that it simplifies matching since the 
high dimensionality of the problem makes matching a very difficult process, especially 
when Xi is a large set of variables.  Thus, matching on a scalar, the propensity score, instead 
of a set of variables reduces the problem to a single dimension and simplifies the matching 
procedure significantly.  This advantage applies only when the propensity score is 
estimated parametrically, which introduces parametric assumptions about p(Xi).  However, 
one can be very flexible in this parametric specification of the matching model.  In addition, 
using a probit (or logit) model helps satisfy the assumption about the boundaries of the 
propensity score. 
One potential limitation of matching methods is the possibility of not finding a non–
treated observation that matches some of the treated observations.  This presents a problem, 
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especially when the effect of program participation is heterogeneous.68  This highly 
depends on how rich the data are, and the matching method must be adjusted to the specific 
context of the data and the program under evaluation.  Using the propensity score, I will 
create a control group based on different matching methods: i) nearest neighbor with 
replacement, ii) nearest 3 neighbors with replacement, iii) kernel matching, and iv) kernel 
matching where weights depend on the distance between the treated and the control being 
matched.  As detailed in the following section, relatively few observations are lost even 
when reducing the bandwidth (or caliper) to the lowest level considered (1%), regardless 
of the matching method used. 
Matching will be based on a set of observable variables from the children in the 
sample that were obtained in the first round of the study (i.e., in 2002).  These variables 
include characteristics of the children, their prenatal experiences (obtained by their 
mothers’ recall), and characteristics of their caregivers and households.  In addition, some 
health outcomes in 2002 will be incorporated as matching variables to produce a control 
group with similar health, in an attempt to reduce the possibility that the conditional 
independence assumption is not satisfied.  In either case, this procedure implies that both 
groups: treatment and control, will be matched pre–treatment. 
The main limitation of using this approach is that there might be some factors 
determining participation that are not observable, which implies that the conditional 
independence assumption is incorrect.  However, the problem of selection on 
                                                 
68 If this effect is assumed to be homogeneous, these unmatched observations could be ignored and estimates 
would still be unbiased.  However, if effects are heterogeneous, strict consistency is achieved only for the 
population in the common support, the matched sample, and it could be threatened when there is a 
considerable loss of observations. 
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unobservables can be reduced by combining this method with difference-in-differences 
estimation.  Using this approach allows one to ignore time-invariant unobservable 
characteristics that determine participation.  Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997 and 
1998) and Blundell and Costa-Dias (2000) suggest that when combined with difference-
in-differences, the conditional independence assumption for matching can be stated in 
terms of the pre–post evolution instead of levels of the outcome.  In our case, this means 
that this assumption can be re-expressed as:  iiCiCi XpSISHH |01  , where CiH 0  and CiH 1  
represent pre- and post-SIS health for individual i.  “It means that controls have evolved 
from a pre- to a post-programme period in the same way treatments would have done had 
they not been treated.  This happens both on the observable component of the model and 
on the unobservable time trend” (Blundell and Costa–Dias, 2009, p. 451). 
Furthermore, since I am mostly interested in estimating the average treatment effect 
on the treated (ATT), where the focus is on those that have been treated and HT is known, 
the condition can be weakened to: ii
C
i XSISH | .  Again, just as in the case of cross–
sectional matching, the theorem formulated by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) can be 
applied to reformulate this assumption into  iiCi XpSISH | .  For the ATT estimation, 
the support assumption also weakens to   1iXp . 
Following the general recommendation of Blundell and Costa-Dias (2009), the 
estimator for the effect of SIS enrollment on health for those enrolled, when using 
propensity score matching with longitudinal data, is: 












jjijii wHHWHH 0101̂  (4.6) 
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where ̂  is the average treatment effect on the treated, Wij is the kernel-weight placed on 
comparison observation j for individual i, and wij represents the reweighting that 
reconstructs the outcome distribution for the treated sample. 
4.5.3. Creating the Treatment and Control Groups, Young Lives Study 
Even though the first round of the Young Lives Study was implemented in 2002, the same 
year SIS operations began, 59% of the sample reported being covered by SIS that year.  It 
is possible that a group of children in the study were previously enrolled in the Mother and 
Child Health Insurance program and their coverage rolled over to SIS, which would justify 
such a high enrollment rate.  In addition, SIS had a major expansion in its first year of 
operations for young children, which could have increased coverage in the regions were 
the study focused (see Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1). 
In contrast, only 30% of the first round sample reported being uninsured.  Given 
that my main interest is evaluating the effect of gaining SIS coverage on children’s 
nutritional status, I focus on the group of children who gained SIS coverage; those who 
were uninsured in 2002 and reported being enrolled in SIS in 2006.  In total, the Young 
Lives Study in Peru has information on 172 children who gained SIS coverage, which is 
the treatment group for this analyses. 
A pool of 358 children compose the universe for the control group: children who 
were uninsured at both time periods, 2002 and 2006.  I use Propensity Score Matching to 
further define the control group by pairing children who gained SIS coverage with those 
who were uninsured in both time periods using a set of observable characteristics.  I 
perform this matching using 27 variables with information from 2002.  The variables I use 
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for matching include characteristics of the child: sex, race and ethnicity, and breastfeeding 
practices; characteristics of the pregnancy: overall assessment, the month of the first 
antenatal care visit, place of birth, weight at birth, and number of weeks at birth; a set of 
the caregiver’s characteristics: relationship to the child, weight and height, literacy and 
education, birth history, race and ethnicity, and marital status; and characteristics of the 
household: urbanicity, ownership of the house, and water supply and sewage. 
Due to the small sample size, I conduct a more robust sensitivity analysis by trying 
12 different matching specifications: four propensity score functions and three different 
bandwidths (or calipers).  The four propensity score functions I use to assess the sensitivity 
of the results to these matching choices are: nearest neighbor, nearest 3 neighbors, kernel-
Epanechnikov, and kernel quartic (biweight).  I also use 5%, 2.5%, and 1% as bandwidths 
(or calipers for the kernel functions).  In addition, I also estimate the effect of SIS on 
children’s malnutrition without matching at the baseline. 
However, the main results I present were obtained using a kernel quartic function 
and a 1% bandwidth in the matching process.  Using this bandwidth, I lose only 11 
observations from the treatment group because they lie outside of the common support 
region.  The wider bandwidths of 5% or 2.5% would both result in 7 cases without a match, 
respectively.  An additional 4 cases lost in comparison to the wider bandwidth is an 
acceptable loss for the gains of having a closer match, especially since 11 observations 
represent only 6.4% of the treatment group. 
In terms of matching functions, the kernel functions seem to perform better; the 
matching resulting from using these functions yield fewer significant differences between 
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groups post-matching (see Table C.5 in Appendix C).  Using these functions and a caliper 
of 1%, only one variable has a post-matching difference in means between groups with a 
probability of accepting the null hypothesis below 10%.69  In contrast, when using nearest 
neighbor functions a higher number of variables still have different means at the different 
levels of bandwidths. 
Thus, I report the results of using the kernel quartic with a 1% bandwidth for the 
pre-treatment matching, using data from 2002 when the children in the sample were only 
1 year of age.  After matching both groups’ observations based on children’s characteristics 
in 2002, I study the effect of gaining SIS coverage in 2006 on their nutritional status 
measured by three outcomes: height-for-age, BMI-for-age, and weight-for-age z-scores. 
Using the Young Lives Study, I focus on equation 4.15: 
     iiiii SSYY   0101  (4.7) 
Under the assumptions made above, estimation of equation 4.7 provides consistent 
estimates of the impact of SIS enrollment on Y. 
This relationship could vary by the age of the child.  For example, the weight-for-
age z-scores could differ at 5 months of age and at 14 months for the same child, everything 
else constant.  Thus, I also estimate equation 4.16 to capture this heterogeneity in the impact 
of SIS enrollment on Y. 
                                                 




       iiiiiiiii AgeAgeSSSSYY   00010101  (4.8) 
When presenting the estimates related to equation 4.8, I will not report estimates of the 
coefficients (e.g., ), but I rather focus on the marginal effect of SIS enrollment on 
malnutrition: δi  = (Yi1 - Yi0)/ (Si1 - Si0). 
4.5.4. Children’s Health Outcomes 
Using the SIS annual enrollment goals for each geographic jurisdiction as an instrument, I 
estimate the effect of having SIS coverage on five health events and symptoms that are 
highly prevalent among children in Peru: having had diarrhea, bloody stools, fever, cough, 
or difficulty/rapid breathing in the last two weeks. 
Diarrhea and bloody stools are very common among children and are a leading 
cause for children’s underdevelopment in Peru.  Among the population of children in the 
DHS sample, 15.3% reported having had diarrhea in the last two weeks, and 1.5% reported 
blood being present in their stools.  When this is a frequent event, children cannot retain 
the nutrients needed for their growth and, even when they have regular access to food and 
a sufficient, balanced diet, this could lead to delayed growth and stunting.  An immediate 
risk of diarrheas is dehydration, which can be easily treated with liquids, especially an oral 
rehydration solution (ORS) which is a prepackaged sachet of glucose and electrolytes 
available in all healthcare facilities.70 
                                                 
70 This rehydration solution can also be made at home diluting six teaspoons of sugar and 0.5 teaspoons of 
salt in one liter of water. 
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Fevers are a common symptom indicating a general problem in a person’s health, 
usually the presence of a virus or bacterial infection.  Among children, fevers that last over 
1-3 days require a healthcare professional evaluation as prolonged fevers are associated 
with febrile seizures.71  This symptom was present in almost one out of four children in the 
population under analysis. 
Coughing among children, and especially having difficulty breathing, are 
symptoms of acute respiratory infections.  In fact, rapid breathing can be an indication of 
pneumonia.  Some complications from this are organ failure caused by bacteria in the 
bloodstream that transmits the infection, lack of oxygen due to the difficulty breathing, 
fluid accumulation around the lungs, and lung abscesses.  In Peru, these symptoms are 
fairly common, as 37.9% of children in this analyses had a cough in the last two weeks, 
and 17.7% had short, rapid breaths. 
In addition to these five health outcomes, I use three different indicators of 
children’s nutritional status, all measured by z-scores: height-for-age, BMI-for-age (as a 
substitute for weight-for-height), and weight-for-age.  Using the first and second rounds of 
the Young Lives Study, I focus on children, 6-18 months of age in 2002, who were 
uninsured in 2002 and compare their z-scores and their different measures of nutritional 
status72 at both time periods. 
                                                 
71 General recommendations suggest that newborns with a temperature over 30 C (or 100.4 F) should seek 
care as soon as detected, whereas children over 2 years of age should only seek care when the fever lasts over 
3 days.  
72 Consistently with the standard definition, I define stunting, wasting, and underweight as having a height-
for-age, BMI-for-age, and weight-for-age z-score, respectively, below –2. 
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Height-for-age is a long-term measure of malnutrition; it is a measure of cumulative 
health that is not sensitive to short-term changes in children’s nutritional status. When in 
deficit, this measure indicates chronic or frequent illness (or chronic inadequate nutrition).  
Cases were the height-for-age z-score of a child is extremely low, below –2, are usually 
considered to represent pathological shortness.  In fact, these cases are commonly 
interpreted as moderate or severe stunting. 
The common measure for current nutritional status is the weight-for-height z-score.  
However, the Young Lives Study for Peru had a portion of missing data for this variable 
in round 2.  Instead, I use as substitute information on the children’s Body Mass Index 
(BMI) relative to the child’s age, another indicator that measures weight relative to height.  
However, the BMI information cannot be used directly and had to be standardized for 
children based on their age and sex, as the BMI is very sensitive to age among children.  
The advantage is that the BMI-for-age z-score is also sensitive to short-term changes in a 
child’s nutritional status.  In addition, the BMI z-score can also be used to produce 
estimates of wasting, a BMI-for-age z-score below –2, and obesity, a BMI-for-age z-score 
over 2. 
The weight-for-age z-score is a relative measure of body mass and age.  This z-
score can be considered to be a composite measure of height-for-age and weight-for-height 
(O’Donnell, 2008, p. 40).  Thus, it is not straightforward to interpret results related to this 
measure, as it combines cumulative and current growth and health deficits.  Despite this 
problem, this measure is commonly used for monitoring growth and to assess changes in 




In this section, I present estimates of the reduced form of the determinants of health 
(equation 4.5). More specifically, I estimate the impact of SIS coverage on two categories 
of children’s health outcomes: i) children’s health events and health symptoms (i.e., having 
had diarrhea, bloody stools, fever, cough, or difficulty breathing in the last two weeks), and 
ii) children’s malnutrition (i.e., children stunted, wasted, overweight, and underweight).  
The choice of these health outcomes is based on data availability and their relevance as 
these health outcomes affect and are important indicators of children’s physical 
development. 
I use the Peru DHS to analyze the effect of SIS on children’s health events and 
symptoms, while the analysis of the Young Lives data is limited to the effect of SIS on 
children malnutrition. 
4.6.1. Health Events and Symptoms 
Using an Instrumental Variables approach, I estimate that SIS has no significant effect on 
these five health events and symptoms.  Table 4.2 shows the estimated effect of being 
enrolled in SIS over this set of health outcomes (see Table C.2 in Appendix C for full 
results of the regressions). 
Although four estimates have a positive sign, suggesting that SIS enrollment would 
increase the likelihood of children under five years of age reporting these symptoms in the 
last two weeks, none of these is statistically different from zero.  The estimate for having 
blood in their stools is negative, although it is also not statistically significant.  These results 
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suggest that SIS does not affect short-term health among its enrollees under five years of 
age. 
 
Table 4.2: Instrumental Variables Estimated Effect of SIS on Children’s Health 







Diarrhea 0.0259 0.2217 1.000 
Bloody stools -0.0661 0.1050 1.000 
Fever 0.3099 0.3451 1.000 
Cough 0.0111 0.3358 1.000 
Short, rapid breaths 0.2299 0.2464 1.000 
Notes: Statistical significance indicates the probability that the coefficient is zero, which were 
estimated using the False Discovery Rate (FDR) control. 
 Robust standard errors estimated clustered at sampling cluster. 
 The overall sample size is 3,940 children under 5 years of age. 
 Author’s analysis of the 2004-2005 DHS-Peru. 
 
All first-stage regressions of these estimates pass the tests for underidentification 
and weak identification (see Table C.1 in Appendix C). 
In addition, I estimated the effects of SIS on these health outcomes for children 
under two years of age, which is a sub-group with higher prevalence of these health 
outcomes.73  Although these estimates show lower q-values, they are still not statistically 
significant (see Table C.4 in Appendix C).  These estimates are reported in the Appendix 
                                                 
73 Using the DHS, 2005, I estimate that 15.3% of all children under five reported having diarrhea in the past 
two weeks, whereas 21.8% of children under two years of age report the problem. 
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because the tests for excluded instruments and underidentification cannot rule out 
weakness of the instrument for this smaller sample (see Table C.3 in Appendix C). 
4.6.2. Nutritional Status 
The estimated marginal effects of gaining SIS coverage on these malnutrition indicators, δ 
in equations 4.7 and 4.8, are presented Table 4.3.  Most estimates are not statistically 
different from zero, indicating that enrolling in SIS would not improve their nutritional 
status. 
According to the p-values, the only significant relationship is between SIS coverage 
and children’s underweight (i.e., BMI-for-age z-score below -2) (see Table C.12 in 
Appendix C).   However, after adjusting these p-values to account for Multiple-Hypothesis 
Testing, I find that SIS does not have a significant effect on any of these malnutrition 
outcomes (see Table 4.3). 
Given the small sample size for this analysis resulting from the high enrollment rate 
of children in SIS at the baseline of the Young Lives Study, I conduct a sensitivity analysis 
consisting of using 4 different propensity score functions and 3 different bandwidths in the 
matching process (see Tables C.6-12 in Appendix C).  Estimates of not matching the two 
groups at the baseline are also shown as a reference in all tables.  This means that I produce 
a total of 13 estimates for each health outcome; the one presented on Table 4.3 and 12 




Despite very few differences in the estimates’ sign, the different combinations of 
matching functions and bandwidths produce similar estimates.  In general, there are fewer 
differences when estimating the effect on relative malnutrition outcomes (i.e., stunting, 
wasting, obesity, and underweight), than when estimating the effect on the continuous z-
scores.  However, all estimates are not statistically significant (q<0.1). 
Table 4.3: Difference-in-differences Matching Estimator for the Effect of SIS on 







Height-for-age Z-score    
       Base specification 0.0276 0.146 1.000 
       Age interaction 0.0542 0.122 1.000 
Stunting (height-for-age z-score < -2)    
       Base specification 0.0454 0.0634 1.000 
       Age interaction 0.0410 0.0621 1.000 
BMI-for-age Z-score    
       Base specification 0.0254 0.1330 1.000 
       Age interaction 0.0223 0.1310 1.000 
Wasting (BMI-for-age z-score < -2)    
       Base specification -0.0096 0.0210 1.000 
       Age interaction -0.0083 0.0210 1.000 
Obesity (BMI-for-age z-score > 2)    
       Base specification -0.0038 0.0455 1.000 
       Age interaction -0.0034 0.0455 1.000 
Weight-for-age Z-score    
       Base specification -0.0270 0.0913 1.000 
       Age interaction -0.0036 0.0889 1.000 
Underweight (weight-for-age z-score < -2    
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       Base specification -0.0587 0.0258 0.396 
       Age interaction -0.0599 0.0271 0.396 
Notes: Statistical significance indicates the probability that the coefficient is zero, which were estimated 
using the False Discovery Rate (FDR) control. 
 Robust standard errors estimated clustered at sampling site level. 
 Author’s analysis of the Young Lives Study, Peru, rounds 1 and 2 (2002 and 2006). 
4.7. Discussion 
I do not find strong evidence of a positive effect of being enrolled in SIS on children’s 
health.  This is consistent with other studies of the relationship between health insurance 
coverage and health.  My study suffers from two data limitations in estimating the effect 
of SIS on children’s health: one set of indicators is a group of health symptoms assessed 
by the survey’s respondents for a very short referral period (last two weeks), and the small 
sample size of one data source weakens the statistical power to evaluate small effects on 
the outcomes. 
When assessing whether enrollment in SIS has an effect on having had diarrhea, 
bloody stools, fever, cough, or difficulty breathing among children under 5 years of age, I 
find no statistically significant effects.  The period for which these symptoms are reported 
is only the two weeks prior to the survey interview and this small window is likely a very 
noisy measure of current health for children.  However, these results cannot rule out the 
possibility that SIS coverage could improve children’s health if we measured it in a longer 
period of time. 
Thus, I also focus on children’s nutritional status using their anthropometric 
outcomes.  Even though a child’s nutritional status depends on factors that fall outside of 
health interventions (e.g., food security), in developing countries these indicators also 
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reflect the health history of a child.  For example, frequent episodes of uncontrolled 
diarrhea in an infant could lead to growth delays and stunting. 
However, I do not find significant results of the effect of SIS coverage on children’s 
malnutrition indicators.  The significant results for underweight reported in Table C.10 in 
Appendix C are likely to be false rejections of the null hypothesis; when adjusting for 
Multiple-Hypothesis Testing, these estimates fall outside of the statistical significance 
range (q>0.1). 
These results are limited by small sample sizes and imperfect, self-reported 
measures of children’s health outcomes.  The DHS-Peru collects additional data on 
children’s health (e.g., hemoglobin levels and anthropometric outcomes).  Unfortunately, 
this only covers a portion of the 2005 sample that is not considered to be representative for 
reporting on these outcomes. 
Improving children’s health involves a deep change in people’s behavior, which is 
only achieved after accessing to abundant information about adequate health practices 
enforced by parents for a prolonged time.  In addition, timely access to needed healthcare, 
even for minor illnesses and symptoms such as diarrhea and fever, can help prevent further 
complications, malnutrition (e.g., stunting), and the development of chronic health 
conditions.  If SIS can facilitate continued access to these services, it has of producing an 


















The Seguro Integral de Salud (SIS) is a publicly-operated health insurance program in Peru 
that was created in 2002 to complement the subsidies already existing through the 
nationwide network of public healthcare providers.  Since 2002, SIS has had four main 
objectives: i) increasing access to healthcare; ii) targeting healthcare toward the poor and 
vulnerable; iii) improving the allocation of public resources; and iv) increasing healthcare 
capital and investment in public facilities.  This dissertation focuses on assessing SIS’ 
success in achieving its first two objectives.  In addition, I estimate the effect of SIS on 
individuals’ out-of-pocket expenditures in healthcare and their probability of incurring 
catastrophic healthcare expenditures.  Lastly, I focus on the effect that SIS had in the health 
of children under five years of age. 
Results from this dissertation make important contributions to the study of the 
effect of health insurance on health and healthcare utilization and expenditures.  First, this 
is the first rigorous study of SIS, a program that in 2019 provided health insurance for 48% 
of the population in Peru.  All previous analyses are descriptive or focus on statistical 
associations between SIS enrollment and healthcare outcomes.  Second, I use a unique 
feature of the early stages of the program to define the identification strategy of my 
analyses.  Instrumental Variables is not an approach widely used in the study of the effects 
of health insurance.  I argue that SIS’ enrolment goals for each geographic jurisdiction are 
a valid instrument in this case; SIS’ enrollment goals affect individuals’ probability of 
enrolling in the program but do not affect directly their health outcomes or consumption of 
healthcare.  Third, due to the richness of data available about access to healthcare by type 
of service in Peru, I estimate the effect of SIS on a large number of types of services for 
each relationship I study.  However, the analysis of this number of outcomes has a high 
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chance of finding false rejections to the null hypothesis of the estimate being statistically 
equal to zero.  Thus, I incorporate the estimation of “sharpened” q-values for each estimate 
to control for Multiple-Hypothesis Testing in my analyses. 
In Chapter 2, I assess SIS’ success in achieving its first two objectives: increasing 
healthcare access, and having a bigger impact on the poor and vulnerable.  Although 
consistent with other studies that find a positive effect of SIS on healthcare utilization, this 
Chapter helps identify the type of services in which SIS has a positive effect: preventive 
services such as regular annual checkups, immunizations, and children wellness checkups.  
Interestingly, I also find that SIS decreases the probability of its enrollees of purchasing 
corrective lenses, which is explained by providers’ practices of rejecting these medical 
equipment to SIS enrollees.  As SIS could not timely reimburse these providers for their 
services, the latter refrained from providing their services. 
In addition, I find that SIS’ effect on healthcare utilization is greater for non-poor 
enrollees, even for types of services where SIS does not have an effect on the whole 
population.  Thus, by increasing healthcare utilization more among the non-poor, SIS is 
widening the gap in access to healthcare by poverty status.  This finding highlights the 
importance of complementing the implementation of any health insurance program with a 
strategy that expands the healthcare supply.  If the poor face geographical barriers to obtain 
healthcare (e.g., some may reside in an area where the nearest healthcare facility is many 




In Chapter 3, I estimate the effect of SIS on individuals’ out-of-pocket expenditures 
and households’ probability of incurring a catastrophic healthcare expenditure.  I find that 
SIS decreases out-of-pocket expenditures in dental care visits, purchasing corrective 
lenses, immunizations, and children’s wellness checkups.  Due to their potential cost 
savings effects, health insurance programs prioritize preventive care.  This is the case of 
SIS, as enrolling in SIS leads to an increase in utilization of these services and it also leads 
to decreased out-of-pocket expenditures. 
Chapter 3 also provides evidence of the extent in which implementation problems 
that SIS experienced affect SIS’ effects on their enrollees’ healthcare expenditures.  As 
mentioned before, SIS persistent debts with healthcare providers forced them to reject 
covered services for its enrollees, or even illegally charge for these services.  These 
practices have meant that SIS enrollees have increased their out-of-pocket expenditures in 
adjunct services due to the program.  For example, provider could have charged patients 
for an MRI needed before a surgery, when this was covered by SIS.  Individuals enrolled 
in SIS are willing to make out-of-pocket payments for this type of services in order to avoid 
forgoing their overall care or treatment. 
SIS was created as a fund to cover the most common treatments for its population, 
but it did not cover high-cost treatments such as dialysis.  Another fund was created for 
this purpose, the FISSAL.  Consistently, I find in Chapter 3 that SIS has no effect on 
individuals’ probability of incurring a catastrophic healthcare expenditure. 
Chapter 4 provides evidence that, even though SIS increases healthcare utilization 
and it decreases out-of-pocket expenditures for some types of care, especially preventive 
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care, it does not affect children’s health.  Although I face some data limitations, this finding 
is consistent throughout different health outcomes and estimation methods. 
In sum, my dissertation provides evidence that: i) SIS was successful in increasing 
access to healthcare, especially for preventive services; ii) non-poor enrollees have gained 
more from this effect; iii) SIS has reduced individuals’ out-of-pocket expenditures in some 
types of healthcare, while increasing expenditures of adjunct services; iv) SIS has not 
affected their enrollees’ probability of incurring catastrophic healthcare expenditures; and 
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Table A.1: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Enrollment in SIS, 2005, First 










          
Enrollment goals 0.1757*** 0.6980*** 0.0191 0.0557 
 (0.0409) (0.1271) (0.0217) (0.0689) 
Age -0.0072*** -0.0407*** -0.0042*** -0.0034*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0040) (0.0002) (0.0010) 
Sex (male) 0.0103*** 0.0317** 0.0180***  
 (0.0034) (0.0134) (0.0036)  
Preschool (no school) -0.0380*** -0.0304 -0.0173* -0.0090 
 (0.0127) (0.0411) (0.0103) (0.0278) 
Primary (no school) -0.0694*** -0.0246 -0.0301** 0.0092 
 (0.0143) (0.0465) (0.0120) (0.0327) 
Secondary (no school) -0.1543*** -0.0524 -0.0767*** 0.0003 
 (0.0149) (0.0467) (0.0117) (0.0354) 
Post-secondary (no school) -0.1563*** -0.1590*** -0.0702*** -0.0421 
 (0.0158) (0.0567) (0.0120) (0.0376) 
Reads & writes 0.0247** 0.0668** 0.0185** -0.0138 
 (0.0111) (0.0326) (0.0083) (0.0220) 
Speaks indigenous language -0.0510*** 0.0183 -0.0135*** 0.0074 
(0.0079) (0.0322) (0.0046) (0.0157) 
Household members -0.0023* -0.0092** 0.0012 -0.0042* 
 (0.0013) (0.0039) (0.0009) (0.0025) 
Sex of HH head (male) -0.0173*** 0.0043 -0.0053 -0.0064 
 (0.0057) (0.0226) (0.0043) (0.0202) 
Poor (non-poor) 0.0202*** 0.1073*** 0.0056 -0.0125 
 (0.0061) (0.0257) (0.0038) (0.0244) 
Extremely poor (non-poor) 0.0293*** 0.0804*** -0.0009 0.0099 
 (0.0090) (0.0287) (0.0062) (0.0258) 
Urbanicity (urban) 0.0642*** 0.1588*** 0.0129** 0.0158 
 (0.0093) (0.0260) (0.0050) (0.0134) 
Central Coast (Northern Coast) -0.0025 0.0095 -0.0140** -0.0436** 
 (0.0162) (0.0604) (0.0063) (0.0195) 
Southern Coast (Northern Coast) 0.0126 0.1489*** 0.0057 -0.0469** 
 (0.0141) (0.0509) (0.0097) (0.0206) 
Northern Highlands (Northern Coast) -0.0785*** -0.0928** -0.0216** 0.0266 
 (0.0154) (0.0468) (0.0099) (0.0289) 
Central Highlands (Northern Coast) -0.0032 -0.0306 -0.0070 -0.0083 
 (0.0144) (0.0415) (0.0072) (0.0227) 
Southern Highlands (Northern Coast) 0.0263* 0.0328 0.0079 -0.0254 
 (0.0158) (0.0451) (0.0076) (0.0201) 
Rainforest (Northern Coast) -0.0017 -0.0059 -0.0041 -0.0233 
 (0.0151) (0.0415) (0.0077) (0.0187) 
Metropolitan Lima (Northern Coast) 0.0075 -0.0544 -0.0029 0.0284 
 (0.0142) (0.0487) (0.0074) (0.0296) 
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Constant 0.3665*** 0.2682*** 0.1822*** 0.1883*** 
 (0.0259) (0.0748) (0.0160) (0.0449) 
     
Observations 64,118 7,660 31,157 3,594 
F test for excluded instruments     
     F test 18.44 30.16 0.77 0.65 
     P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.3804 0.4189 
Sanderson-Windmeijer multivariate Chi-squared test of underidentification:  
    SW Chi-square test 18.46 30.28 0.77 0.66 
     P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.3797 0.417 
Reference group in parentheses for categorical variables   
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     







Table A.2: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Healthcare Utilization, Services 
Used in the Last Four Weeks, 2005, Second Stage (Table 2.2) 
 Doctor's visit Medication Laboratory X rays 
Other 
exams 
            
Enrollment in SIS -0.0167 -0.110 -0.0212 -0.0714 0.0121 
 (0.211) (0.285) (0.0564) (0.0435) (0.0154) 
Age 0.000227 0.000774 0.000477 -0.000200 0.000130 
 (0.00153) (0.00205) (0.000411) (0.000314) (0.000112) 
Sex (male) 0.0304*** 0.0550*** 0.00483** 0.00612*** 0.000985** 
 (0.00481) (0.00611) (0.00191) (0.00141) (0.000484) 
Preschool (no school) 0.0311** 0.0248 0.00989* 0.00167 -0.000555 
 (0.0125) (0.0163) (0.00505) (0.00375) (0.00105) 
Primary (no school) 0.0261 0.0108 0.00853 -0.00350 0.000270 
 (0.0188) (0.0245) (0.00660) (0.00500) (0.00157) 
Secondary (no school) -0.00708 -0.0290 -0.00300 -0.0103 0.00119 
 (0.0358) (0.0465) (0.0108) (0.00820) (0.00265) 
Post-secondary (no school) 0.0132 -0.0249 0.00695 -0.00469 0.00398 
 (0.0376) (0.0484) (0.0110) (0.00824) (0.00299) 
Reads & writes -0.0117 -0.00871 0.00236 0.00405 0.000608 
 (0.0107) (0.0137) (0.00440) (0.00331) (0.000868) 
Speaks indigenous language -0.0201 -0.0398** -0.00367 -0.00303 -0.000635 
(0.0124) (0.0160) (0.00399) (0.00299) (0.000861) 
Household members -0.000621 -0.000811 0.00116** 0.000605** 3.00e-05 
 (0.00132) (0.00174) (0.000517) (0.000287) (8.83e-05) 
Sex of HH head (male) 0.00506 0.00284 -0.00228 -0.00301 0.000327 
 (0.00789) (0.00965) (0.00308) (0.00204) (0.000664) 
Poor (non-poor) -0.0649*** -0.065*** -0.025*** -0.0124*** -0.00179** 
 (0.00782) (0.0107) (0.00280) (0.00198) (0.000753) 
Extremely poor (non-poor) -0.121*** -0.151*** -0.031*** -0.0146*** -0.0020*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0145) (0.00320) (0.00219) (0.000740) 
Urbanicity (urban) -0.0311** -0.064*** -0.00375 0.00142 -0.000933 
 (0.0154) (0.0206) (0.00400) (0.00310) (0.00117) 
Central Coast (Northern Coast) -0.0334** -0.083*** -0.012*** -0.0079*** -0.00200 
 (0.0170) (0.0213) (0.00437) (0.00269) (0.00144) 
Southern Coast (NC) 0.00660 -0.064*** -0.00416 -0.00153 -0.00126 
 (0.0212) (0.0234) (0.00581) (0.00343) (0.00136) 
Northern Highlands (NC) -0.0221 -0.0176 -0.018*** -0.00645* -0.00208* 
 (0.0169) (0.0215) (0.00504) (0.00332) (0.00120) 
Central Highlands (NC) -0.0262** -0.055*** -0.017*** -0.00227 -0.00215** 
 (0.0116) (0.0147) (0.00374) (0.00232) (0.000999) 
Southern Highlands (NC) -0.00604 -0.0463** -0.0114** 0.00408 -0.00268** 
 (0.0152) (0.0190) (0.00500) (0.00354) (0.00120) 
Rainforest (NC) -0.0297** -0.0299* -0.00602 -0.00213 -0.0025*** 
 (0.0130) (0.0154) (0.00396) (0.00219) (0.000935) 
Metropolitan Lima (NC) -0.0634*** -0.113*** -5.16e-05 0.000644 -0.00200* 
 (0.0123) (0.0148) (0.00531) (0.00301) (0.00114) 
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Constant 0.250*** 0.447*** 0.0284 0.0330* -0.00253 
 (0.0919) (0.123) (0.0245) (0.0188) (0.00642) 
      
Observations 64,118 64,118 64,118 64,118 64,118 
R-squared 0.019 0.021 0.015 -0.038 -0.006 
Reference group in parentheses for categorical variables    
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      







Table A.3: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Healthcare Utilization, Services 
Used in the Last Three Months (Part I), 2005, Second Stage (Table 2.2) 
  Preventive Dental Eyes Glasses 
          
Enrollment in SIS 1.726*** -0.159 -0.0945* -0.111** 
 (0.534) (0.110) (0.0568) (0.0500) 
Age 0.00882** -0.00113 -7.87e-05 -0.000474 
 (0.00387) (0.000802) (0.000430) (0.000361) 
Sex (male) 0.0752*** 0.00509* -0.000598 0.00124 
 (0.00906) (0.00300) (0.00172) (0.00149) 
Preschool (no school) 0.0945*** 0.00844 0.00642 0.00118 
 (0.0313) (0.00707) (0.00392) (0.00351) 
Primary (no school) 0.151*** 0.0116 0.00486 -0.00203 
 (0.0450) (0.0100) (0.00606) (0.00511) 
Secondary (no school) 0.270*** 0.0154 0.00240 -0.00582 
 (0.0871) (0.0190) (0.0106) (0.00897) 
Post-secondary (no school) 0.287*** 0.0739*** 0.0267** 0.00732 
 (0.0878) (0.0216) (0.0122) (0.00934) 
Reads & writes -0.0422* 0.00998* 0.00674** 0.00503* 
 (0.0252) (0.00551) (0.00329) (0.00296) 
Speaks indigenous language 0.0516* -0.0114* -0.0103*** -0.0123*** 
(0.0311) (0.00672) (0.00381) (0.00345) 
Household members -0.00155 -0.000743 -0.000125 -0.000274 
(0.00283) (0.000768) (0.000439) (0.000325) 
Sex of HH head (male) 0.00103 0.00728 0.00613* 0.000493 
 (0.0152) (0.00556) (0.00366) (0.00294) 
Poor (non-poor) -0.0271 -0.0452*** -0.0156*** -0.0124*** 
 (0.0174) (0.00558) (0.00253) (0.00196) 
Extremely poor (non-poor) -0.0736*** -0.0578*** -0.0125*** -0.00928*** 
 (0.0254) (0.00644) (0.00282) (0.00249) 
Urbanicity (urban) -0.0927** -0.00110 0.000137 0.00303 
 (0.0431) (0.00821) (0.00388) (0.00357) 
Central Coast (Northern Coast) 0.0151 -0.0117 -0.00586 -0.00581* 
 (0.0227) (0.00951) (0.00408) (0.00334) 
Southern Coast (Northern Coast) 0.0614** 0.0175** -0.00162 -0.00274 
 (0.0304) (0.00805) (0.00426) (0.00318) 
Northern Highlands (Northern Coast) 0.0567 0.00662 -0.0110*** -0.00826** 
 (0.0397) (0.00937) (0.00402) (0.00357) 
Central Highlands (Northern Coast) 0.0960*** 0.0174** -0.000949 0.00284 
 (0.0322) (0.00688) (0.00331) (0.00297) 
Southern Highlands (Northern Coast) 0.0826** 0.0437*** 0.00734 0.00977** 
 (0.0369) (0.00828) (0.00513) (0.00456) 
Rainforest (Northern Coast) -0.000814 0.0120* -0.00241 0.00173 
 (0.0309) (0.00661) (0.00331) (0.00293) 
Metropolitan Lima (Northern Coast) 0.0282 0.0199** 0.00981* 0.00136 
 (0.0243) (0.00914) (0.00534) (0.00374) 
Constant -0.518** 0.124** 0.0372 0.0505** 
 (0.230) (0.0486) (0.0257) (0.0218) 
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Observations 64,118 64,118 64,118 64,118 
R-squared -1.737 -0.009 -0.024 -0.086 
Reference group in parentheses for categorical variables   
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     






Table A.4: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Healthcare Utilization, Services 
Used in the Last Three Months (Part II), 2005, Second Stage (Table 2.2) 
  Immunization 
Child's 
checkup Birth control Other 
          
Enrollment in SIS 1.822*** 0.658*** 1.142 0.213 
 (0.559) (0.188) (1.839) (0.157) 
Age 0.0107*** -0.117*** 0.00470 0.00262** 
 (0.00405) (0.00856) (0.00774) (0.00115) 
Sex (male) 0.0133 -0.0434** 0.0736** 0.0308*** 
 (0.00884) (0.0186) (0.0345) (0.00386) 
Preschool (no school) 0.0841** 0.0397 0.0442 0.0325*** 
 (0.0332) (0.0394) (0.0329) (0.00995) 
Primary (no school) 0.137*** 0.0548 0.0586 0.0454*** 
 (0.0481) (0.0438) (0.0557) (0.0148) 
Secondary (no school) 0.275*** 0.0654 0.103 0.0695** 
 (0.0916) (0.0510) (0.140) (0.0274) 
Post-secondary (no school) 0.291*** 0.114* 0.0922 0.0912*** 
 (0.0929) (0.0660) (0.129) (0.0302) 
Reads & writes -0.0521* -0.0199 -0.00796 0.00194 
 (0.0268) (0.0358) (0.0358) (0.00748) 
Speaks indigenous language 0.0694** -0.0210 0.0100 -0.00752 
(0.0322) (0.0302) (0.0240) (0.00819) 
Household members 0.00184 -0.00441 -0.00370 -0.00127 
 (0.00302) (0.00416) (0.00254) (0.000942) 
Sex of HH head (male) 0.0284* -0.0203 -0.0292** 0.00907 
 (0.0153) (0.0255) (0.0121) (0.00620) 
Poor (non-poor) -0.0335* -0.0875*** 0.000448 -0.0394*** 
 (0.0180) (0.0331) (0.0121) (0.00629) 
Extremely poor (non-poor) -0.0825*** -0.0966*** -0.00770 -0.0513*** 
 (0.0270) (0.0331) (0.00991) (0.00804) 
Urbanicity (urban) -0.106** -0.0714* -0.0186 -0.0160 
 (0.0450) (0.0382) (0.0272) (0.0123) 
Central Coast (Northern Coast) 0.0142 0.0736 0.0231 -0.0869*** 
 (0.0261) (0.0636) (0.0301) (0.0133) 
Southern Coast (Northern Coast) 0.0389 0.0732 0.00639 -0.0913*** 
 (0.0266) (0.0487) (0.0166) (0.0108) 
Northern Highlands (Northern Coast) 0.0746* 0.104*** -0.0279 -0.0112 
 (0.0424) (0.0369) (0.0366) (0.0131) 
Central Highlands (Northern Coast) 0.120*** 0.0707** -0.0198 -0.0835*** 
 (0.0340) (0.0352) (0.0183) (0.0108) 
Southern Highlands (Northern Coast) 0.0852** 0.0963*** -0.0372* -0.0440*** 
 (0.0388) (0.0348) (0.0195) (0.0125) 
Rainforest (Northern Coast) 0.00503 -0.0387 0.000618 -0.0372** 
 (0.0329) (0.0413) (0.0127) (0.0147) 
Metropolitan Lima (Northern Coast) 0.0302 0.142*** -0.0203 -0.0488*** 
 (0.0255) (0.0476) (0.0156) (0.0124) 
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Constant -0.626*** 0.420*** -0.184 -0.0184 
 (0.242) (0.105) (0.345) (0.0691) 
     
Observations 64,118 7,660 31,157 64,118 
R-squared -2.905 0.064 -0.848 -0.018 
Reference group in parentheses for categorical variables   
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     









Table A.5: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Healthcare Utilization, Services 
Used in the Last Twelve Months, 2005, Second Stage (Table 2.2) 
  Hospitalization 
Pregnancy's 
checkup Birth 
        
Enrollment in SIS -0.0910 5.070 2.110 
 (0.0765) (6.074) (3.128) 
Age -0.000189 0.0103 0.00124 
 (0.000552) (0.0223) (0.0113) 
Sex (male) 0.0201***   
 (0.00318)   
Preschool (no school) 0.0106* 0.103 0.0212 
 (0.00600) (0.140) (0.0758) 
Primary (no school) 0.00880 -0.0379 -0.0522 
 (0.00826) (0.169) (0.0952) 
Secondary (no school) 0.00278 -0.00120 0.00901 
 (0.0133) (0.169) (0.0899) 
Post-secondary (no school) 0.00309 0.203 0.0851 
 (0.0143) (0.291) (0.159) 
Reads & writes 0.00190 0.102 0.0410 
 (0.00562) (0.139) (0.0770) 
Speaks indigenous language -0.00599 -0.0661 -0.00775 
(0.00496) (0.105) (0.0589) 
Household members 0.00191*** 0.0341 0.0312** 
 (0.000658) (0.0275) (0.0147) 
Sex of HH head (male) 0.00111 0.0147 0.0218 
 (0.00396) (0.113) (0.0544) 
Poor (non-poor) -0.0165*** -0.0320 0.0275 
 (0.00364) (0.122) (0.0608) 
Extremely poor (non-poor) -0.0231*** -0.132 -0.0509 
 (0.00450) (0.148) (0.0771) 
Urbanicity (urban) -0.00492 -0.106 -0.0858 
 (0.00613) (0.122) (0.0648) 
Central Coast (Northern Coast) -0.0101** 0.146 0.0587 
 (0.00495) (0.315) (0.164) 
Southern Coast (Northern Coast) 0.00333 0.301 0.105 
 (0.00965) (0.354) (0.191) 
Northern Highlands (Northern Coast) -0.0197*** -0.208 -0.0287 
 (0.00568) (0.250) (0.129) 
Central Highlands (Northern Coast) -0.0150*** 0.0230 0.0367 
 (0.00500) (0.112) (0.0635) 
Southern Highlands (Northern Coast) -0.00410 0.109 0.0605 
 (0.00635) (0.175) (0.0964) 
Rainforest (Northern Coast) -0.000405 0.0211 0.0538 
 (0.00513) (0.138) (0.0755) 
Metropolitan Lima (Northern Coast) 0.00520 -0.164 -0.133 
 (0.00537) (0.157) (0.0819) 
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Constant 0.0529 -0.580 -0.153 
 (0.0328) (1.274) (0.653) 
    
Observations 64,118 3,594 3,594 
R-squared -0.016 -7.179 -1.610 
Reference group in parentheses for categorical variables   
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    





Table A.6: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Doctor’s Visits Using Different 










            
Enrollment in SIS -0.0167 2.128 0.122 -0.0280 -0.0710 
 (0.211) (4.517) (0.305) (0.180) (0.167) 
Age 0.000227 0.0157 0.00123 0.000146 -0.000164 
 (0.00153) (0.0326) (0.00221) (0.00130) (0.00121) 
Sex (male) 0.0304*** 0.00825 0.0290*** 0.0305*** 0.0309*** 
 (0.00481) (0.0473) (0.00541) (0.00467) (0.00460) 
Preschool (no school) 0.0311** 0.119 0.0368** 0.0306*** 0.0288** 
 (0.0125) (0.191) (0.0151) (0.0117) (0.0116) 
Primary (no school) 0.0261 0.184 0.0363 0.0253 0.0221 
 (0.0188) (0.336) (0.0244) (0.0171) (0.0166) 
Secondary (no school) -0.00708 0.333 0.0149 -0.00887 -0.0157 
 (0.0358) (0.720) (0.0499) (0.0311) (0.0295) 
Post-secondary (no school) 0.0132 0.357 0.0354 0.0114 0.00452 
 (0.0376) (0.728) (0.0515) (0.0332) (0.0315) 
Reads & writes -0.0117 -0.0699 -0.0155 -0.0114 -0.0103 
 (0.0107) (0.126) (0.0120) (0.0104) (0.0104) 
Speaks indigenous language -0.0201 0.0761 -0.0139 -0.0206* -0.0225** 
(0.0124) (0.204) (0.0160) (0.0113) (0.0109) 
Household members -0.000621 0.00450 -0.000291 -0.000648 -0.000751 
 (0.00132) (0.0109) (0.00141) (0.00130) (0.00130) 
Sex of HH head (male) 0.00506 0.0420 0.00745 0.00487 0.00413 
 (0.00789) (0.0806) (0.00893) (0.00760) (0.00752) 
Poor (non-poor) -0.0649*** -0.112 -0.0679*** -0.0646*** -0.0637*** 
 (0.00782) (0.100) (0.00924) (0.00743) (0.00729) 
Extremely poor (non-poor) -0.121*** -0.193 -0.125*** -0.120*** -0.119*** 
 (0.0104) (0.151) (0.0126) (0.00980) (0.00963) 
Urbanicity (urban) -0.0311** -0.174 -0.0403* -0.0304** -0.0275** 
 (0.0154) (0.301) (0.0211) (0.0135) (0.0129) 
Central Coast (Northern Coast) -0.0334** 0.00371 -0.0310* -0.0336** -0.0343** 
 (0.0170) (0.0805) (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0171) 
Southern Coast (NC) 0.00660 0.0349 0.00842 0.00645 0.00589 
 (0.0212) (0.0662) (0.0208) (0.0212) (0.0214) 
Northern Highlands (NC) -0.0221 0.0927 -0.0147 -0.0227 -0.0250 
 (0.0169) (0.243) (0.0202) (0.0160) (0.0158) 
Central Highlands (NC) -0.0262** -0.0542 -0.0280** -0.0260** -0.0255** 
 (0.0116) (0.0677) (0.0120) (0.0115) (0.0115) 
Southern Highlands (NC) -0.00604 -0.0870 -0.0113 -0.00561 -0.00399 
 (0.0152) (0.168) (0.0176) (0.0145) (0.0143) 
Rainforest (NC) -0.0297** -0.0768 -0.0327** -0.0294** -0.0285** 
 (0.0130) (0.107) (0.0138) (0.0128) (0.0127) 
Metropolitan Lima (NC) -0.0634*** -0.00961 -0.0599*** -0.0637*** -0.0648*** 
 (0.0123) (0.116) (0.0135) (0.0120) (0.0120) 
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Constant 0.250*** -0.667 0.191 0.255*** 0.273*** 
 (0.0919) (1.933) (0.132) (0.0785) (0.0735) 
      
Observations 64,118 64,118 64,118 64,118 64,118 
R-squared 0.019 -2.843 0.038 0.016 0.004 
Columns are regressions on the same outcome using enrollment goals for different sub-groups 
Reference group in parentheses for categorical variables    
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,*p <0.1      






Table A.7: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Children’s Checkups Using 










            
Enrollment in SIS 0.658*** 1.970** 0.818*** 0.635*** 0.538*** 
 (0.188) (0.987) (0.230) (0.175) (0.159) 
Age -0.117*** -0.0627 -0.110*** -0.118*** -0.122*** 
 (0.00856) (0.0419) (0.0103) (0.00809) (0.00744) 
Sex (male) -0.0434** -0.0846* -0.0484** -0.0427** -0.0397** 
 (0.0186) (0.0455) (0.0202) (0.0183) (0.0175) 
Preschool (no school) 0.0397 0.0886 0.0457 0.0389 0.0353 
 (0.0394) (0.0928) (0.0435) (0.0390) (0.0370) 
Primary (no school) 0.0548 0.100 0.0603 0.0540 0.0506 
 (0.0438) (0.102) (0.0486) (0.0434) (0.0410) 
Secondary (no school) 0.0654 0.152 0.0759 0.0638 0.0574 
 (0.0510) (0.121) (0.0560) (0.0505) (0.0479) 
Post-secondary (no school) 0.114* 0.343 0.142* 0.110* 0.0926 
 (0.0660) (0.220) (0.0745) (0.0646) (0.0606) 
Reads & writes -0.0199 -0.119 -0.0320 -0.0182 -0.0108 
 (0.0358) (0.104) (0.0402) (0.0354) (0.0329) 
Speaks indigenous language -0.0210 -0.0793 -0.0281 -0.0200 -0.0157 
(0.0302) (0.0740) (0.0333) (0.0297) (0.0284) 
Household members -0.00441 0.00795 -0.00290 -0.00462 -0.00553 
 (0.00416) (0.0126) (0.00466) (0.00407) (0.00384) 
Sex of HH head (male) -0.0203 -0.0267 -0.0211 -0.0202 -0.0197 
 (0.0255) (0.0489) (0.0277) (0.0253) (0.0241) 
Poor (non-poor) -0.0875*** -0.236** -0.106*** -0.0849*** -0.0740** 
 (0.0331) (0.119) (0.0384) (0.0318) (0.0294) 
Extremely poor (non-poor) -0.0966*** -0.225** -0.112*** -0.0944*** -0.0850*** 
 (0.0331) (0.111) (0.0381) (0.0320) (0.0298) 
Urbanicity (urban) -0.0714* -0.291* -0.0981** -0.0676* -0.0514 
 (0.0382) (0.172) (0.0455) (0.0367) (0.0335) 
Central Coast (Northern Coast) 0.0736 0.131 0.0806 0.0726 0.0684 
 (0.0636) (0.126) (0.0695) (0.0628) (0.0596) 
Southern Coast (NC) 0.0732 0.00227 0.0646 0.0745 0.0797* 
 (0.0487) (0.111) (0.0543) (0.0479) (0.0447) 
Northern Highlands (NC) 0.104*** 0.105 0.104** 0.104*** 0.104*** 
 (0.0369) (0.0901) (0.0416) (0.0363) (0.0342) 
Central Highlands (NC) 0.0707** 0.00194 0.0623 0.0718** 0.0769** 
 (0.0352) (0.0936) (0.0397) (0.0346) (0.0321) 
Southern Highlands (NC) 0.0963*** -0.0271 0.0813** 0.0985*** 0.108*** 
 (0.0348) (0.113) (0.0396) (0.0339) (0.0316) 
Rainforest (NC) -0.0387 -0.156 -0.0530 -0.0367 -0.0281 
 (0.0413) (0.121) (0.0467) (0.0399) (0.0375) 
Metropolitan Lima (NC) 0.142*** 0.382** 0.171*** 0.138*** 0.120*** 
 (0.0476) (0.191) (0.0567) (0.0451) (0.0415) 
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Constant 0.420*** -0.243 0.339*** 0.431*** 0.480*** 
 (0.105) (0.522) (0.127) (0.0986) (0.0903) 
      
Observations 7,660 7,660 7,660 7,660 7,660 
R-squared 0.064 -2.534 -0.096 0.083 0.155 
Columns are regressions on the same outcome using enrollment goals for different sub-groups 
Reference group in parentheses for categorical variables    
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,* p<0.1      









Table A.8: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Enrollment in SIS, 2005, 










          
Enrollment goals 0.1102*** 0.4591*** 0.0071 0.0804 
 (0.0416) (0.1385) (0.0227) (0.0847) 
Enrollment goals * poverty status 0.0933*** 0.2871*** 0.0157* -0.0199 
 (0.0147) (0.0623) (0.0092) (0.0460) 
Age -0.0072*** -0.0405*** -0.0042*** -0.0034*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0040) (0.0002) (0.0011) 
Sex (male) 0.0103*** 0.0312** 0.0181***  
 (0.0034) (0.0135) (0.0036)  
Preschool (no school) -0.0374*** -0.0325 -0.0170 -0.0103 
 (0.0127) (0.0412) (0.0104) (0.0278) 
Primary (no school) -0.0683*** -0.0215 -0.0292** 0.0063 
 (0.0144) (0.0467) (0.0121) (0.0327) 
Secondary (no school) -0.1524*** -0.0511 -0.0755*** -0.0027 
 (0.0150) (0.0469) (0.0116) (0.0364) 
Post-secondary (no school) -0.1541*** -0.1640*** -0.0694*** -0.0440 
(0.0158) (0.0558) (0.0119) (0.0358) 
Reads & writes 0.0248** 0.0669** 0.0189** -0.0160 
(0.0111) (0.0326) (0.0083) (0.0218) 
Speaks indigenous language -0.0513*** 0.0130 -0.0142*** 0.0090 
 (0.0079) (0.0325) (0.0046) (0.0158) 
Household members -0.0025** -0.0091** 0.0010 -0.0040 
 (0.0012) (0.0039) (0.0008) (0.0027) 
Sex of HH head (male) -0.0167*** 0.0052 -0.0052 -0.0064 
 (0.0057) (0.0225) (0.0043) (0.0204) 
Urbanicity (urban) 0.0621*** 0.1461*** 0.0113 0.0210 
 (0.0094) (0.0264) (0.0049) (0.0128) 
Central Coast (Northern Coast) -0.0029 0.0007 -0.0140** -0.0428** 
 (0.0159) (0.0592) (0.0063) (0.0195) 
Southern Coast (Northern Coast) 0.0106 0.1375*** 0.0053 -0.0450** 
 (0.0142) (0.0516) (0.0097) (0.0204) 
Northern Highlands (Northern Coast) -0.0770*** -0.0951** -0.0221** 0.0301 
 (0.0154) (0.0472) (0.0097) (0.0294) 
Central Highlands (Northern Coast) -0.0029 -0.0352 -0.0075 -0.0059 
 (0.0143) (0.0418) (0.0071) (0.0226) 
Southern Highlands (Northern Coast) 0.0271* 0.0286 0.0078 -0.0233 
 (0.0157) (0.0446) (0.0075) (0.0201) 
Rainforest (Northern Coast) -0.0011 -0.0076 -0.0041 -0.0220 
 (0.0151) (0.0417) (0.0077) (0.0186) 
Metropolitan Lima (Northern Coast) 0.0042 -0.0668 -0.0037 0.0315 
 (0.0141) (0.0484) (0.0074) (0.0302) 
Constant 0.3818*** 0.3538*** 0.1853*** 0.1795*** 
 (0.0260) (0.0717) (0.0160) (0.0494) 
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Observations 64,118 7,660 31,157 3,594 
F test for excluded instruments     
     F test 29.66 26.84 1.83 0.47 
     P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.1608 0.6282 
Sanderson-Windmeijer multivariate Chi-squared test of underidentification:  
    SW Chi-square test 17.66 30.17 0.52 0.8 
     P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.4722 0.3699 
Reference group in parentheses for categorical variables   
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     





Table A.9: Instrumental Variables Estimates of the Interaction between 










          
Enrollment goals -0.1017 -0.5470 -0.0492 -0.1107 
 (0.0364) (0.1249) (0.0195) (0.0676) 
Enrollment goals * poverty status 0.3948 1.4556 0.1138 0.1661 
 (0.0158) (0.0503) (0.0068) (0.0232) 
Age -0.0055 -0.0290 -0.0032 -0.0034 
 (0.0003) (0.0037) (0.0002) (0.0007) 
Sex (male) 0.0086 0.0154 0.0136  
 (0.0029) (0.0120) (0.0027)  
Preschool (no school) -0.0195 -0.0197 -0.0157 -0.0066 
 (0.0120) (0.0405) (0.0097) (0.0274) 
Primary (no school) -0.0422 0.0032 -0.0232 0.0145 
 (0.0135) (0.0448) (0.0114) (0.0311) 
Secondary (no school) -0.1109 -0.0261 -0.0555 0.0090 
 (0.0140) (0.0443) (0.0112) (0.0330) 
Post-secondary (no school) -0.0984 -0.0450 -0.0447 -0.0012 
(0.0144) (0.0500) (0.0112) (0.0321) 
Reads & writes 0.0238 0.0341 0.0156 -0.0198 
(0.0105) (0.0312) (0.0074) (0.0212) 
Speaks indigenous language -0.0507 -0.0008 -0.0131 0.0132 
 (0.0074) (0.0310) (0.0037) (0.0146) 
Household members -0.0016 -0.0069 0.0013 -0.0015 
 (0.0011) (0.0034) (0.0008) (0.0020) 
Sex of HH head (male) -0.0092 0.0042 -0.0030 -0.0052 
 (0.0054) (0.0188) (0.0035) (0.0140) 
Urbanicity (urban) 0.0478 0.1027 0.0081 0.0263 
 (0.0086) (0.0254) (0.0044) (0.0113) 
Central Coast (Northern Coast) -0.0039 0.0136 -0.0112 -0.0347 
 (0.0119) (0.0392) (0.0048) (0.0174) 
Southern Coast (Northern Coast) -0.0003 0.0771 -0.0022 -0.0376 
 (0.0112) (0.0371) (0.0071) (0.0194) 
Northern Highlands (Northern Coast) -0.0664 -0.0797 -0.0171 0.0225 
 (0.0146) (0.0428) (0.0094) (0.0293) 
Central Highlands (Northern Coast) 0.0059 -0.0227 -0.0080 -0.0178 
 (0.0128) (0.0376) (0.0061) (0.0213) 
Southern Highlands (Northern Coast) 0.0280 0.0233 0.0054 -0.0259 
 (0.0137) (0.0402) (0.0060) (0.0193) 
Rainforest (Northern Coast) -0.0008 -0.0039 -0.0080 -0.0277 
 (0.0136) (0.0357) (0.0068) (0.0179) 
Metropolitan Lima (Northern Coast) 0.0070 -0.0678 -0.0030 -0.0020 
 (0.0129) (0.0388) (0.0063) (0.0237) 
Constant 0.2734 0.2767 0.1338 0.1665 
 (0.0235) (0.0635) (0.0144) (0.0426) 
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Observations 64,118 7,660 31,157 3,594 
F test for excluded instruments     
     F test 313.93 431.39 139.35 25.74 
     P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Sanderson-Windmeijer multivariate Chi-squared test of underidentification:  
    SW Chi-square test 33.56 64.72 0.67 4.22 
     P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.4116 0.0399 
Reference group in parentheses for categorical variables   
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     






Table A.10: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Healthcare Utilization by 




visit Medication Laboratory X rays 
Other 
exams 
            
Enrollment in SIS 0.522* 0.471 0.155** 0.00683 0.0361 
 (0.292) (0.387) (0.0791) (0.0599) (0.0232) 
Enrollment in SIS * Poverty 
status -0.645*** -0.726*** -0.199*** -0.0896*** -0.0236*** 
 (0.0952) (0.118) (0.0274) (0.0185) (0.00815) 
Age 0.000638 0.00106 0.000677 -0.000117 0.000171 
 (0.00166) (0.00220) (0.000448) (0.000345) (0.000128) 
Sex (male) 0.0310*** 0.0560*** 0.00489** 0.00618*** 0.000939* 
 (0.00495) (0.00639) (0.00197) (0.00142) (0.000486) 
Preschool (no school) 0.0394*** 0.0330* 0.0130** 0.00309 -0.000150 
 (0.0142) (0.0179) (0.00527) (0.00388) (0.00112) 
Primary (no school) 0.0384* 0.0237 0.0127* -0.00162 0.000816 
 (0.0210) (0.0268) (0.00694) (0.00528) (0.00171) 
Secondary (no school) 0.00997 -0.0129 0.00373 -0.00719 0.00208 
 (0.0390) (0.0500) (0.0115) (0.00882) (0.00296) 
Post-secondary (no school) 0.0419 0.00300 0.0181 0.000566 0.00523 
(0.0422) (0.0533) (0.0121) (0.00907) (0.00332) 
Reads & writes -0.00734 -0.00254 0.00323 0.00452 0.000565 
 (0.0113) (0.0143) (0.00436) (0.00327) (0.000889) 
Speaks indigenous language -0.0298** -0.0534*** -0.00557 -0.00402 -0.000566 
 (0.0130) (0.0164) (0.00405) (0.00306) (0.000907) 
Household members -0.00188 -0.00251 0.000842 0.000412 6.92e-05 
 (0.00140) (0.00180) (0.000536) (0.000300) (0.000102) 
Sex of HH head (male) 0.00742 0.00497 -0.00132 -0.00258 0.000471 
 (0.00850) (0.0101) (0.00322) (0.00208) (0.000701) 
Urbanicity (urban) -0.0394** -0.0752*** -0.00527 0.000775 -0.00107 
 (0.0160) (0.0213) (0.00408) (0.00322) (0.00124) 
Central Coast (Northern Coast) -0.0298* -0.0793*** -0.0109** -0.00710** -0.00198 
 (0.0163) (0.0206) (0.00448) (0.00282) (0.00150) 
Southern Coast (NC) 0.00593 -0.0644*** -0.00426 -0.00151 -0.00136 
 (0.0203) (0.0209) (0.00538) (0.00352) (0.00145) 
Northern Highlands (NC) -0.0299 -0.0309 -0.0185*** -0.00667* -0.00186 
 (0.0188) (0.0227) (0.00505) (0.00341) (0.00126) 
Central Highlands (NCt) -0.0245** -0.0546*** -0.0158*** -0.00158 -0.00192* 
 (0.0124) (0.0151) (0.00390) (0.00236) (0.000986) 
Southern Highlands (NCt) -0.00459 -0.0455** -0.0105** 0.00464 -0.00270** 
 (0.0160) (0.0196) (0.00524) (0.00368) (0.00122) 
Rainforest (NC) -0.0314** -0.0326** -0.00617 -0.00216 
-
0.00250*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0160) (0.00412) (0.00230) (0.000954) 
Metropolitan Lima (NC) -0.0576*** -0.108*** 0.00241 0.00176 -0.00165 
 (0.0144) (0.0156) (0.00582) (0.00329) (0.00117) 
170 
 
      
Constant 0.178* 0.381*** -0.000678 0.0198 -0.00653 
 (0.105) (0.138) (0.0279) (0.0216) (0.00779) 
      
Observations 64,118 64,118 64,118 64,118 64,118 
R-squared -0.046 -0.034 -0.016 -0.051 -0.023 
Reference group in parentheses for categorical variables    
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      






Table A.11: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Healthcare Utilization by 
Poverty Status, Services Used in the Last Three Months (Part I), 
 Second Stage (Table 2.3) 
  Preventive Dental Eyes Glasses 
          
Enrollment in SIS 2.201*** 0.0519 -0.0415 -0.0665 
 (0.724) (0.153) (0.0782) (0.0692) 
Enrollment in SIS * Poverty status -0.517** -0.269*** -0.0653*** -0.0532** 
 (0.208) (0.0499) (0.0245) (0.0217) 
Age 0.00939** -0.00102 -3.31e-05 -0.000427 
 (0.00418) (0.000887) (0.000469) (0.000396) 
Sex (male) 0.0749*** 0.00567* -0.000460 0.00133 
 (0.00960) (0.00313) (0.00172) (0.00149) 
Preschool (no school) 0.101*** 0.0123 0.00765* 0.00222 
 (0.0334) (0.00787) (0.00423) (0.00375) 
Primary (no school) 0.161*** 0.0168 0.00631 -0.000820 
 (0.0487) (0.0112) (0.00651) (0.00548) 
Secondary (no school) 0.284*** 0.0236 0.00514 -0.00350 
 (0.0939) (0.0211) (0.0115) (0.00966) 
Post-secondary (no school) 0.307*** 0.0898*** 0.0320** 0.0117 
 (0.0972) (0.0243) (0.0132) (0.0102) 
Reads & writes -0.0408 0.0126** 0.00729** 0.00540* 
(0.0255) (0.00582) (0.00339) (0.00303) 
Speaks indigenous language 0.0481 -0.0169** -0.0114*** -0.0131*** 
 (0.0317) (0.00706) (0.00391) (0.00352) 
Household members -0.00128 -0.00192** -0.000477 -0.000526 
 (0.00292) (0.000791) (0.000454) (0.000334) 
Sex of HH head (male) 0.00322 0.00830 0.00648* 0.000799 
 (0.0161) (0.00577) (0.00376) (0.00298) 
Urbanicity (urban) -0.0995** -0.00360 0.000101 0.00305 
 (0.0449) (0.00861) (0.00410) (0.00372) 
Central Coast (Northern Coast) 0.0150 -0.00821 -0.00456 -0.00481 
 (0.0237) (0.00966) (0.00407) (0.00334) 
Southern Coast (NC) 0.0593* 0.0182** -0.00126 -0.00248 
 (0.0327) (0.00819) (0.00414) (0.00315) 
Northern Highlands (NC) 0.0532 0.00355 -0.0109** -0.00799** 
 (0.0404) (0.00972) (0.00423) (0.00365) 
Central Highlands (Northern Coast) 0.0973*** 0.0189*** -6.89e-05 0.00361 
 (0.0323) (0.00713) (0.00324) (0.00295) 
Southern Highlands (Northern 
Coast) 0.0810** 0.0463*** 0.00846 0.0106** 
 (0.0379) (0.00893) (0.00523) (0.00471) 
Rainforest (Northern Coast) -0.00269 0.0119* -0.00219 0.00191 
 (0.0314) (0.00706) (0.00335) (0.00301) 
Metropolitan Lima (Northern Coast) 0.0331 0.0227** 0.0108** 0.00223 
 (0.0263) (0.0102) (0.00544) (0.00388) 
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Constant -0.579** 0.0895 0.0255 0.0406 
 (0.260) (0.0559) (0.0290) (0.0247) 
     
Observations 64,118 64,118 64,118 64,118 
R-squared -1.908 -0.043 -0.030 -0.090 
Reference group in parentheses for categorical variables   
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     







Table A.12: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Healthcare Utilization by 
Poverty Status, Services Used in the Last Three Months (Part II), 2005, 
 Second Stage (Table 2.3) 
  Immunization 
Child's 
checkup Birth control Other 
          
Enrollment in SIS 2.371*** 0.843*** 1.696 0.491** 
 (0.762) (0.242) (2.872) (0.222) 
Enrollment in SIS * Poverty status -0.594*** -0.212*** -0.332 -0.317*** 
 (0.221) (0.0742) (0.445) (0.0745) 
Age 0.0113** -0.116*** 0.00595 0.00292** 
 (0.00441) (0.00906) (0.0108) (0.00126) 
Sex (male) 0.0129 -0.0455** 0.0680 0.0309*** 
 (0.00948) (0.0193) (0.0478) (0.00396) 
Preschool (no school) 0.0922*** 0.0436 0.0480 0.0374*** 
 (0.0355) (0.0389) (0.0434) (0.0107) 
Primary (no school) 0.149*** 0.0598 0.0663 0.0520*** 
 (0.0522) (0.0434) (0.0747) (0.0161) 
Secondary (no school) 0.292*** 0.0725 0.124 0.0799*** 
 (0.0992) (0.0511) (0.193) (0.0298) 
Post-secondary (no school) 0.314*** 0.142** 0.113 0.109*** 
(0.103) (0.0692) (0.181) (0.0332) 
Reads & writes -0.0507* -0.0259 -0.0128 0.00351 
 (0.0273) (0.0359) (0.0499) (0.00770) 
Speaks indigenous language 0.0656** -0.0235 0.0138 -0.0109 
 (0.0331) (0.0303) (0.0345) (0.00826) 
Household members 0.00216 -0.00488 -0.00347 -0.00183* 
 (0.00314) (0.00434) (0.00287) (0.000959) 
Sex of HH head (male) 0.0310* -0.0209 -0.0275* 0.0105* 
 (0.0164) (0.0260) (0.0160) (0.00640) 
Urbanicity (urban) -0.113** -0.0737* -0.0215 -0.0187 
 (0.0471) (0.0378) (0.0323) (0.0130) 
Central Coast (Northern Coast) 0.0143 0.0834 0.0266 -0.0845*** 
 (0.0279) (0.0657) (0.0404) (0.0141) 
Southern Coast (Northern Coast) 0.0365 0.0724 0.00308 -0.0914*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0518) (0.0212) (0.0117) 
Northern Highlands (Northern 
Coast) 0.0713 0.102*** -0.0224 -0.0124 
 (0.0435) (0.0374) (0.0521) (0.0137) 
Central Highlands (Northern Coast) 0.122*** 0.0721** -0.0188 -0.0814*** 
 (0.0344) (0.0349) (0.0226) (0.0111) 
Southern Highlands (Northern 
Coast) 0.0836** 0.0958*** -0.0408 -0.0425*** 
 (0.0401) (0.0351) (0.0252) (0.0131) 
Rainforest (Northern Coast) 0.00304 -0.0388 -0.000229 -0.0375** 
 (0.0336) (0.0413) (0.0141) (0.0152) 
Metropolitan Lima (Northern Coast) 0.0361 0.147*** -0.0183 -0.0451*** 
 (0.0279) (0.0503) (0.0206) (0.0134) 
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Constant -0.699** 0.345*** -0.244 -0.0632 
 (0.275) (0.125) (0.489) (0.0786) 
     
Observations 64,118 7,660 31,157 64,118 
R-squared -3.215 0.034 -1.367 -0.065 
Reference group in parentheses for categorical variables   
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     






Table A.13: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Healthcare Utilization by 
Poverty Status, Services Used in the Last Twelve Months, 2005, 
 Second Stage (Table 2.3) 
  Hospitalization 
Pregnancy's 
checkup Birth 
        
Enrollment in SIS 0.0323 4.794 1.857 
 (0.106) (4.155) (2.297) 
Enrollment in SIS * Poverty status -0.141*** -0.988 -0.310 
 (0.0345) (1.169) (0.598) 
Age -6.13e-05 0.00604 -0.000847 
 (0.000607) (0.0162) (0.00872) 
Sex (male) 0.0201***   
 (0.00314)   
Preschool (no school) 0.0127** 0.0970 0.0197 
 (0.00634) (0.107) (0.0642) 
Primary (no school) 0.0117 -0.0119 -0.0394 
 (0.00878) (0.125) (0.0791) 
Secondary (no school) 0.00724 0.0209 0.0151 
 (0.0143) (0.133) (0.0769) 
Post-secondary (no school) 0.0105 0.206 0.0726 
(0.0157) (0.208) (0.127) 
Reads & writes 0.00261 0.0874 0.0375 
 (0.00567) (0.111) (0.0685) 
Speaks indigenous language -0.00755 -0.0591 -0.00648 
 (0.00508) (0.0891) (0.0549) 
Household members 0.00168** 0.0296 0.0295*** 
 (0.000677) (0.0189) (0.0108) 
Sex of HH head (male) 0.00174 0.00722 0.0188 
 (0.00406) (0.0935) (0.0466) 
Urbanicity (urban) -0.00622 -0.0919 -0.0865 
 (0.00638) (0.112) (0.0648) 
Central Coast (Northern Coast) -0.00913* 0.102 0.0345 
 (0.00502) (0.227) (0.130) 
Southern Coast (Northern Coast) 0.00323 0.253 0.0774 
 (0.00930) (0.254) (0.153) 
Northern Highlands (Northern Coast) -0.0204*** -0.194 -0.0275 
 (0.00576) (0.199) (0.111) 
Central Highlands (Northern Coast) -0.0142*** -0.00547 0.0225 
 (0.00486) (0.0877) (0.0548) 
Southern Highlands (Northern Coast) -0.00354 0.0706 0.0393 
 (0.00640) (0.123) (0.0762) 
Rainforest (Northern Coast) -0.000591 -0.0182 0.0343 
 (0.00514) (0.0984) (0.0602) 
Metropolitan Lima (Northern Coast) 0.00681 -0.163 -0.131* 
 (0.00557) (0.123) (0.0671) 
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Constant 0.0337 -0.395 -0.0395 
 (0.0375) (0.893) (0.496) 
    
Observations 64,118 3,594 3,594 
R-squared -0.020 -4.366 -0.931 
Reference group in parentheses for categorical variables   
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    

















Table B.1: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Healthcare Expenditures, 
Services Used in the Last Four Weeks, 2005, Second Stage (Table 3.3) 
  
Doctor's 
visit Medication Laboratory X rays 
Other 
exams 
            
Enrollment in SIS -0.899 -2.265* -0.146 -0.320 0.000952 
 (0.763) (1.211) (0.254) (0.235) (0.0793) 
Age -0.00290 -0.00386 0.00102 -0.00107 6.70e-05 
 (0.00560) (0.00874) (0.00185) (0.00171) (0.000562) 
Sex (male) 0.121*** 0.252*** 0.0224** 0.0244*** 0.00398* 
 (0.0198) (0.0298) (0.00966) (0.00658) (0.00242) 
Preschool (no school) 0.0658 0.0615 -0.00431 -0.00657 -0.00494 
 (0.0525) (0.0794) (0.0243) (0.0207) (0.00620) 
Primary (no school) 0.0398 -0.0525 -0.0237 -0.0311 -0.00428 
 (0.0747) (0.112) (0.0318) (0.0274) (0.00911) 
Secondary (no school) -0.0724 -0.294 -0.0634 -0.0572 -0.00448 
 (0.136) (0.203) (0.0495) (0.0448) (0.0140) 
Post-secondary (no school) -0.135 -0.409* -0.0576 -0.0601 -0.000211 
 (0.141) (0.212) (0.0527) (0.0443) (0.0154) 
Reads & writes -0.0501 -0.00773 0.0317 0.0210 0.00320 
 (0.0432) (0.0673) (0.0210) (0.0169) (0.00556) 
Speaks indigenous language 0.0258 -0.114* 0.00974 -7.32e-05 -0.00339 
(0.0421) (0.0692) (0.0211) (0.0144) (0.00496) 
Household members 0.00497 0.0110 0.00794*** 0.00267 0.000317 
 (0.00541) (0.00846) (0.00267) (0.00167) (0.000460) 
Sex of HH head (male) -0.0113 -0.0480 -0.0134 -0.0134 -0.00156 
 (0.0311) (0.0488) (0.0144) (0.0116) (0.00243) 
Poor (non-poor) -0.279*** -0.418*** -0.0981*** -0.0496*** -0.00619* 
 (0.0309) (0.0555) (0.0147) (0.0107) (0.00360) 
Extremely poor (non-poor) -0.516*** -0.894*** -0.131*** -0.0691*** -0.00873** 
 (0.0374) (0.0711) (0.0165) (0.0118) (0.00348) 
Urbanicity (urban) -0.173*** -0.300*** -0.0136 0.00823 -0.000571 
 (0.0538) (0.0893) (0.0183) (0.0171) (0.00613) 
Central Coast (Northern Coast) -0.225*** -0.378*** -0.0314 -0.0313** -0.0106** 
 (0.0627) (0.114) (0.0220) (0.0137) (0.00517) 
Southern Coast (NC) -0.191*** -0.491*** -0.0340 -0.0130 -0.00235 
 (0.0710) (0.102) (0.0243) (0.0177) (0.00654) 
Northern Highlands (NC) -0.0943 -0.124 -0.0534** -0.0148 -0.0105* 
 (0.0620) (0.104) (0.0222) (0.0177) (0.00546) 
Central Highlands (NC) -0.211*** -0.329*** -0.0628*** -0.00987 -0.00597 
 (0.0489) (0.0693) (0.0169) (0.0114) (0.00500) 
Southern Highlands (NC) -0.181*** -0.328*** -0.0558** 0.0151 -0.00584 
 (0.0554) (0.0855) (0.0218) (0.0171) (0.00684) 
Rainforest (NC) -0.192*** -0.0857 -0.0296* -0.00315 -0.00606 
 (0.0494) (0.0744) (0.0161) (0.0110) (0.00489) 
Metropolitan Lima (NC) -0.307*** -0.502*** 0.0218 0.00302 -0.00839 
 (0.0544) (0.0845) (0.0240) (0.0152) (0.00515) 
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Constant 1.212*** 2.573*** 0.144 0.158 0.0129 
 (0.339) (0.527) (0.112) (0.102) (0.0318) 
      
Observations 64,064 63,280 64,114 64,114 64,118 
R-squared 0.017 -0.010 0.009 -0.026 0.001 
Reference group in parentheses for categorical variables    
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,* p<0.1      






Table B.2: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Healthcare Expenditures, 
Services Used in the Last Three Months (Part I), 2005, Second Stage (Table 3.3) 
  Dental Eyes Glasses 
        
Enrollment in SIS -1.229** -0.228 -0.700** 
 (0.545) (0.214) (0.314) 
Age -0.00663* 0.000344 -0.00279 
 (0.00402) (0.00162) (0.00226) 
Sex (male) 0.0341** -0.0100 0.00709 
 (0.0158) (0.00938) (0.00929) 
Preschool (no school) 0.0240 0.0313** 0.0152 
 (0.0356) (0.0153) (0.0208) 
Primary (no school) 0.0244 0.0190 -0.00705 
 (0.0512) (0.0235) (0.0315) 
Secondary (no school) 0.0450 0.0339 -0.0318 
 (0.0971) (0.0412) (0.0561) 
Post-secondary (no school) 0.375*** 0.150*** 0.0629 
 (0.108) (0.0484) (0.0586) 
Reads & writes 0.0665** 0.0182 0.0318* 
 (0.0281) (0.0128) (0.0181) 
Speaks indigenous language -0.0504 -0.0293** -0.0785*** 
(0.0351) (0.0144) (0.0217) 
Household members -0.000764 0.000851 -0.00214 
(0.00405) (0.00217) (0.00214) 
Sex of HH head (male) 0.0446 0.0277* 0.00256 
 (0.0347) (0.0150) (0.0195) 
Poor (non-poor) -0.270*** -0.0695*** -0.0790*** 
 (0.0297) (0.0124) (0.0128) 
Extremely poor (non-poor) -0.306*** -0.0605*** -0.0547*** 
 (0.0333) (0.0128) (0.0161) 
Urbanicity (urban) 0.0353 -0.00870 0.0181 
 (0.0393) (0.0154) (0.0222) 
Central Coast (Northern Coast) -0.0987** -0.0224 -0.0302 
 (0.0465) (0.0169) (0.0213) 
Southern Coast (Northern Coast) -0.00434 -0.00322 -0.0214 
 (0.0384) (0.0191) (0.0197) 
Northern Highlands (Northern 
Coast) 0.0148 -0.0332** -0.0572*** 
 (0.0449) (0.0154) (0.0219) 
Central Highlands (Northern Coast) 0.0796** -0.00148 0.0156 
 (0.0359) (0.0135) (0.0185) 
Southern Highlands (Northern 
Coast) 0.174*** 0.0218 0.0622** 
 (0.0461) (0.0192) (0.0286) 
Rainforest (Northern Coast) 0.0777** -0.00713 0.0121 
 (0.0344) (0.0132) (0.0180) 
Metropolitan Lima (Northern Coast) 0.100** 0.0379* 0.00976 
 (0.0490) (0.0197) (0.0237) 
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Constant 0.686*** 0.0995 0.307** 
 (0.242) (0.0977) (0.137) 
    
Observations 64,065 64,096 64,108 
R-squared -0.028 0.007 -0.079 
Reference group in parentheses for categorical 
variables   
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    






Table B.3: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Healthcare Expenditures, 
Services Used in the Last Three Months (Part II), 2005, Second Stage (Table 3.3) 
  Immunization 
Child's 
checkup Birth control Other 
          
Enrollment in SIS -0.513** -0.611*** 6.487 1.426** 
 (0.239) (0.205) (8.216) (0.619) 
Age -0.00426** -0.0691*** 0.0267 0.0157*** 
 (0.00173) (0.0126) (0.0347) (0.00464) 
Sex (male) 0.00576 -0.0158 -0.127 0.0682*** 
 (0.00714) (0.0253) (0.152) (0.0144) 
Preschool (no school) -0.0223* -0.0266 0.105 0.135*** 
 (0.0128) (0.0333) (0.151) (0.0414) 
Primary (no school) -0.0375* -0.0118 0.193 0.199*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0398) (0.255) (0.0622) 
Secondary (no school) -0.0712* -0.0663 0.519 0.360*** 
 (0.0394) (0.0462) (0.629) (0.113) 
Post-secondary (no school) 0.000515 0.0587 0.530 0.477*** 
 (0.0465) (0.117) (0.578) (0.125) 
Reads & writes 0.00979 0.0382 -0.126 0.000770 
 (0.00980) (0.0295) (0.161) (0.0305) 
Speaks indigenous language -0.0296* 0.0861*** 0.0615 0.0197 
(0.0161) (0.0265) (0.107) (0.0325) 
Household members -0.00209 -0.0160*** -0.00785 -0.00191 
 (0.00162) (0.00518) (0.0111) (0.00423) 
Sex of HH head (male) -0.00666 -0.116*** -0.00457 0.0763** 
 (0.0103) (0.0334) (0.0518) (0.0298) 
Poor (non-poor) -0.0373*** -0.111** -0.104* -0.215*** 
 (0.00885) (0.0519) (0.0560) (0.0269) 
Extremely poor (non-poor) -0.0273** -0.137*** -0.0644 -0.251*** 
 (0.0116) (0.0498) (0.0420) (0.0327) 
Urbanicity (urban) 0.0143 0.0727* -0.124 -0.105** 
 (0.0175) (0.0410) (0.114) (0.0500) 
Central Coast (Northern Coast) -0.0215 -0.0381 0.0956 -0.279*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0581) (0.133) (0.0528) 
Southern Coast (Northern Coast) 0.0565 -0.0366 0.0172 -0.350*** 
 (0.0378) (0.0474) (0.0758) (0.0447) 
Northern Highlands (Northern Coast) -0.0171 0.0247 0.0937 0.0180 
 (0.0185) (0.0407) (0.159) (0.0576) 
Central Highlands (Northern Coast) 0.0162 0.0502 0.0256 -0.266*** 
 (0.0124) (0.0382) (0.0660) (0.0416) 
Southern Highlands (Northern Coast) 0.0463** 0.0943* -0.0477 -0.191*** 
 (0.0199) (0.0494) (0.0888) (0.0504) 
Rainforest (Northern Coast) 0.00849 0.0430 0.00394 -0.125** 
 (0.0110) (0.0376) (0.0534) (0.0541) 
Metropolitan Lima (Northern Coast) 0.00719 0.119 0.0104 -0.0691 
 (0.0115) (0.0733) (0.0696) (0.0541) 
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Constant 0.294*** 0.714*** -1.069 -0.421 
 (0.105) (0.133) (1.550) (0.285) 
     
Observations 63,811 7,527 31,146 64,045 
R-squared -0.122 -0.028 -5.329 -0.148 
Reference group in parentheses for categorical 
variables    
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     





Table B.4: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Healthcare Expenditures, 
Services Used in the Last Twelve Months, 2005, Second Stage (Table 3.3) 





          
Enrollment in SIS -0.493 0.573 1.184 -0.720*** 
 (0.383) (2.586) (4.292) (0.259) 
Age -0.00107 0.00444 0.00939 -0.00276 
 (0.00277) (0.0190) (0.0317) (0.00187) 
Sex (male) 0.0841***   0.0634*** 
 (0.0134)   (0.00574) 
Preschool (no school) 0.0255 0.0514 0.0392 0.0218 
 (0.0274) (0.0609) (0.108) (0.0176) 
Primary (no school) 0.00647 0.0317 0.0475 0.00882 
 (0.0402) (0.0705) (0.118) (0.0249) 
Secondary (no school) -0.0163 0.0903 0.141 -0.0273 
 (0.0653) (0.215) (0.355) (0.0440) 
Post-secondary (no school) -0.0292 0.116 0.133 0.00791 
 (0.0695) (0.196) (0.328) (0.0473) 
Reads & writes 0.0278 -0.0132 -0.0174 0.0154 
 (0.0273) (0.0319) (0.0491) (0.0149) 
Speaks indigenous language -0.0378 -0.0113 0.0371 -0.0385*** 
(0.0237) (0.0367) (0.0593) (0.0145) 
Household members 0.0124*** 0.00473 0.0195*** 0.00322* 
 (0.00338) (0.00527) (0.00686) (0.00193) 
Sex of HH head (male) 0.00179 -0.0511* -0.0110 -0.0222** 
 (0.0223) (0.0271) (0.0388) (0.0112) 
Poor (non-poor) -0.0828*** -0.0341 -0.00685 -0.0881*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0437) (0.0674) (0.0108) 
Extremely poor (non-poor) -0.125*** -0.0309 -0.000461 -0.184*** 
 (0.0221) (0.0193) (0.0290) (0.0149) 
Urbanicity (urban) 0.0100 -0.0608 -0.0429 -0.0501** 
 (0.0311) (0.103) (0.172) (0.0196) 
Central Coast (Northern Coast) -0.0242 -0.0204 -0.0307 -0.127*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0836) (0.135) (0.0204) 
Southern Coast (Northern Coast) -0.0210 -0.0479 -0.107** -0.115*** 
 (0.0349) (0.0391) (0.0487) (0.0202) 
Northern Highlands (Northern Coast) -0.0849*** -0.0298 0.0249 -0.0542** 
 (0.0294) (0.0923) (0.140) (0.0227) 
Central Highlands (Northern Coast) -0.0580** -0.0410 -0.0872** -0.0904*** 
 (0.0227) (0.0274) (0.0412) (0.0142) 
Southern Highlands (Northern Coast) -0.0184 -0.0676 -0.149 -0.0342* 
 (0.0278) (0.0565) (0.0923) (0.0180) 
Rainforest (Northern Coast) 0.00254 -0.0508 -0.0487 -0.0250 
 (0.0219) (0.0382) (0.0667) (0.0167) 
Metropolitan Lima (Northern Coast) -0.00179 0.0194 -0.0879* -0.101*** 
 (0.0254) (0.0438) (0.0524) (0.0169) 
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Constant 0.229 -0.107 -0.373 0.654*** 
 (0.164) (0.831) (1.377) (0.114) 
     
Observations 64,084 17,736 17,728 64,118 
R-squared -0.013 -0.073 -0.242 -0.097 
Reference group in parentheses for categorical variables    
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     




Table B.5: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Healthcare Expenditures 
(Binary), Services Used in the Last Four Weeks, 2005, Second Stage 
  
Doctor's 
visit Medication Laboratory X rays 
Other 
exams 
            
Enrollment in SIS -0.0826 -0.497** -0.0159 -0.0532 0.000545 
 (0.154) (0.242) (0.0404) (0.0361) (0.0117) 
Age 5.58e-05 -0.00177 0.000183 -0.000207 1.10e-05 
 (0.00113) (0.00174) (0.000293) (0.000262) (8.28e-05) 
Sex (male) 0.0230*** 0.0514*** 0.00394*** 0.00384*** 0.000570 
 (0.00383) (0.00554) (0.00145) (0.000984) (0.000352) 
Preschool (no school) 0.0185* 0.00993 -0.000134 -0.00107 -0.000551 
 (0.0103) (0.0156) (0.00368) (0.00315) (0.000771) 
Primary (no school) 0.0165 -0.0108 -0.00295 -0.00490 -0.000419 
 (0.0148) (0.0220) (0.00495) (0.00418) (0.00123) 
Secondary (no school) 0.00202 -0.0605 -0.00874 -0.00916 -0.000530 
 (0.0272) (0.0399) (0.00780) (0.00686) (0.00203) 
Post-secondary (no school) -0.0151 -0.0874** -0.00718 -0.0101 0.000201 
 (0.0280) (0.0414) (0.00841) (0.00682) (0.00223) 
Reads & writes -0.0136 -0.00532 0.00474 0.00301 0.000369 
 (0.00846) (0.0131) (0.00323) (0.00258) (0.000718) 
Speaks indigenous language 0.0130 -0.0252* 0.00125 -0.000223 -0.000462 
(0.00827) (0.0133) (0.00318) (0.00222) (0.000731) 
Household members 0.000826 0.000685 0.00110*** 0.000380 3.83e-05 
 (0.000981) (0.00164) (0.000380) (0.000252) (6.64e-05) 
Sex of HH head (male) -0.000626 -0.00999 -0.00207 -0.00215 -0.000224 
 (0.00606) (0.00943) (0.00227) (0.00172) (0.000339) 
Poor (non-poor) -0.0487*** -0.0453*** -0.0150*** 
-
0.00704*** -0.000847 
 (0.00622) (0.0103) (0.00232) (0.00163) (0.000532) 
Extremely poor (non-poor) -0.101*** -0.131*** -0.0205*** -0.0100*** -0.00127** 
 (0.00759) (0.0144) (0.00260) (0.00180) (0.000512) 
Urbanicity (urban) -0.0400*** -0.0584*** -0.00255 0.00139 -3.33e-05 
 (0.0109) (0.0178) (0.00292) (0.00263) (0.000911) 
Central Coast (Northern Coast) -0.0314** -0.0897*** -0.00551 -0.00467** -0.00138* 
 (0.0127) (0.0211) (0.00354) (0.00206) (0.000736) 
Southern Coast (NC) -0.0258* -0.0966*** -0.00427 -0.00164 -7.09e-05 
 (0.0141) (0.0184) (0.00411) (0.00272) (0.000949) 
Northern Highlands (NC) 0.00339 -0.0369* -0.00825** -0.00242 -0.00144* 
 (0.0125) (0.0202) (0.00365) (0.00268) (0.000797) 
Central Highlands (NC) -0.0264*** -0.0608*** -0.0101*** -0.00115 -0.000768 
 (0.00948) (0.0134) (0.00271) (0.00174) (0.000699) 
Southern Highlands (NC) -0.0226** -0.0516*** -0.00892** 0.00284 -0.000813 
 (0.0106) (0.0164) (0.00353) (0.00262) (0.000926) 
Rainforest (NC) -0.0262*** -0.0244* -0.00467* -0.000222 -0.000776 
 (0.00979) (0.0144) (0.00264) (0.00166) (0.000669) 
Metropolitan Lima (NC) -0.0526*** -0.117*** 0.00210 0.000458 -0.00101 
 (0.0104) (0.0154) (0.00380) (0.00223) (0.000724) 
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Constant 0.187*** 0.529*** 0.0211 0.0261* 0.00158 
 (0.0683) (0.106) (0.0179) (0.0156) (0.00471) 
      
Observations 64,064 63,280 64,114 64,114 64,118 
R-squared 0.030 -0.051 0.009 -0.034 0.001 
Reference group in parentheses for categorical variables    
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      






Table B.6: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Healthcare Expenditures 
(Binary), Services Used in the Last Three Months (Part I), 2005, Second Stage 
  Dental Eyes Glasses 
        
Enrollment in SIS -0.210** -0.0548 -0.107** 
 (0.0957) (0.0442) (0.0481) 
Age -0.00125* -2.78e-05 -0.000427 
 (0.000703) (0.000333) (0.000347) 
Sex (male) 0.00556** -0.00183 0.00115 
 (0.00256) (0.00175) (0.00140) 
Preschool (no school) 0.00310 0.00554* 0.00262 
 (0.00627) (0.00312) (0.00327) 
Primary (no school) 0.00415 0.00285 -0.000622 
 (0.00902) (0.00478) (0.00483) 
Secondary (no school) 0.00536 0.00522 -0.00443 
 (0.0169) (0.00846) (0.00862) 
Post-secondary (no school) 0.0534*** 0.0243*** 0.00945 
 (0.0186) (0.00924) (0.00889) 
Reads & writes 0.0121** 0.00359 0.00449 
 (0.00503) (0.00257) (0.00280) 
Speaks indigenous language -0.00657 -0.00641** -0.0118*** 
(0.00621) (0.00298) (0.00331) 
Household members -0.000372 -3.31e-05 -0.000315 
(0.000703) (0.000370) (0.000320) 
Sex of HH head (male) 0.00635 0.00456* 0.000511 
 (0.00566) (0.00261) (0.00292) 
Poor (non-poor) -0.0418*** -0.0118*** -0.0116*** 
 (0.00485) (0.00237) (0.00192) 
Extremely poor (non-poor) -0.0520*** -0.0104*** -0.00805*** 
 (0.00568) (0.00246) (0.00241) 
Urbanicity (urban) 0.00421 -0.00159 0.00273 
 (0.00699) (0.00313) (0.00342) 
Central Coast (Northern Coast) -0.0185** -0.00508 -0.00528 
 (0.00840) (0.00324) (0.00330) 
Southern Coast (Northern Coast) -0.00524 -0.000215 -0.00335 
 (0.00691) (0.00425) (0.00309) 
Northern Highlands (Northern Coast) 0.00375 -0.00719** -0.00887*** 
 (0.00829) (0.00316) (0.00343) 
Central Highlands (Northern Coast) 0.0115* -0.000209 0.00215 
 (0.00654) (0.00280) (0.00286) 
Southern Highlands (Northern Coast) 0.0287*** 0.00511 0.00922** 
 (0.00804) (0.00404) (0.00437) 
Rainforest (Northern Coast) 0.0112* -0.00151 0.00175 
 (0.00630) (0.00270) (0.00280) 
Metropolitan Lima (Northern Coast) 0.00999 0.00629 0.00120 
 (0.00819) (0.00383) (0.00365) 
Constant 0.127*** 0.0254 0.0467** 
 (0.0424) (0.0199) (0.0209) 
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Observations 64,065 64,096 64,108 
R-squared -0.031 -0.001 -0.083 
Reference group in parentheses for categorical variables   
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    






Table B.7: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Healthcare Expenditures 
(Binary), Services Used in the Last Three Months, 2005, Second Stage 
  Immunization 
Child's 
checkup Birth control Other 
          
Enrollment in SIS -0.101** -0.114*** 1.211 0.223 
 (0.0438) (0.0353) (1.582) (0.152) 
Age -0.000836*** -0.00747*** 0.00499 0.00275** 
 (0.000318) (0.00109) (0.00668) (0.00112) 
Sex (male) 0.00106 -0.00373 -0.0257 0.0188*** 
 (0.00133) (0.00291) (0.0294) (0.00325) 
Preschool (no school) -0.00429* -0.00557 0.0206 0.0260*** 
 (0.00243) (0.00507) (0.0289) (0.00980) 
Primary (no school) -0.00694* -0.00110 0.0375 0.0387*** 
 (0.00387) (0.00560) (0.0488) (0.0147) 
Secondary (no school) -0.0142* -0.0111 0.0995 0.0642** 
 (0.00730) (0.00692) (0.121) (0.0272) 
Post-secondary (no school) -0.00177 -0.00117 0.101 0.0847*** 
 (0.00855) (0.0142) (0.111) (0.0294) 
Reads & writes 0.00174 0.00834* -0.0245 0.000317 
 (0.00188) (0.00438) (0.0309) (0.00711) 
Speaks indigenous language -0.00601** 0.0106*** 0.0105 0.00342 
(0.00288) (0.00372) (0.0206) (0.00777) 
Household members -0.000365 -0.00182*** -0.00149 -0.000665 
 (0.000300) (0.000643) (0.00214) (0.000859) 
Sex of HH head (male) -0.000837 -0.0157*** -0.000400 0.0111** 
 (0.00195) (0.00431) (0.00989) (0.00567) 
Poor (non-poor) -0.00681*** -0.00314 -0.0201* -0.0392*** 
 (0.00167) (0.00661) (0.0108) (0.00596) 
Extremely poor (non-poor) -0.00514** -0.00880 -0.0133* -0.0517*** 
 (0.00219) (0.00631) (0.00794) (0.00745) 
Urbanicity (urban) 0.00294 0.0133* -0.0245 -0.0200* 
 (0.00330) (0.00707) (0.0220) (0.0116) 
Central Coast (Northern Coast) -0.00419 -0.0100 0.0153 -0.0790*** 
 (0.00263) (0.00744) (0.0256) (0.0125) 
Southern Coast (Northern Coast) 0.0109 -0.0111* 0.00200 -0.0977*** 
 (0.00726) (0.00601) (0.0147) (0.0109) 
Northern Highlands (Northern Coast) -0.00355 -0.00515 0.0160 -0.00387 
 (0.00353) (0.00616) (0.0307) (0.0132) 
Central Highlands (Northern Coast) 0.00328 0.000886 0.00482 -0.0786*** 
 (0.00247) (0.00551) (0.0127) (0.0101) 
Southern Highlands (Northern Coast) 0.00906** 0.00813 -0.00818 -0.0506*** 
 (0.00359) (0.00702) (0.0170) (0.0121) 
Rainforest (Northern Coast) 0.00149 0.00276 0.000492 -0.0440*** 
 (0.00211) (0.00529) (0.0103) (0.0130) 
Metropolitan Lima (Northern Coast) 0.000671 0.00565 -0.000924 -0.0450*** 
 (0.00215) (0.00953) (0.0134) (0.0125) 
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Constant 0.0574*** 0.115*** -0.195 -0.0297 
 (0.0192) (0.0208) (0.298) (0.0687) 
     
Observations 63,811 15,324 31,146 64,045 
R-squared -0.140 -0.117 -4.153 -0.055 
Reference group in parentheses for categorical 
variables    
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     







Table B.8: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Healthcare Expenditures 
(Binary), Services Used in the Last Twelve Months, 2005, Second Stage 
  Hospitalization 
Pregnancy's 
checkup Birth 
        
Enrollment in SIS -0.0782 0.204 0.0571 
 (0.0571) (0.808) (0.782) 
Age -0.000260 0.00153 0.000572 
 (0.000414) (0.00594) (0.00578) 
Sex (male) 0.0136***   
 (0.00212)   
Preschool (no school) 0.00281 0.0171 0.000104 
 (0.00429) (0.0194) (0.0205) 
Primary (no school) 0.000895 0.0107 0.000459 
 (0.00619) (0.0224) (0.0226) 
Secondary (no school) -0.00339 0.0264 0.00917 
 (0.00996) (0.0674) (0.0657) 
Post-secondary (no school) -0.00546 0.0274 0.00870 
 (0.0105) (0.0618) (0.0606) 
Reads & writes 0.00419 -0.00421 0.000658 
 (0.00422) (0.00999) (0.00933) 
Speaks indigenous language -0.00494 -0.00307 0.00576 
(0.00351) (0.0110) (0.0107) 
Household members 0.00186*** 0.00162 0.00424*** 
 (0.000528) (0.00121) (0.00128) 
Sex of HH head (male) 0.000985 -0.0111 -0.00380 
 (0.00341) (0.00777) (0.00689) 
Poor (non-poor) -0.0103*** -0.00883 0.00213 
 (0.00295) (0.0131) (0.0122) 
Extremely poor (non-poor) -0.0173*** -0.00681 0.00504 
 (0.00349) (0.00525) (0.00539) 
Urbanicity (urban) -0.000320 -0.0192 -0.00136 
 (0.00469) (0.0324) (0.0312) 
Central Coast (Northern Coast) -0.00162 -0.000412 -0.0104 
 (0.00456) (0.0260) (0.0243) 
Southern Coast (Northern Coast) -0.00308 -0.0115 -0.0220** 
 (0.00505) (0.00983) (0.00882) 
Northern Highlands (Northern Coast) -0.0133*** -0.00685 0.00642 
 (0.00455) (0.0270) (0.0258) 
Central Highlands (Northern Coast) -0.00973*** -0.00953 -0.0164** 
 (0.00347) (0.00750) (0.00768) 
Southern Highlands (Northern Coast) -0.00193 -0.0157 -0.0265 
 (0.00431) (0.0177) (0.0170) 
Rainforest (Northern Coast) 0.00173 -0.0139 -0.00526 
 (0.00352) (0.0118) (0.0123) 
Metropolitan Lima (Northern Coast) -0.000947 0.00308 -0.0205** 
 (0.00392) (0.0110) (0.00938) 
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Constant 0.0389 -0.0478 -0.0176 
 (0.0246) (0.260) (0.251) 
    
Observations 64,084 17,736 17,728 
R-squared -0.015 -0.173 -0.004 
Reference group in parentheses for categorical variables   
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    






Table B.9: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Households’ Enrollment in SIS, 
2005, First Stage (Table 3.4) 
  
Household Member  
Enrolled in SIS 
    




Sex (male) 0.01507 
 (0.01033) 
Preschool (no school) -0.00596 
 (0.02132) 
Primary (no school) 0.00983 
 (0.02565) 
Secondary (no school) -0.03133 
 (0.02574) 
Post-secondary (no school) -0.09365*** 
 (0.02846) 
Reads & writes 0.02328 
 (0.02032) 
Speaks indigenous language -0.00837 
(0.01421) 
Household members 0.06760*** 
 (0.00222) 
Poor (non-poor) 0.09870*** 
 (0.01242) 
Extremely poor (non-poor) 0.11835*** 
 (0.01673) 
Urbanicity (urban) 0.10614*** 
 (0.01348) 
Central Coast (Northern Coast) -0.04016 
 (0.03025) 
Southern Coast (Northern Coast) -0.01029 
 (0.02905) 
Northern Highlands (Northern Coast) -0.08324*** 
 (0.02785) 
Central Highlands (Northern Coast) -0.03981* 
 (0.02414) 
Southern Highlands (Northern Coast) -0.03667 
 (0.02478) 
Rainforest (Northern Coast) 0.00153 
 (0.02385) 








F test for excluded instruments  
     F test 11.44 
     P-value 0.0008 
Sanderson-Windmeijer multivariateChi-squared test of underidentification: 
    SW Chi-square test 11.46 
     P-value 0.0007 
Demographic variables refer to the household's head, unless otherwise explicitly defined 
Reference group in parentheses for categorical variables 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  





Table B.10: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Catastrophic Healthcare 










          
HH Member Enrolled in SIS -0.758** -0.557* -0.294 -0.332 
 (0.370) (0.327) (0.276) (0.261) 
Age -0.00340 -0.00179 0.000101 -4.92e-05 
 (0.00228) (0.00202) (0.00171) (0.00162) 
Sex (male) 0.0113 0.00286 -0.00845 -0.0218 
 (0.0194) (0.0188) (0.0168) (0.0149) 
Preschool (no school) 0.0727** 0.0606** 0.0561** 0.0418* 
 (0.0289) (0.0267) (0.0247) (0.0243) 
Primary (no school) 0.0749** 0.0520 0.0392 0.0182 
 (0.0348) (0.0321) (0.0303) (0.0293) 
Secondary (no school) 0.0694* 0.0519 0.0487 0.0139 
 (0.0392) (0.0377) (0.0347) (0.0339) 
Post-secondary (no school) 0.0346 0.0167 0.0285 0.00145 
 (0.0553) (0.0531) (0.0496) (0.0480) 
Reads & writes -0.00403 0.00385 0.00163 0.0129 
 (0.0281) (0.0261) (0.0236) (0.0226) 
Speaks indigenous language -0.0166 -0.00336 -0.00194 -0.00148 
(0.0195) (0.0178) (0.0157) (0.0140) 
Household members 0.101*** 0.0779*** 0.0525*** 0.0501*** 
 (0.0248) (0.0221) (0.0188) (0.0177) 
Poor (non-poor) -0.00578 -0.0298 -0.0509 -0.0443 
 (0.0409) (0.0369) (0.0317) (0.0303) 
Extremely poor (non-poor) -0.159*** -0.154*** -0.157*** -0.124*** 
 (0.0514) (0.0454) (0.0389) (0.0373) 
Urbanicity (urban) -0.0160 -0.00497 -0.00780 0.00903 
 (0.0442) (0.0375) (0.0326) (0.0306) 
Central Coast (Northern Coast) -0.119*** -0.122*** -0.0900*** -0.0860*** 
 (0.0399) (0.0344) (0.0287) (0.0311) 
Southern Coast (Northern Coast) -0.150*** -0.133*** -0.105** -0.105*** 
 (0.0378) (0.0402) (0.0421) (0.0394) 
Northern Highlands (Northern Coast) 0.0166 0.0317 0.0426 0.0265 
 (0.0387) (0.0339) (0.0333) (0.0308) 
Central Highlands (Northern Coast) -0.0740*** -0.0748*** -0.0716*** -0.0677*** 
 (0.0264) (0.0238) (0.0226) (0.0223) 
Southern Highlands (Northern Coast) -0.0682** -0.0766*** -0.0769*** -0.0833*** 
 (0.0281) (0.0268) (0.0249) (0.0238) 
Rainforest (Northern Coast) 0.0141 0.0310 0.0258 0.0254 
 (0.0271) (0.0245) (0.0233) (0.0240) 
Metropolitan Lima (Northern Coast) -0.166*** -0.152*** -0.120*** -0.121*** 
 (0.0459) (0.0417) (0.0371) (0.0362) 
Constant 0.574*** 0.425*** 0.286*** 0.264*** 
 (0.113) (0.102) (0.0886) (0.0842) 
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Observations 15,445 15,445 15,445 15,445 
R-squared -0.253 -0.128 -0.010 -0.037 
Demograohic variables refer to the household's head, unless otherwise explicitly defined 
Reference group in parentheses for categorical variables   
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     

















Table C.1: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Enrollment in SIS among 
Children under Five Years of Age, 2004-2005, First Stage (Table 4.2) 
  Enrollment in SIS 
    




Sex (male) -0.023047 
 (0.01874) 
Mother's Education: Primary (no school) 0.023551 
 (0.03840) 
Mother's Education: Secondary (no school) 0.017832 
 (0.01502) 
Mother's Education: Some College (no school) 0.015022 
 (0.05512) 
Mother's Education: College Graduate (no school) -0.058722 
 (0.06625) 
Mother Employed 0.062285*** 
 (0.02186) 
Mother is Head's Wife (HH head) -0.077942 
(0.06418) 
Mother is Head's Relative (HH head) -0.009964 
(0.05697) 
Mother is Head's Non-Relative (HH head) 0.213794 
 (0.13340) 
HH Head's Sex (male) -0.063365 
 (0.04937) 
HH Wealth: Poorer (poorest) 0.036751 
 (0.02601) 
HH Wealth: Middle  (poorest) -0.020614 
 (0.04204) 
HH Wealth: Richer  (poorest) -0.032500 
 (0.04640) 
HH Wealth: Richest  (poorest) -0.178604*** 
 (0.06571) 
Cluster Altitude in meters -0.000039* 
 (0.00002) 
Coast (Metropolitan Lima) 0.144599** 
 (0.06070) 
Highlands (ML) 0.181274** 
 (0.08067) 
High Rainforest (ML) 0.086735 
 (0.07107) 
Low Rainforest (ML) 0.035129 
 (0.06965) 










F test for excluded instruments  
     F test 11.1 
     P-value 0.0009 
Sanderson-Windmeijer multivariate Chi-squared test of underidentification: 
    SW Chi-square test 11.19 
     P-value 0.0008 
Reference group in parentheses for categorical variables 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  





Table C.2: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Health Events and Symptoms 
among Children under Five Years of Age, 2004-2005, Second Stage (Table 4.2) 
  Diarrhea 
Bloody 
Stools Fever Cough 
Rapid 
Breathing 
            
Enrollment in SIS 0.0673 -0.0702 0.313 0.0539 0.257 
 (0.225) (0.103) (0.340) (0.326) (0.242) 
Age -0.0263 -0.0108 0.0123 -0.00933 0.0181 
 (0.0254) (0.0119) (0.0378) (0.0364) (0.0264) 
Sex (male) -0.0268* -0.00746 0.00562 -0.0236 0.00731 
 (0.0145) (0.00527) (0.0194) (0.0211) (0.0165) 
Mother Has Primary (no school) 0.0283 0.0182*** 0.0215 0.0374 0.0482 
 (0.0248) (0.00698) (0.0440) (0.0483) (0.0335) 
Mother Has Secondary (NS) 0.0376 0.00792 0.000959 0.0457 0.0320 
 (0.0282) (0.00613) (0.0475) (0.0506) (0.0364) 
Mother Has Some College (NS) 0.00124 0.0211 -0.0276 0.0450 -0.0246 
 (0.0392) (0.0132) (0.0587) (0.0683) (0.0449) 
Mother Has College Graduate (NS) -0.0165 -0.000175 -0.0184 -0.0496 0.00262 
 (0.0491) (0.0100) (0.0729) (0.0749) (0.0568) 
Mother Employed -0.000505 0.0131* 0.0104 0.0280 0.00457 
 (0.0221) (0.00765) (0.0299) (0.0310) (0.0235) 
Mother is Head's Wife -0.0905 0.0165 0.0345 -0.0994 -0.0819 
(0.0580) (0.0177) (0.0660) (0.0719) (0.0578) 
Mother is Head's Relative -0.0532 0.0267 0.0116 -0.0504 -0.0691 
 (0.0534) (0.0163) (0.0600) (0.0616) (0.0498) 
Mother is Head's Non-Relative 0.0459 0.0116 0.00671 -0.00343 -0.0546 
 (0.135) (0.0294) (0.189) (0.187) (0.180) 
HH Head's Sex (male) -0.0430 0.0151 0.0285 -0.0418 -0.0393 
 (0.0358) (0.0153) (0.0495) (0.0509) (0.0366) 
HH Wealth: Poorer (poorest) -0.0168 -0.00203 0.0334 0.0159 -0.00596 
 (0.0195) (0.00897) (0.0322) (0.0350) (0.0265) 
HH Wealth: Middle  (poorest) -0.0668*** -0.0105 0.00829 -0.0418 -0.0126 
 (0.0249) (0.00818) (0.0399) (0.0398) (0.0320) 
HH Wealth: Richer  (poorest) -0.0588 -0.0130 0.0339 -0.0552 -0.0181 
 (0.0395) (0.00958) (0.0474) (0.0521) (0.0390) 
HH Wealth: Richest  (poorest) -0.0772 -0.0319 0.0479 -0.134 0.0351 
 (0.0645) (0.0209) (0.0865) (0.0885) (0.0735) 
Cluster Altitude in meters -2.57e-05* -4.71e-06 -9.66e-06 -4.21e-05* 8.54e-06 
 (1.44e-05) (5.97e-06) (2.36e-05) (2.27e-05) (1.62e-05) 
Coast (Metropolitan Lima) -0.0585 0.00169 -0.0627 -0.0955 -0.0716 
 (0.0586) (0.0234) (0.0855) (0.0842) (0.0609) 
Highlands (ML) 0.0267 0.0193 0.00981 -0.0183 -0.0474 
 (0.0746) (0.0354) (0.119) (0.115) (0.0774) 
High Rainforest (ML) 0.0712 0.0306 0.0130 -0.0335 -0.0214 
 (0.0736) (0.0273) (0.0917) (0.0917) (0.0696) 
Low Rainforest (ML) 0.0236 0.0251 0.0799 -0.0580 0.0336 
 (0.0547) (0.0207) (0.0746) (0.0785) (0.0545) 
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Small city (capital, large city) 0.0295 -0.00755 -0.0194 0.0307 0.0124 
 (0.0265) (0.0103) (0.0450) (0.0486) (0.0328) 
Town (capital, large city) 0.0321 -0.00453 -0.00514 0.0212 -0.0385 
 (0.0356) (0.00618) (0.0377) (0.0412) (0.0305) 
Constant 0.302* 0.0365 0.0303 0.548** 0.0878 
 (0.163) (0.0657) (0.231) (0.220) (0.170) 
      
Observations 3,940 3,940 3,940 3,940 3,940 
R-squared 0.045 -0.056 -0.037 0.024 -0.033 
Reference group in parentheses for categorical variables    
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      





Table C.3: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Enrollment in SIS among 
Children under Two Years of Age, 2004-2005, First Stage 
  Enrollment in SIS 
    




Sex (male) -0.014805 
 (0.02683) 
Mother's Education: Primary (no school) 0.1398252** 
 (0.05613) 
Mother's Education: Secondary (no school) 0.094891 
 (0.07289) 
Mother's Education: Some College (no school) 0.072892 
 (0.08942) 
Mother's Education: College Graduate (no school) 0.000304 
 (0.11068) 
Mother Employed 0.053103 
 (0.03341) 
Mother is Head's Wife (HH head) -0.057583 
(0.09787) 
Mother is Head's Relative (HH head) 0.013618 
(0.08811) 
Mother is Head's Non-Relative (HH head) 0.2874218* 
 (0.16203) 
HH Head's Sex (male) -0.063008 
 (0.06939) 
HH Wealth: Poorer (poorest) -0.017548 
 (0.03849) 
HH Wealth: Middle  (poorest) -0.184008*** 
 (0.06580) 
HH Wealth: Richer  (poorest) -0.1958748** 
 (0.07874) 
HH Wealth: Richest  (poorest) -0.4412666*** 
 (0.10293) 
Cluster Altitude in meters -0.0000558* 
 (0.00003) 
Coast (Metropolitan Lima) 0.046499 
 (0.10155) 
Highlands (ML) 0.137988 
 (0.12549) 
High Rainforest (ML) 0.014957 
 (0.10848) 
Low Rainforest (ML) -0.104902 
 (0.11069) 










F test for excluded instruments  
     F test 6.34 
     P-value 0.0121 
Sanderson-Windmeijer multivariateChi-squared test of underidentification: 
    SW Chi-square test 6.45 
     P-value 0.0111 
Reference group in parentheses for categorical variables 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  






Table C.4: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Health Events and Symptoms 
among Children under Two Years of Age, 2004-2005, Second Stage 
  Diarrhea 
Bloody 
Stools Fever Cough 
Rapid 
Breath 
            
Enrollment in SIS 0.500 -0.306 0.650 0.320 0.366 
 (0.399) (0.221) (0.557) (0.434) (0.328) 
Age 0.165*** -0.0101 0.147** 0.122** 0.118*** 
 (0.0490) (0.0223) (0.0632) (0.0544) (0.0397) 
Sex (male) -0.0319 -0.0159 0.0469 0.0241 0.0479* 
 (0.0251) (0.0127) (0.0336) (0.0312) (0.0271) 
Mother Has Primary (no school) -0.00629 0.0568 -0.0316 -0.0162 0.0172 
 (0.0687) (0.0389) (0.0976) (0.0916) (0.0692) 
Mother Has Secondary (NS) 0.00441 0.0288 -0.0882 -0.0280 -0.0488 
 (0.0569) (0.0285) (0.0869) (0.0802) (0.0647) 
Mother Has Some College (NS) 0.0191 0.0451 -0.0927 -0.00838 -0.0632 
 (0.0783) (0.0442) (0.105) (0.101) (0.0766) 
Mother Has College Graduate 
(NS) 0.0175 -0.0130 -0.0503 -0.0769 -0.0404 
 (0.0872) (0.0350) (0.113) (0.125) (0.0862) 
Mother Employed -0.0279 0.0323* -0.0294 -0.00286 -0.0265 
 (0.0373) (0.0191) (0.0486) (0.0454) (0.0345) 
Mother is Head's Wife 6.74e-05 0.00965 0.128 0.0777 -0.0525 
(0.107) (0.0453) (0.113) (0.103) (0.0861) 
Mother is Head's Relative 0.0416 0.0413 0.0992 0.0952 -0.0310 
 (0.103) (0.0435) (0.106) (0.0951) (0.0834) 
Mother is Head's Non-Relative 0.0344 0.0867 -0.0111 -0.0565 -0.103 
 (0.238) (0.0901) (0.255) (0.252) (0.190) 
HH Head's Sex (male) 0.0115 0.00447 0.113 0.124* 0.0223 
 (0.0712) (0.0330) (0.0832) (0.0725) (0.0548) 
HH Wealth: Poorer (poorest) 0.0219 -0.00995 0.0677 0.0176 0.0339 
 (0.0393) (0.0162) (0.0535) (0.0417) (0.0365) 
HH Wealth: Middle  (poorest) -0.0191 -0.0611 0.117 0.0325 0.111 
 (0.0948) (0.0478) (0.126) (0.0939) (0.0771) 
HH Wealth: Richer  (poorest) 0.0253 -0.0815 0.159 -0.00927 0.105 
 (0.115) (0.0501) (0.143) (0.111) (0.0901) 
HH Wealth: Richest  (poorest) 0.0461 -0.166* 0.230 0.0573 0.162 
 (0.208) (0.100) (0.269) (0.208) (0.160) 
Cluster Altitude in meters -1.28e-05 -2.07e-05 1.39e-05 -6.64e-05* -4.69e-06 
 (3.21e-05) (1.51e-05) (4.36e-05) (3.53e-05) (2.67e-05) 
Coast (Metropolitan Lima) -0.161 0.00142 -0.109 -0.0725 -0.0553 
 (0.0994) (0.0411) (0.113) (0.104) (0.0796) 
Highlands (ML) -0.0940 0.0640 -0.0807 0.0698 0.0491 
 (0.142) (0.0716) (0.181) (0.157) (0.109) 
High Rainforest (ML) 0.0311 0.0440 -0.0337 0.0258 0.0480 
 (0.118) (0.0513) (0.130) (0.120) (0.0917) 
Low Rainforest (ML) 0.00980 0.0137 0.0720 -0.0151 0.104 
 (0.0954) (0.0370) (0.0960) (0.0992) (0.0782) 
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Small city (capital, large city 0.0493 -0.00829 0.0326 0.0156 -0.0249 
 (0.0542) (0.0222) (0.0673) (0.0577) (0.0465) 
Town (capital, large city 0.0336 0.000442 0.0564 0.0793 -0.0471 
 (0.0581) (0.0250) (0.0616) (0.0600) (0.0599) 
Constant -0.115 0.198 -0.352 0.131 -0.112 
 (0.299) (0.147) (0.405) (0.303) (0.239) 
      
Observations 1,631 1,631 1,631 1,631 1,631 
R-squared -0.171 -0.909 -0.316 -0.044 -0.090 
Reference group in parentheses for categorical variables    
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      













Variables Not Statistically 
Different after Matching 
 <0.1 <0.2 <0.3 
Nearest Neighbor     
5.0% bandwidth 7 2 3 4 
2.5% bandwidth 7 2 3 4 
1.0% bandwidth 11 2 2 5 
     
Nearest 3 Neighbors     
5.0% bandwidth 7 1 2 4 
2.5% bandwidth 7 1 2 6 
1.0% bandwidth 11 1 2 4 
     
Kernel-Epanechnikov     
5.0% bandwidth 7 0 0 0 
2.5% bandwidth 7 0 1 1 
1.0% bandwidth 11 1 2 2 
     
Kernel Quartic     
5.0% bandwidth 7 0 0 0 
2.5% bandwidth 7 0 1 1 
1.0% bandwidth 11 1 2 2 
Note: Robust standard errors estimated clustered at sampling site level. 










NN NN NN NN NN NN 
 1 1 1 3 3 3 
Caliper/Bandwidth 5.0% 2.5% 1.0% 5.0% 2.5% 1.0% 
                
Base specification 0.021 -0.024 -0.024 -3.2E-6 0.089 0.073 0.046 
 (0.093) (0.141) (0.141) (0.150) (0.125) (0.126) (0.148) 
Observations 523 263 263 258 371 370 362 
        
+ Age interaction 0.034 0.0028 0.0028 0.023 0.122 0.108 0.078 
 (0.074) (0.118) (0.118) (0.126) (0.106) (0.107) (0.124) 
Observations 523 263 263 258 371 370 362 
Matching method No 
PSM 
Kernel Kernel Kernel Kernel Kernel Kernel 
 Epa Epa Epa Quartic Quartic Quartic 
Caliper/Bandwidth  5.0% 2.5% 1.0% 5.0% 2.5% 1.0% 
                
Base specification 0.021 0.027 0.001 0.020 0.029 -0.002 0.028 
 (0.093) (0.109) (0.118) (0.145) (0.109) (0.122) (0.146) 
Observations 523 514 512 490 514 512 490 
        
+ Age interaction 0.0341 0.072 0.044 0.046 0.071 0.039 0.054 
 (0.074) (0.094) (0.100) (0.122) (0.094) (0.103) (0.122) 
Observations 523 514 512 490 514 512 490 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at sampling site level) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Table C.7: SIS’ Estimated Effect on Stunting (height-for-age z-score < -2),  
2002-2006 
Matching method No 
PSM 
NN NN NN NN NN NN 
 1 1 1 3 3 3 
Caliper/Bandwidth  5.0% 2.5% 1.0% 5.0% 2.5% 1.0% 
                
Base specification 0.014 0.044 0.044 0.039 -0.001 0.005 0.034 
 (0.049) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.057) (0.058) (0.062) 
Observations 523 265 265 258 378 382 375 
        
+ Age interaction 0.013 0.040 0.040 0.035 -0.006 0.000 0.028 
 (0.049) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.058) (0.059) (0.061) 
Observations 523 263 263 258 371 370 362 
Matching method No 
PSM 
Kernel Kernel Kernel Kernel Kernel Kernel 
 Epa Epa Epa Quartic Quartic Quartic 
Caliper/Bandwidth  5.0% 2.5% 1.0% 5.0% 2.5% 1.0% 
                
Base specification 0.015 0.014 0.036 0.049 0.016 0.041 0.045 
 (0.049) (0.059) (0.059) (0.064) (0.059) (0.059) (0.063) 
Observations 523 514 512 490 514 512 490 
        
+ Age interaction 0.013 0.009 0.030 0.045 0.010 0.034 0.041 
(0.049) (0.059) (0.059) (0.063) (0.059) (0.059) (0.062) 
Observations 523 514 512 490 514 512 490 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at sampling site level) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






Table C.8: SIS’ Estimated Effect on Body Mass Index-for-age Z-score,  
2002-2006 
Matching method No 
PSM 
NN NN NN NN NN NN 
 1 1 1 3 3 3 
Caliper/Bandwidth  5.0% 2.5% 1.0% 5.0% 2.5% 1.0% 
                
Base specification 0.021 -0.009 -0.009 0.019 -0.088 -0.082 0.017 
 (0.122) (0.149) (0.149) (0.146) (0.116) (0.115) (0.127) 
Observations 523 263 263 258 371 370 362 
        
+ Age interaction 0.022 -0.011 -0.011 0.017 -0.091 -0.086 0.010 
 (0.123) (0.151) (0.151) (0.15) (0.116) (0.115) (0.123) 
Observations 523 263 263 258 371 370 362 
Matching method No 
PSM 
Kernel Kernel Kernel Kernel Kernel Kernel 
 Epa Epa Epa Quartic Quartic Quartic 
Caliper/Bandwidth  5.0% 2.5% 1.0% 5.0% 2.5% 1.0% 
                
Base specification 0.021 -0.087 -0.063 0.017 -0.087 -0.057 0.025 
 (0.122) (0.121) (0.124) (0.135) (0.120) (0.128) (0.133) 
Observations 523 514 512 490 514 512 490 
        
+ Age interaction 0.022 -0.087 -0.065 0.014 -0.087 -0.060 0.022 
(0.123) (0.123) (0.125) (0.133) (0.121) (0.128) (0.131) 
Observations 523 514 512 490 514 512 490 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at sampling site level) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






Table C.9: SIS’ Estimated Effect on Wasting (BMI-for-age Z-score < -2),  
2002-2006 
Matching method No 
PSM 
NN NN NN NN NN NN 
 1 1 1 3 3 3 
Caliper/Bandwidth  5.0% 2.5% 1.0% 5.0% 2.5% 1.0% 
                
Base specification -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) 
Observations 523 263 263 258 371 370 362 
        
+ Age interaction -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) 
Observations 523 263 263 258 371 370 362 
Matching method No 
PSM 
Kernel Kernel Kernel Kernel Kernel Kernel 
 Epa Epa Epa Quartic Quartic Quartic 
Caliper/Bandwidth  5.0% 2.5% 1.0% 5.0% 2.5% 1.0% 
                
Base specification -0.012 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Observations 523 514 512 490 514 512 490 
        
+ Age interaction -0.011 -0.008 -0.008 -0.0083 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) 
Observations 523 514 512 490 514 512 490 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at sampling site level) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






Table C.10: SIS’ Estimated Effect on Obesity (weight-for-age Z-score > 2),  
2002-2006 
Matching method No 
PSM 
NN NN NN NN NN NN 
 1 1 1 3 3 3 
Caliper/Bandwidth  5.0% 2.5% 1.0% 5.0% 2.5% 1.0% 
                
Base specification -0.027 -0.082 -0.082 -0.072 -0.051 -0.051 -0.016 
 (0.040) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.043) (0.042) (0.049) 
Observations 523 263 263 258 371 370 362 
        
+ Age interaction -0.026 -0.082 -0.082 -0.071 -0.050 -0.050 -0.016 
 (0.041) (0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.044) (0.043) (0.048) 
Observations 523 263 263 258 371 370 362 
Matching method No 
PSM 
Kernel Kernel Kernel Kernel Kernel Kernel 
 Epa Epa Epa Quartic Quartic Quartic 
Caliper/Bandwidth  5.0% 2.5% 1.0% 5.0% 2.5% 1.0% 
                
Base specification -0.027 -0.050 -0.038 -0.004 -0.049 -0.034 -0.004 
 (0.040) (0.045) (0.046) (0.047) (0.045) (0.047) (0.046) 
Observations 523 514 512 490 514 512 490 
        
+ Age interaction -0.026 -0.046 -0.036 -0.003 -0.046 -0.032 -0.003 
(0.041) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.048) (0.046) 
Observations 523 514 512 490 514 512 490 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at sampling site level) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






Table C.11. SIS’ Estimated Effect on weight-for-age Z-score, 2002-2006 
Matching method No 
PSM 
NN NN NN NN NN NN 
 1 1 1 3 3 3 
Caliper/Bandwidth  5.0% 2.5% 1.0% 5.0% 2.5% 1.0% 
                
Base specification 0.036 -0.056 -0.056 -0.056 0.027 0.027 0.028 
 (0.085) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.091) (0.091) (0.092) 
Observations 524 274 274 274 386 386 382 
        
+ Age interaction 0.044 -0.039 -0.039 -0.039 0.045 0.044 0.050 
 (0.080) (0.122) (0.122) (0.12) (0.085) (0.085) (0.087) 
Observations 524 274 274 274 386 386 382 
Matching method No 
PSM 
Kernel Kernel Kernel Kernel Kernel Kernel 
 Epa Epa Epa Quartic Quartic Quartic 
Caliper/Bandwidth  5.0% 2.5% 1.0% 5.0% 2.5% 1.0% 
                
Base specification 0.036 -0.021 -0.013 -0.018 -0.021 -0.015 -0.027 
 (0.085) (0.092) (0.084) (0.090) (0.090) (0.083) (0.091) 
Observations 524 515 514 502 515 514 502 
        
+ Age interaction 0.044 0.008 0.010 0.005 0.006 0.008 -0.004 
 (0.080) (0.090) (0.081) (0.086) (0.087) (0.080) (0.090) 
Observations 524 515 514 502 515 514 502 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at sampling site level) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






Table C.12: SIS’ Estimated Effect on Underweight (weight-for-age Z-score < -2),  
2002-2006 
Matching method No 
PSM 
NN NN NN NN NN NN 
 1 1 1 3 3 3 
Caliper/Bandwidth  5.0% 2.5% 1.0% 5.0% 2.5% 1.0% 
                
Base specification -0.05** -0.08** -0.08** -0.08** -0.06* -0.06* -0.05* 
 (0.024) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Observations 524 274 274 274 386 386 382 
        
+ Age interaction -0.05** -0.08** -0.08** -0.08** -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* 
 (0.024) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Observations 524 274 274 274 386 386 382 
Matching method No 
PSM 
Kernel Kernel Kernel Kernel Kernel Kernel 
 Epa Epa Epa Quartic Quartic Quartic 
Caliper/Bandwidth  5.0% 2.5% 1.0% 5.0% 2.5% 1.0% 
                
Base specification -0.05** -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** 
 (0.024) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) 
Observations 524 515 514 502 515 514 502 
        
+ Age interaction -0.05** -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** 
(0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) 
Observations 524 515 514 502 515 514 502 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at sampling site level) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Author’s analysis of the 2002-2006 Young Lives Study, Peru 
 
 
 
 
 
 
